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Abstract 
This dissertation analyses whether permanent caregivers should be given sole guardianship 
responsibilities. It shows that the current legal regulations are not sufficient to secure the 
placement of a child with foster parents on a permanent basis. Therefore, it examines not 
only the Care of Children Act 2004 and the Children, Young Persons, and Their Children Act 
1989, but also the Green Paper for Vulnerable Children as well as the White Paper for 
Vulnerable Children, launched in October 2012 by the Ministry of Social Development. The 
White Paper contains a suggestion to limit parental rights in order to secure the “Home for 
Life” policy, but fails to discuss the proposed amendments in depth and does not set out 
detailed provisions. In order to fill the gap in the present debate, this dissertation contains 
recommendations to amend the current legal provisions. 
 
Word length 
The text of this dissertation (excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes, bibliography and 
appendix) comprises approximately 35,823 words. 
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I Introduction 
This dissertation focuses on vulnerable children who are in need of care and protection. 
Children are full members of the human family with special rights and needs. They desire to 
grow up in a family environment that will enable them to develop individual personalities for 
life in society.
1
 Children are “considered as people to be nurtured, not objects to have their 
ownership negotiated”,2 but also:3 
 
The very fact of their physical weakness, immaturity, lack of knowledge and experience 
renders children dependent on the adults around them. For very young children their 
survival depends on the quality of care and commitment provided for them by the adults 
who have responsibility for them. They need shelter, food, education, health care, 
affection and protection and their survival is dependent on the willingness and capacity 
of adults to meet these needs. 
 
Where parents do not fulfil their duties, a third person has to step in. In such a case, 
children‟s rights have to be taken into account and every decision made must be for the 
benefit of the child. In most cases foster parents are this “third person”. Where children are 
permanently placed with them the law should secure this placement and the chance for the 
child to grow up in a family-like setting. Foster parents can obtain parenting and guardianship 
orders to secure the placement and receive legal responsibility. Unfortunately, this does not 
protect the placement from disruption by the birth parents. 
 
The Ministry of Social Development launched the White Paper for Vulnerable Children in 
October 2012, after the public had the chance to submit proposal in regard to the Green Paper 
for Vulnerable Children.
4
 This included plans to stabilise and secure permanent placements. 
The Minister of Justice, on the other hand, proposed regulations to reform the Family Court.
5
 
One suggestion is to limit access to the Family Court in cases of vexatious applications. 
Unfortunately, the White Paper fails to discuss the issue of permanent placement and 
necessary court orders in depth nor does it set out any detailed provisions. This dissertation 
seeks to fill the gap in the present debate. 
 
In having a closer look on the White Paper, I suggest to grant permanent foster carers sole 
guardianship, thus excluding birth parents. This involves a balance between security and 
                                               
1  United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child GA Res 44/25 (1989), preamble. 
2
  Susan Smith “Protection and identity: Finding the right balance to belong” (2012) 7 NZFLJ 124 at 125. 
3  Gerison Lansdown “Children‟s rights” in Berry Mayall (ed) Children’s childhood: Observed and 
Experienced (The Falmer Press, London, 1994) 33 at 34. 
4  Paula Bennett, Ministry of Social Development “The White Paper for Vulnerable Children” 
(Wellington, 2012); “Green Paper for Vulnerable Children – Complete Summary of Submissions” 
(Ministry of Social Development, Wellington, August 2012); see also below chapter III at 6. 
5  Minister of Justice “Family Court Review: Proposals to Reform” (2012); see also Family Court 
Proceedings Reform Bill 2012. 
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identity of the child. If carers get more responsibilities and rights, the birth parents will lose 
influence. The connection between the child and the birth parents can be altered in a way that 
renders the return of the child to the birth family impossible. However, granting caregivers 
more rights also means more protection for the child, with the possibility of living with and 
experiencing the foster family as a “normal” family and as a full member. 
 
After examining the recent political developments in chapter III, key principles which should 
guide a decisions-making process are set out in chapter IV. Chapter V is about the two 
important New Zealand statutes which relate to care and placement of a child. This chapter 
also takes a look at the role of foster parents and birth parents as well as it deals with 
questions relating to a Māori perspective. Furthermore, the practice of Child, Youth and 
Family is examined. In chapter VI the question is answered and justified whether or not foster 
parents should be given sole guardianship responsibilities. Finally, chapter VII contains 
recommendations to amend the current legislation. However, starting point of the dissertation 
are the children in foster care. 
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II Children in Foster Care 
Before even considering changing laws it is important to be aware of the real life situation of 
those concerned. The question of whether permanent caregivers should be given sole 
guardianship responsibility concerns the birth parents and caregivers. However, more 
important are the children who are permanently placed. The caregivers should be entitled to 
sole guardianship responsibility only for the benefit of the child. 
 
A permanent placement will occur only as the last resort.
6
 In June 2012, 3.884 children were 
in out of home placements in New Zealand.
7
 Before a child is removed:
8
 
 
The necessary assistance and support should be provided to enable the child or young 
person to be cared for and protected within his or her own family, whānau, hapū, iwi, and 
family group. 
 
On the other hand, this also means that children entering foster care have a complicated 
legacy. Children who are permanently placed have previously “often” undergone different 
placements. They concerned carry emotional burdens:
9
 
 
It is clear that children enter foster care with significantly higher rates of psychiatric 
disorder, development delay, behavioural problems, academic and learning difficulties 
and health issues than the norm and even more than similarly economically 
disadvantaged children. In addition, the separation from family and multiple placements 
disruptions typically experienced by children in foster care often compound their 
problems. 
 
Furthermore, “the vast majority of children placed in foster care have been placed due to 
abuse or neglect.”10 Bernard and Dozier distinguish physical neglect as “abandonment and 
failure to provide healthcare” and emotional neglect as “inattention to the needs for affection, 
failure to provide psychological care, and domestic violence.”11 Neglect can be caused by 
several factors such as parental substance abuse, poverty and homelessness.
12
 Besides neglect 
and abuse, parental illness, parental imprisonment or death can be reasons for children 
                                               
6  See the home for life policy in chapter V D at 76. 
7  Child, Youth and Family “Children in care and foster carers“ (30 June 2012) <www.cyf.govt.nz>. 
8  Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989, s 13(d). 
9
  Robert W Plant and Lesley Siegel “Children in Foster Care: Prevention and Treatment of Mental 
Health Problems” in Thomas P Gullotta and Gary M Blau (eds) Family influences in childhood 
behavior and development (Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, New York, 2008) 209 at 211. 
10  At 211. 
11  Kirstin Bernard and Mary Dozier “Adoption and Foster Placement” in Marshall M Haith and Janette B 
Benson (eds) Encyclopaedia of Infant and Early Childhood Development (Academic Press, San Diego, 
2008) 25 at 27. 
12
  At 27. 
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entering foster care.
13
 These facts should be borne in mind when thinking about a way to 
create living conditions for those affected children that allow them to experience a “normal” 
upbringing. This dissertation focuses especially on children of abusive and neglectful parents. 
 
Another point which has to be mentioned is the question of adoption.
14
 Children who are not 
able to return to their birth families may be adopted, so the new caregivers have all the 
responsibilities and rights. However, even taking into consideration the advantages adoption 
might bring, this is not an option for all children: children who do not want to be adopted; 
children who are close to their new caregivers who do not want an adoption and moving the 
child to other caregivers would not be in their interests; in situations in which the relationship 
between the new caregivers and the child is not yet established and they still wish to get to 
know each other before making such a great step; and of course, children who still have a 
strong attachment to their birth family, for example, in cases where the parents cannot 
provide a home for the child, but still have an emotional bond. Adoption may also not be 
appropriate in cases of kinship placements due to incoherent results: the aunt becomes the 
mother and the mother becomes the aunt or the grandfather becomes the father and the father 
becomes the brother. Finally, Māori culture does not approve the severance of the legal 
relationship between child and birth parents or whānau that adoption involves.15 
 
As mentioned, adoption might have some advantages compared with permanent placements. 
Research shows that children in foster care think that an adoption provides more security. 
Triseliotis compared long-term foster care and adoption and stated:
16
 
 
Because of the lack of legal security, which meant that the placement could be 
terminated at any time, many children and foster carers were left in a continual state of 
anxiety of what might happen next. 
 
Furthermore, he discovered that children in long-term foster care are in an ambiguous 
position and they do not have the feeling of “belonging”:17 
 
They do not live with their biological parents, and often are not in touch with them, yet 
their carers are not their „parents‟, and neither can they call them „mum‟ or „dad‟ by right. 
This ambiguity appears to lead to a sense of unusualness and difference, experienced 
especially in school and at play. 
                                               
13  At 27. 
14
  This dissertation focuses on permanent placements. Adoption will only be mentioned at some points, 
but not examined in detail. 
15  Joan Metge and Jacinta Ruru “Kua Tutū Te Puehu, Kia Mau: Māori Aspirations and Family Law 
Policy” in Mark Henaghan and Bill Atkin (eds) Family Law Policy in New Zealand (3rd ed, 
LexisNexis, Wellington, 2007) 47 at 61. 
16  John Triseliotis “Long-term foster care or adoption? The evidence examined” (2002) 7 Child and 
Family Social Work 23 at 28. 
17
  At 28. 
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Even in long-term foster care children feel less secure and their sense of belonging is weaker. 
Especially in cases in which adoption is not an option the law should provide regulations 
which might help to counteract the disadvantages identified above. Due to the fact that 
adoption is rare in New Zealand this dissertation focuses on another permanent solution for 
children in foster care.  
 
6 Recent Developments 
 
 
III Recent Developments 
The Ministry of Social Development launched on the 27 July 2011 the Green Paper “Every 
child thrives, belongs, achieves – Ka whai orange, ka whai wāhi, ka whai traumata ia 
tamaiti”.18 This Green Paper for Vulnerable Children sketched ideas to improve the life of 
vulnerable children and wanted to discuss them with the public.
19
 Inter alia the paper 
examined that in 2009/2010 21,000 cases of child abuse and neglect were confirmed by 
Child, Youth and Family.
20
 Furthermore, 1,286 hospital admissions of children in 2008/2009 
were the result of assault, neglect or maltreatment.
21
 The vision of the government is that 
every child should thrive, belong and achieve. Thrive is seen as being healthy, protected from 
harm and having basic needs met; belong means be loved and supported, confident with own 
identity and have good relationships with family and friends; children should achieve strong 
foundations for lifelong learning, achieve in their own culture and have the support needed to 
contribute positively to their future.
22
 
 
The paper asked several questions like: “When should government agencies step in and 
intervene with families and whānau?”23 or “What … actions or principles would you like to 
see included in the legislation?”24 The public was asked to comment by 28 February 2012.25 
Almost 10,000 submissions were received from children, the general public, organisations 
and frontline workers.
26
 Regarding responsibility for children, for example, “submissions 
drew attention to the needs of particular groups of carers; for example grandparents, foster 
parents, teen parents and carers of children with disabilities.”27 Furthermore, it was said that 
the balance between support and protection is not right: “the needs of children should come 
before the needs of parents and caregivers, particularly when children were at risk.” 28 
Moreover, it was “argued that government should step in „as early as possible‟, particularly 
                                               
18  Paula Bennett, Ministry of Social Development “Every child thrives, belongs, achieves – Ka whai 
orange, ka whai wāhi, ka whai traumata ia tamaiti” (Wellington, 27 July 2011). 
19  At iv. 
20  At 2. 
21  At 2. 
22  At 2. 
23  At 10. 
24  At 16. 
25  At 32. 
26  They are summarised in the one-page “Summary of Submissions on the Green Paper for Vulnerable 
Children”, in the “Executive Summary of Submission on the Green Paper for Vulnerable Children” 
(Ministry of Social Development, Wellington, August 2012) and in the “Green Paper for Vulnerable 
Children – Complete Summary of Submissions” (Ministry of Social Development, Wellington, August 
2012). 
27  “Executive Summary of Submission on the Green Paper for Vulnerable Children” (Ministry of Social 
Development, Wellington, August 2012) at 8; “Green Paper for Vulnerable Children – Complete 
Summary of Submissions” (Ministry of Social Development, Wellington, August 2012) at 10. 
28  “Executive Summary of Submission on the Green Paper for Vulnerable Children” (Ministry of Social 
Development, Wellington, August 2012) at 9; “Green Paper for Vulnerable Children – Complete 
Summary of Submissions” (Ministry of Social Development, Wellington, August 2012) at 11. 
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where risk was identified.”29 Besides, submissions postulate “greater consequences for those 
who neglect and/or abuse children” 30  and “harsher consequences for maltreatment.”31  In 
addition, non-parental carers of vulnerable children should get more support, for example, 
grandparents and foster parents.
32
  
 
In October 2012 the White Paper for Vulnerable Children was published by the Ministry of 
Social Development as the government response to the submissions made on the Green 
Paper.
33
 It contains the actions to be taken to protect vulnerable children. One of these steps is 
the introduction of new guardianship orders. The guardianship rights of parents should be 
curtailed or limited by the Family Court, where they are a serious risk to their child.
34
 
Children should get a “safe and secure fresh” start in a “permanent, secure and loving home” 
where they have been seriously abused.
35
 These new guardianship orders shall give security 
to caregivers and address their and the child‟s specific needs.36 Furthermore, they should 
finalise the Home for Life
37
 care arrangement.
38
 More precisely, the new guardianship order 
shall increase security and stability by:
39
 
 
… reducing or limiting the guardianship rights of parents by enabling the Family Court 
to direct which guardianship powers reside exclusively with the caregivers and which are 
shared with the child‟s natural parents or other guardians; 
 
requiring a significant change in circumstances before a care order could be challenged 
… 
                                               
29  “Executive Summary of Submission on the Green Paper for Vulnerable Children” (Ministry of Social 
Development, Wellington, August 2012) at 9; “Green Paper for Vulnerable Children – Complete 
Summary of Submissions” (Ministry of Social Development, Wellington, August 2012) at 11. 
30
  “Executive Summary of Submission on the Green Paper for Vulnerable Children” (Ministry of Social 
Development, Wellington, August 2012) at 10; “Green Paper for Vulnerable Children – Complete 
Summary of Submissions” (Ministry of Social Development, Wellington, August 2012) at 12. 
31  “Executive Summary of Submission on the Green Paper for Vulnerable Children” (Ministry of Social 
Development, Wellington, August 2012) at 11; “Green Paper for Vulnerable Children – Complete 
Summary of Submissions” (Ministry of Social Development, Wellington, August 2012) at 13. 
32  “Executive Summary of Submission on the Green Paper for Vulnerable Children” (Ministry of Social 
Development, Wellington, August 2012) at 13; “Green Paper for Vulnerable Children – Complete 
Summary of Submissions” (Ministry of Social Development, Wellington, August 2012) at 16. 
33  Paula Bennett, Ministry of Social Development “The White Paper for Vulnerable Children” 
(Wellington, 2012). 
34  Paula Bennett, Ministry of Social Development “The White Paper for Vulnerable Children” 
(Wellington, 2012) volume I at 20. 
35  At 20. 
36
  Paula Bennett, Ministry of Social Development “The White Paper for Vulnerable Children” 
(Wellington, 2012) volume II at 124. 
37  The Home for Life policy is the permanency policy of Child, Youth and Family. Its goal is to give 
every child a permanent home. See also below chapter V D at 75. 
38  Paula Bennett, Ministry of Social Development “The White Paper for Vulnerable Children” 
(Wellington, 2012) volume II at 124; regarding the Home for Life policy see also below chapter V D 
at 75. 
39
  At 124–125. 
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assuring Home for Life parents that they will be supported should the child‟s parents 
attempt to disrupt the placement. 
 
The remaining questions are: What is meant by limiting or reducing guardianship rights? 
What is the difference between limiting and reducing? For how long? Can parents recover 
them? Who should get these if parents do not have them? At which point in the process? 
What kind of rights?  
 
The suggestion is a positive and good step towards a securer placement and better upbringing 
of the child. Nevertheless, the questions listed above have to be answered. Unfortunately, the 
White Paper does not contain as much detail as it does in comparison to the new Child Abuse 
Prevention Order. Furthermore, the only support mentioned relates to preventing possible 
disruption caused by parents without examining in detail what kind of support they will 
receive. Beyond this, the child and the permanent caregivers may need more support, for 
example, psychological and financial support.
40
  
 
In the following sections this dissertation seeks to show that the suggestions made in the 
White Paper are not sufficient to improve the situation for children permanently placed and 
their new caregivers. To fill the gap, the recommendations provide more details to amend the 
current legislation. 
                                               
40
  See also below chapter IV D at 19. 
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IV Key Principles 
Every decision made in this realm of law has a deep personal impact on the person concerned. 
The development of the child is influenced by many different adults. The law should provide 
them with several rules to guide and to prevent disputes. All this should be done for the 
benefit of the child. In most of the cases the child is the most vulnerable person, the person 
who is most affected and the person who contributes the least to the situation. 
 
An examination of the existing rules as well as a suggestion of alterations to the provisions in 
favour of the benefit of the child cannot be done without setting a framework of key guiding 
principles. To my mind, there are five key principles in favour of the child which should be 
considered and which the following sections examine. Some of these can be found in the 
different statutes relevant to the relationship between parents and child or the placement of 
and care for a child.
41
 
A The Welfare and Best Interests of the Child 
The welfare principle is a common axiom that can be found in various jurisdictions. The New 
Zealand law relating to children declares it to be “the first and paramount consideration”.42 
 
Welfare is a difficult concept to define. Rather, a description is used to clarify the principle:
43
 
 
Once basic needs have been met, the ways in which individuals define, determine and 
construct their own welfare and well-being are likely to vary considerably, depending 
upon a wide range of personal and cultural factors, and the social, economic and political 
context in which they live. Thus welfare … is not an absolute but a relative concept. 
 
The distinction contained in the New Zealand legislation between welfare and (best) interests 
complicates the definition. The Oxford English Dictionary defines welfare as “state or 
condition of doing or being well; good fortune, happiness, or well-being (of a person …); 
thriving or successful progress in life, property”.44 In contrast, “interest” is defined as “good, 
benefit, profit, advantage”.45 Both terms do not mean the same. Judge O‟Dwyer distinguished 
them in a case decided under the Care of Children Act 2004 (COCA) as follows:
46
 
 
                                               
41  This section gives an overview over important principles. Below, a discussion of them in relation to the 
Care of Children Act 2004 and the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989 can be 
found as well as recommendations. 
42  See Care of Children Act, s 4; Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act, s 6. 
43  Allison James and Adrian James Key Concepts in Childhood Studies (Sage Publications Ltd, London, 
2008) at 143. 
44  Oxford English Dictionary (2nd ed, 1989, online ed) Welfare at [1a]. 
45  Oxford English Dictionary (2nd ed, 1989, online ed) Interest at [2b]. 
46
  C v W [Custody] [2005] NZFLR 953 at [24]. 
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The addition of the term “best interests” in s 4 of COCA underlines that a decision must 
focus not only on the immediate day-to-day welfare of a child such as care and nurture, 
but also the long-term interests of ideally maintaining relationships with both parents. It 
had become common under the Guardianship Act for “best interests” to be considered 
alongside “welfare”, although that Act only used the term “welfare”. The inclusion of 
“best interests” in the new legislation highlights the importance of the Court looking at 
the longer term developmental, educational, cultural, and familial needs of a child. 
 
The same point is made by Bisson J in Director-General of Social Welfare v L.
47
 Judge 
McAloon interpreted:
48
 
 
… welfare as meaning matters relating to day to day care, such as the provision of a 
suitable environment, adequate food, clothing, shelter, hygiene, schooling, stability, and 
general daily oversight and management. Best interests relates to matters which are more 
long term such as preparation for the future, teaching life skills, role modelling and 
kindred aspects of parenting. 
 
Nevertheless, welfare and best interests cannot be defined in a general sense. Of course, 
general goals can and should be set. However, every child is different and the welfare and 
best interests of the particular child have to be considered in light of his or her particular 
circumstances.
49
 
 
On the other hand, there are a few general statements that can be made. Children need a 
secure base in which they grow up and develop their individual personality – in favour of 
their welfare and best interests. Schofield and Beek
50
 identified different issues which are 
important in establishing this sense of security. They name five dimensions, each associated 
with a developmental benefit.
51
 First, the caregiver should be physically and emotionally 
available, so the child can learn to trust.
52
 Furthermore, their studies showed that even at a 
later stage in their lives young people needed their former foster parents and the feeling that 
they are available was essential to them.
53
  
 
For the welfare and best interests of a child mental health is important and part of this is the 
competence to manage feelings and behaviour. One of the dimensions for a secure base 
identified by Schofield and Beek is sensitivity, so the foster child can learn to name emerging 
                                               
47
  Director-General of Social Welfare v L [1989] 2 NZLR 314 at 325. 
48  M v O FC Te Awamutu FAM-2005-072-185, 26 June 2007, at [57]. 
49  See Care of Children Act 2004, s 4(2). 
50  Gillian Schofield and Mary Beek “Growing up in foster care: providing a secure base through 
adolescence” (2009) 14 Child and Family Social Work 255. 
51  At 259. 
52  At 260. 
53
  At 261. 
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feelings and manage them and can also comprehend the behaviour, feelings or thoughts of the 
caregiver, which means the child can develop emotional intelligence.
54
 
 
The third issue caregivers should attempt to fulfil is acceptance:
55
 
 
Accepting the young people for who they were and building their self esteem and 
acceptance of themselves were often mentioned by foster carers in this study as central to 
their parenting. 
 
Fourthly, caregivers should form an alliance and work together with the child to solve 
problems.
56
 Children in foster care often experience powerlessness or an excess of dominance, 
becoming aggressive for example, depending on the lives they had in their birth families and 
these experiences continue while in care, because often decisions are made out of their sight 
or because of their destructive behaviour children initiate further movements.
57
 “Foster-
family life needs to modify such experiences by teaching children and young people the 
benefits of the appropriate exercise of choice, power and co-operation.”58  
 
Fifthly, ensuring the child feels part of the family mean not only that foster parents offer 
continuing involvement and support, but that the child can also experience the feeling of 
belonging.
59
 
 
These different issues can not only secure the successful placement of a child, but 
furthermore contribute to making the placement harmonious and family-like. This supports 
the welfare and best interests of the child. 
 
Due to the difficulty in defining welfare it is important to look at other aspects in order to 
clarify the meaning of this undefined legal term. Several of these will be examined as key 
principles in the following sections. However, at this point it should be kept in mind that 
welfare and best interests can be “a powerful tool in the hands of adults”.60 The term is so 
vague that it can be used to justify different decisions and even overrule the views and wishes 
of the child. Lansdown said: “The welfare principle serves to perpetuate the structural 
vulnerability of childhood rather than seek to provide children with greater opportunities for 
                                               
54  Gillian Schofield and Mary Beek “Growing up in foster care: providing a secure base through 
adolescence” (2009) 14 Child and Family Social Work 255 at 261. 
55  At 262. 
56  At 263. 
57  At 263. 
58  At 263. 
59  At 264. 
60  Gerison Lansdown “Children‟s rights” in Berry Mayall (ed) Children’s childhood: Observed and 
Experienced (The Falmer Press, London, 1994) 33 at 41. 
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taking control of their own lives.”61 The weakness of welfare and best interests as a principle 
is that adults determine what is best for children. The principle is interpreted from the 
perspective of an adult. This confirms the supposition that “children are not respected as 
human beings who have an important contribution to make to society, and that their voices 
are rarely listened to.” 62  The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
proclaimed another image of the child: the child as a full member of the human family with 
rights, and not the immature property of their parents. The previously mentioned assumption 
is in contrast to that image of the child. Therefore, it is important to define welfare and best 
interests from a child‟s point of view and to support this determination by a consideration of 
other essential rights and needs. 
 
However, even though the welfare has to be considered differently for every specific child, 
basic needs have to be met, starting with food, clothing and shelter as well as education and 
ending with a secure and harmonious family-like setting. Every child has a right to 
experience this and to have these basic needs met. 
B Permanency 
The second key principle to be examined and simultaneously supports the child‟s welfare is 
permanency. This could be understood as creating:
63
 
 
… a permanent living arrangement that provides continuity of relationships with 
nurturing caregivers where there is a sense of emotional, cultural and personal belonging, 
and the opportunity for life long attachments … Permanency is a way of thinking, 
planning and acting in statutory social work practice that promotes belonging, attachment, 
continuity and stability in a child or young person‟s life. 
 
Permanency in the living situation is a relevant factor to the child‟s welfare. As mentioned 
above, the development of a sense of belonging secures the placement of a child and is, at 
least, one of the most basic means of promoting the child‟s welfare. A sense of belonging can 
only be cultivated if the placement is a permanent one. The arrangements made for the child‟s 
care, development and upbringing should be long-term. Keeping in mind the difficult living 
                                               
61
  Gerison Lansdown “Children‟s rights” in Berry Mayall (ed) Children’s childhood: Observed and 
Experienced (The Falmer Press, London, 1994) 33 at 42. 
62  Anne B Smith ”Children‟s rights: An overview” in Anne B Smith and others (eds) Advocating for 
children: International Perspectives on Children’s Rights (University of Otago Press, Dunedin, 2000) 
13 at 16. 
63  Department of Child, Youth and Family Services Children in care: Permanency policy (unpublished, 
Wellington, 2006) as cited in Allan Cooke “Permanency for children: why permanently placed children 
need ongoing support, and how to deliver that support” (2008) 6 NZFLJ 37 at 38. 
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situations the children come from, it is important for them to experience a real family life. 
Thus, the existing disadvantages can be compensated for:
64
  
 
The encouraging news is that the removal from a neglectful environment and the 
provision of appropriate human contact and stimulation through placement in foster care 
can reverse these delays [mentioned above
65]. … [In] many cases, the impact of abuse 
and neglect can be reduced with proper care. 
 
Due to the therapeutic nature of the care that is given, children can be prompted to overcome 
their difficult early childhood years. However, this requires an ongoing relationship with the 
responsible adult, because a bond of trust can only be created in this way. Continuous 
changes in the living arrangements of the child cause recurrent disruptions of existing 
relationships so that the child cannot develop a feeling of belonging or confidence. If a child 
has been permanently removed from the birth family one guiding principle should be the 
intention that the child becomes a permanent member of the new family. 
 
Another important point in connection with permanency which might be hard to address is 
the attitude of the new caregivers. Triseliotis mentioned that the feeling of uncertainty derives, 
of course, from the possibility not only of an adoption by others, but also of challenging of 
court orders. Furthermore, the precariousness may be caused by the foster parents 
themselves:
66
 
 
Examples of such unpredictabilities include foster carers who in all honesty say they will 
look after a 2- or 3-year-old for the remainder of their childhood, only to give up after 6, 
8 or even 10 years. At such a late stage it is almost impossible to find an adoptive home 
for the child, especially for a boy. The scenario that usually follows is a succession of 
temporary fostering placements with the child eventually growing up without a family to 
call their own and no social base in life. Yet uprooting can prove very traumatic to the 
child. 
 
Furthermore, foster parents may not be able to cope with the behaviour of the child or their 
life circumstances may change and so they are no longer able to care for the child. 
 
Moreover, the reality shows that permanency is often illusory. It will be shown that the 
parental responsibility is often not solely held by the new caregivers. In fact, the chief 
executive or even the birth parents retain rights and possibilities. So, the actual regulations 
                                               
64  Robert W Plant and Lesley Siegel “Children in Foster Care: Prevention and Treatment of Mental 
Health Problems” in Thomas P Gullotta and Gary M Blau (eds) Family influences in childhood 
behavior and development (Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, New York, 2008) 209 at 212. 
65  See above chapter II at 3. 
66  John Triseliotis “Long-term foster care or adoption? The evidence examined” (2002) 7 Child and 
Family Social Work 23 at 31. 
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themselves give rise to problems which might affect the development of a sense of belonging 
and the permanency of a placement. Furthermore, guardianship orders or parenting orders 
and consequently the relationship between child and new caregivers can be challenged by 
different parties such as the birth parents.
67
 This could destabilise the placement as well. 
 
However, Judge Maude noted “that permanency is but a word.”68 Permanency does not mean 
that in the future there cannot be a change of the decision:
69
 
 
… for some, as yet unforeseen, reason. That said, once a plan of permanency is accepted, 
the Court will be [loath] to interfere with that other than for reasons of serious risk. 
 
Even if, as Judge Ryan stated, “[statistically a] permanent placement with foster parents often 
fails”,70 children should be moved as little as possible and should have the opportunity to 
experience a real family life and a sense of belonging, to establish strong and functional 
relationships with others. They should also be given the opportunity to develop a significant 
psychological attachment to the person in whose care they are placed – promoting their 
welfare and best interests as the paramount consideration.  
C Participation 
Another key principle to examine is the participation of the child in all processes or decisions. 
As mentioned above, the term welfare and best interests is vague and can justify different 
decisions at the same time and, of course, can be misused as well. Furthermore, it can be used 
to override the feelings, wishes and views of children:
 71
 
 
The application of a welfare principle which fails to address the right of children to 
participate in decisions which affect them is to undermine their capacity for self-
determination. The welfare principle serves to perpetuate the structural vulnerability of 
childhood rather than seek to provide children with greater opportunities for taking 
control of their own lives. 
 
Therefore, it is important to give children the opportunity or perhaps even the right to 
participate. 
 
                                               
67
  See below chapter V A 6 at 62. 
68  Ministry of Social Development v C-P F FC Kaikohe FAM-2008-027-000351, 26, 27 May 2011 
at [41]. 
69  At [41]. 
70  Ministry of Social Development v C FC North Shore FAM-2005-004-001166, 19 February 2010 
at [17]. 
71  Gerison Lansdown “Children‟s rights” in Berry Mayall (ed) Children’s childhood: Observed and 
Experienced (The Falmer Press, London, 1994) 33 at 42. 
 Sole Guardianship for Permanent Caregivers 15 
 
 
In the last century children were assumed to be the property of their parents and the 
recognition that children have rights was lacking. “Children are regarded as „immature, 
irrational, incompetent, asocial [and] acultural‟ with adults being „mature, rational, competent, 
social and autonomous‟”.72 The understanding of childhood has changed in recent years. 
Assuming that children are immature, irrational, incompetent, asocial and acultural 
contradicts our current understanding and deprives them of their status as a full member of 
the human family.  
 
One of the fundamental rights is participation, especially in matters that personally affect an 
individual. Often children are denied this right. It is argued that children cannot handle the 
responsibility that comes with the opportunity to participate. Children are not able to foresee 
the consequences:
73
 
 
… children are seldom in a position to determine what constitutes their own welfare. 
They are rarely consulted by adults in order to determine their views and understandings 
of what might be for their welfare or in their best interests. This is, in part, a reflection of 
the dominant view of adults that children lack the competence to understand and decide 
about such issues, that they lack the experience to know how their needs can best be met, 
and that because they are developmentally incomplete, they are therefore vulnerable. … 
Thus any rights that children have in relation to their own welfare become the 
responsibility of adults to meet. 
 
The first criticism of this position is that this cannot be said in such a generic way. The ability 
to foresee and understand possible consequences and to handle the obligations connected 
with the opportunity to decide differs from child to child and increases, of course, during the 
process of growing-up. Second, as Atwool states, “the same can be said of many adults and 
yet they are not denied access to their rights on this basis.”74 Continuing, she correctly points 
out that the denial of the right to participate, because children are not able to handle the onus, 
is a circular argument. “This argument also becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy because denial 
of rights ensures that children are never given the opportunity to take responsibility.”75 
                                               
72  Alan Prout and Allison James “A New Paradigm for the Sociology of Childhood? Provenance, Promise 
and Problems” in Allison James and Alan Prout (eds) Constructing and Reconstructing Childhood: 
Contemporary Issues in the Sociological Study of Childhood (2nd, Falmer Press, London, 1997) 7 
at 13, citing R MacKay “Conceptions of children and models of socialisation” in H P Dreitzel (ed) 
Childhood and Socialization (Collier-Macmillam, London, 1973) 27–43 at 28. 
73  Allison James and Adrian James Key Concepts in Childhood Studies (Sage Publications Ltd, London, 
2008) at 143–144. 
74  Nicola Atwool “Participation in Decision-making: The Experience of New Zealand Children in Care” 
(2006) 3 Child Care in Practice 259 at 264. 
75  At 264; see also Allison James and Adrian James Key Concepts in Childhood Studies (Sage 
Publications Ltd, London, 2008) at 35: “… the failure of adults to give children responsibility can limit 
their ability to learn how o become competent and to develop their competences …”. 
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Properly, the argument should be reversed: “Adults have a responsibility for ensuring that 
children have the opportunity to exercise their rights.”76  
 
A right to participate can be found inter alia in art 12 of the United Nations Convention on 
the Rights of the Child, ratified in New Zealand on the 6 April 1993.
77
 In scrutinising the 
rights of children Lansdown examines art 12. To his mind a “serious application of the 
principle [in art 12] would require” five points, which to my mind should be self-evident.78 
First, it has to be ensured that children get adequate information appropriate to their age 
which enables them to form opinions.
79
 The second point is to put children in a position to 
express their views and formed opinions and ascertain options with them.
80
 Thirdly, these 
opinions should be listened to and should be considered with respect and seriousness; 
furthermore, children should be told how their views will be considered.
81
 This is an 
important point because even if children are represented in a decision-making process, it does 
not necessarily mean that their views will be taken into account.
82
 Fourthly, he mentions that 
adults should let children know the outcome of any decisions, especially, if the decisions are 
contrary to the children‟s opinions and that the reasons must be wholly explained.83 This 
shows children how they are part of the decision-making process, even if the decision is not 
what they want it to be. However, participation does not mean that everything depends solely 
on the will of the child. Lastly adults should:
84
 
 
… provide children using public services with effective, accessible and genuine avenues 
of complaint, backed up by access to independent advocacy for situations where children 
[feel] they have been mistreated or ignored or abused in any way. 
 
In July 1999 a conference with the theme „Children‟s Rights: National and International‟ was 
held at the University of Otago. During this conference, a forum consisting of seven children 
convened and deliberated about arts 12 and 13. Although, this was not a representative survey, 
                                               
76  Nicola Atwool “Participation in Decision-making: The Experience of New Zealand Children in Care” 
(2006) 3 Child Care in Practice 259 at 265. 
77  United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child GA Res 44/25 (1989). The proposals of the 
White Paper of Vulnerable Children are consistent with the Convention and address some concerns 
made by the Committee for the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child. Inter alia, the 
White Paper develops a strategy to address child abuse and neglect, increases training for professionals 
and local services to assist parents to raise their child, see White Paper at 9. In developing a competent 
workforce a child-centred approach is taken, see White Paper at 147. It fails to improve participation 
rights. 
78  Gerison Lansdown “Children‟s rights” in Berry Mayall (ed) Children’s childhood: Observed and 
Experienced (The Falmer Press, London, 1994) 33 at 38–39. 
79
  At 38. 
80  At 39. 
81  At 39. 
82  See also Allison James and Adrian James Key Concepts in Childhood Studies (Sage Publications Ltd, 
London, 2008) at 29. 
83  Gerison Lansdown “Children‟s rights” in Berry Mayall (ed) Children’s childhood: Observed and 
Experienced (The Falmer Press, London, 1994) 33 at 39. 
84
  At 39. 
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especially given the small number of participants, several aspects of the report from the 
Children‟s Forum can be inferred which may be of great importance for the question of 
participation:
85
 
 
The most important information we came up with in our discussion is: we are people as 
well; we are all different, with different maturity levels; we are children, but we do have 
rights; we can make responsible decisions if we are given a chance; it is okay for us to 
make the wrong decision sometimes, even if we know all the information; please listen to 
us instead of ignoring us, and take notice of what we have to say; expect an opinion from 
us, and ask for it; … you may not want to hear what we say, but we have a right to say it; 
lastly, we need adults to guide us towards making good decisions, but we also need you 
to let us practise making wrong decisions as well. 
 
Children should get the opportunity to have a say in the matters which affect them. They 
should get or be able to enforce a right to participate. No one would deny that adults have this 
right. If a child is able to understand, why should he or she be excluded? The consideration of 
the wishes and views of the child supports their perception as a personality. The participation 
may increase the chance of forming a stable and secure attachment. At the very least the 
probability of a rebellion against the solution is less. Presenting children a fait accompli may 
increase the chances of a rejection of the placement: “Where old enough, the children must be 
consulted and listened to, and their views seriously considered and respected. This is also the 
best predictor of placement stability.”86 Children should be able to express their own views 
about who they live with and about the duration of the stay, as well as questions about the 
contact to their birth parents.
87
 
 
As mentioned above, one weakness of the idea of welfare as a key principle lies in the 
inherent vagueness of this indefinite legal term. Even participation rights like the one 
provided in art 12 could be pruned for the benefit of the protection of the child determining 
welfare and best interests of a child in this context:
88
 
 
It allows children‟s best interests to be determined in terms of their welfare and … 
enables adults to override any wishes and feelings children themselves may have 
expressed about wanting to participate in decision-making processes. 
 
                                               
85
  Report from the Children‟s Forum published in Anne B Smith “Children‟s rights: An overview” in 
Anne B Smith and others (eds) Advocating for children: International Perspectives on Children’s 
Rights (University of Otago Press, Dunedin, 2000) 13 at 17. 
86  John Triseliotis “Long-term foster care or adoption? The evidence examined” (2002) 7 Child and 
Family Social Work 22 at 30. 
87  Stephen Coyle “Permanency policy: children in care” (2008) 6 NZFLJ 45 at 48. 
88  Allison James and Adrian James Key Concepts in Childhood Studies (Sage Publications Ltd, London, 
2008) at 13. 
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Furthermore, James and James state that “the trust of the Convention is that defining and 
providing for the welfare of children are the responsibilities of adults.“ 89 This could lead to a 
vicious circle, to the detriment of the child and his or her rights. Therefore, it is important to 
respect children‟s views, to interpret them from a child‟s point of view and to take them into 
account seriously. Denying or pretending a child‟s right to participate does not exist cannot 
be justified because of their alleged lack of competence:
90
 
 
Conversely, if children are given responsibility and, if necessary, guidance, they 
frequently demonstrate levels of competence much higher than many adults might 
anticipate: children learn by experience and competence grows through experience, 
rather than simply with age. 
 
In accordance with Lansdown there are two possible approaches in determining the 
competence of a child:
91
 
 
One possibility is that the onus should rest with the child to demonstrate competence. … 
The second and more radical approach is to introduce a presumption of competence in 
the exercise of rights. 
 
Assuming a child‟s incompetence on the basis of age is questioned by Lansdown,92 who 
suggests that a more appropriate solution than this radical variant above might be a “mixed 
model” – a fourth model proposed by him.93 Based on this, there should not be a general 
presumption of competence. Instead, especially in personal matters, the second approach is 
preferable to the first. This means that in questions of adoption, placement in care, and other 
similar matters:
94
 
 
… the law could operate with a presumption of competence, in which the onus would be 
on concerned adults to demonstrate that a child was incompetent if the child‟s right to 
take responsibility for a decision was to be overruled. 
 
Such an approach does not ignore the fact that children are not able to take care of themselves 
and to make decisions for themselves right from the beginning, but it delays the initial point 
or the focus into the area of the child. This gives more weight to the rights of the child. 
 
                                               
89  Allison James and Adrian James Key Concepts in Childhood Studies (Sage Publications Ltd, London, 
2008) at 144. 
90
  At 35. 
91  Gerison Lansdown The Evolving Capacities of the Child (Save the Children, UNICEF, Florence, 2005) 
at 50. 
92  See also Allison James and Adrian James Key Concepts in Childhood Studies (Sage Publications Ltd, 
London, 2008) at 36. 
93  See Gerison Lansdown The Evolving Capacities of the Child (Save the Children, UNICEF, Florence, 
2005) at 52. 
94
  A 52. 
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Putting the prejudice of incompetence aside and treating children as full members of the 
human family there is no question of whether they should be consulted or involved. “It seems 
that we have little to lose by increasing children‟s participation. … But more importantly, 
taking account of children‟s views may lead to better decisions.”95 Nicola Atwool states:96 
 
Even if the outcomes of decision-making involving children are not significantly better at 
least they have had a chance to have a say, and this may make it easier to live with the 
consequences. There is nothing more damaging than the pervasive sense of powerless 
that results from having no voice. 
D Ongoing Support 
Children living in foster care have experienced life situations that may have seriously 
affected their wellbeing. In most cases before they were permanently placed they lived in 
several households with different foster parents. Furthermore, most of the time they were 
removed from their birth family because they were in need of care and protection
97
. Being in 
“need of care and protection” requires a serious impairment of the wellbeing caused by 
physical, psychological, emotional or sexual harm, ill-treatment, abuse or serious social 
deprivation.
98
 To avoid (psychological) problems which may occur in the future due to the 
treatment of the child, ongoing support is important. 
 
As stated above, children can leave their traumatised legacy behind growing up in proper 
care.
99
 Therefore, it is important to find a new home for life as Child, Youth and Family in 
New Zealand calls it.
100
 Furthermore, within this placement some children may need 
professional psychological support. In this context it is also necessary to take objective needs 
into account. 
 
As already mentioned above, one problem could be the attitude of the new caregivers if they 
do not hold on to the relationship with the placed child. This not only means that the child 
needs support, but that the caregivers should also be reminded of the importance of their role 
and psychologically supported to avoid breakdowns in the relationship between them and the 
child.  
                                               
95  Nicola Atwool “Participation in Decision-making: The Experience of New Zealand Children in Care” 
(2006) 3 Child Care in Practice 259 at 265. 
96  At 266. 
97  That a child is “in need of care and protection” pursuant to s 14 of the Children, Young Persons, and 
Their Families Act is prerequisite for a declaration under s 67 of the Children, Young Persons, and 
Their Families Act. This in turn is a requirement for any court order under Part 2 of the Act, including 
services orders, custody orders, support orders or guardianship orders. See below chapter V A 3 (b) 
at 42 for several cases when a child is in need of care and protection. 
98  The Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989 also mentions in s 14 other cases when a 
child or young person is in need of care and protection. 
99  See above chapter IV B at 12. 
100
  See below chapter V D at 75. 
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E Contact Issues 
Another controversial issue concerns contact with the birth family. The key difference 
between a permanent placement and adoption is that within the process of permanent 
placement the legal relationships remain whereas they are detached in the context of adoption. 
So the question is, if legal kinship remains, should the child know the birth family, and, 
furthermore, how intense should possible contact be? Some research shows that the child‟s 
need for belonging in foster placements is often insufficient,
101
 so “a need for connectedness 
to birth parents, siblings or extended family remains pivotal.”102  
 
The question of whether ongoing contact with the birth parents should be permitted or not 
cannot be answered generally. First of all, the child‟s welfare and best interests have to be 
considered. This is not only a question which affects the parents and the caregivers. The 
short-term effects as well as the long-term interests have to be taken into account determining 
the child‟s welfare and best interests. Furthermore, the child‟s identity and the knowledge of 
origin are important factors as well. Nonetheless, special circumstances can require that the 
natural parents‟ contact with the child has to be prohibited or, at least, suspended. This could 
be the case where the child suffers disadvantageous effects while in their care. On the other 
hand, contact with the birth parents could be useful in the long run in securing the 
relationship between the birth parents and the child, and therefore it can be argued that 
minimal detriment caused by this contact should be tolerated. 
 
However, there might be situations in which possible contact would be detrimental. In 
Ministry of Social Development v C a child, aged nearly 6-years-old, was removed from the 
care of her mother at the age of 13 months and placed with kinship caregivers.
103
 The main 
issue in this case was the contact the child should have with her father. Judge Ryan dismissed 
the application of the father for a parenting order providing him with day-to-day contact. 
Instead the father was allowed to see his daughter twice a year and have contact by letter. 
Judge Ryan stated that:
104
 
 
… she deserves to have a positive relationship with both of her birth parents but any 
contact needs to be done in such a way as to not jeopardise the security of her 
placement … . 
 
… [The] paramount consideration for this child is to ensure that the current arrangement 
with [her caregivers] continues and that this placement is supported totally. No access 
arrangement should be contemplated that is likely to undermine the placement. 
 
                                               
101  Susan Smith “Protection and identity: Finding the right balance to belong” (2012) 7 NZFLJ 124 at 126. 
102  At 126. 
103  Ministry of Social Development v C FC North Shore FAM-2005-004-001166, 19 February 2010. 
104
  At [15], [16]. 
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The girl may want to reinstate contact and a relationship with her father at a later stage in 
life.
105
 If this is the case, the judgment would not prevent this. However, the decision made 
by Judge Ryan was based on the wellbeing of the child. In his mind, contact would be 
traumatising:
106
 
 
The child‟s immediate reaction was fear which developed … into a fear of her father and 
in particular a fear of being abducted by him. In fact it appears the most recent nightmare 
featured what were clearly the child‟s mother and father sneaking into her house with a 
view to removing her. 
 
Another point which has to be considered is the parental attitude. When talking about 
permanent placements, one ambition is the establishment of a secure and family-like 
relationship between the caregivers and the child. This is connected with the opportunity to 
develop a psychological attachment and a sense of belonging. The efforts of litigious parents 
to have contact with their child can be distracting. If the establishment of a secure 
relationship is prevented because parents are unable to accept the current situation, contact 
between the parents and the child should be limited as well. A prolonged disturbance of the 
relationship between the caregivers and the child is contrary to the welfare and best interests 
of the child. 
 
Besides contact with the birth parents, staying in touch with other family members can be 
important for the child. Therefore, even if contact with the birth parents is not appropriate, in 
some situations contact with members of the extended family such as grandparents or siblings 
might has to be considered. Aspects regarding the Māori point of view will be examined in a 
special section below.
107
 However, it can be stated that any contact with parents or other 
family members must be beneficial for the child.
108
 In the end, contact to the birth family 
must be congruent with the purpose of a permanent placement.
109
 
F Needs versus Rights 
Seeing children as immature and incompetent is used to justify their exclusion from the 
decisions-making process and the assumption that adults should decide what is best for 
children. Atwool sees a distinction between needs and rights as “a key to challenging the 
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  Ministry of Social Development v C FC North Shore FAM-2005-004-001166, 19 February 2010 
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107  See below chapter V C at 72. 
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109  Allan Cooke “Contact Issues for children who have been permanently placed out of their birth 
families” (2009) 6 NZFLJ 176 at 180. 
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deficit model of childhood”.110 To her mind “the concept of needs fits well with a deficit 
model of childhood” and a welfare approach that focuses on the needs rather than on the 
rights is able to disempower the child.
111
 In order to overcome the antiquated concept of 
childhood it is necessary to recognise the needs, but, furthermore, to acknowledge and 
strengthen the rights of the child.  
 
The distinction between needs and rights is a good starting point to bring light to the dark 
maze of definitions of childhood, children themselves and children‟s abilities. Firstly, it has 
to be recognised that children are not a homogenous group.
112
 They differ in their abilities, 
and are motivated by their various ages and social and cultural backgrounds. However, some 
essential needs for survival that can be identified are the same no matter the child. James and 
James distinguish between three different types of needs:
113
 
 
There are psychological and social needs that are rooted in our nature as social 
animals … [Children] have special physical needs in terms of nutrition, clothing and 
health care; special social needs in terms of schooling, socialisation and moral 
development; and special psychological needs in terms of protection, nurturing and 
attachment. 
 
Furthermore, it is stated that these needs were transferred to rights because of the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.
114
 James and James mentioned that critics see 
a weakening of the rights by the mechanism for their enforcement.
115
 So the inclusion of the 
various needs into a legal statute could be a step back in protecting and promoting children. 
 
It is possible that the general granting of several rights by the United Nations Convention on 
the Rights of the Child has shifted the focus of attention. This does not lead to a weakening of 
the rights and position of the child overall – a statement I do not agree with. Some rights are 
essential, so essential that they should not be questioned, whether codified or not. In addition, 
several rights might not be or even cannot be codified and arise out of the fact of human 
existence itself. The right to life, the right to personal freedom, the right to personal integrity, 
the right of personality and the right to participate are some of these basic rights. The 
principle of equality and the principle to be treated with respect and tolerance are 
fundamentals as well.  
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  Nicola Atwool “Participation in Decision-making: The Experience of New Zealand Children in Care” 
(2006) 3 Child Care in Practice 259 at 263. 
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Children are entitled to these objectives to the same extent as adults, or, at least, should be. 
The fact that children are not able to care for themselves, and the logical conclusion that 
those who bear responsibility for their existence have to fill in for this lack of capability 
initially in their favour, does not remove any of these rights. Keeping this in mind, children 
may be vulnerable and in need of protection, but, on the other hand, have rights like everyone 
else and should be treated accordingly: as full members of the human family. 
G Summary 
This dissertation places a clear and profound emphasis on the child. The child‟s rights and 
needs are the linchpin, keeping in mind that the starting-point has to be the individual child in 
his or her specific circumstances. Every child is an individual with complex needs, has 
multiple rights and is vulnerable, but is a full member of the human family and has to be 
treated as such.  
 
The welfare and best interests of the child must be paramount. The rights or interests of the 
birth parents are subordinate. A decision should not be taken only to be equitable to birth 
parents. However, defining welfare and best interests is not possible. The concept itself is 
shaped by vagueness and therefore greatly in need of interpretation. Several other principles 
might be helpful to give a shape to this indefinite legal term. These identified objectives are 
based on the idea of offering every child similar conditions and the opportunity to grow up in 
a harmonious family environment, shaped by happiness, love and understanding, the 
possibility to develop an individual personality and to be prepared to live his or her individual 
life in society. Therefore it is important to create a secure and permanent placement. However, 
the welfare and best interests of the child should only be paramount or the first consideration, 
if this is determined from the child‟s point of view. 
 
In addition, it should be kept in mind that children have rights as well. The idea of children as 
the property of their parents was indeed overcome long ago. However, because of their 
inability to care for themselves their rights might still be curtailed and they are not seen as 
entire legal subjects. 
 
Therefore, in every decision-making process the child should have the possibility to 
participate. Furthermore, in personal matters it must be assumed that the child is competent 
and adults should have to demonstrate that the child is not able to make a decision. In this 
case, overruling the rights of the child can be justified. Decisions made in this realm of law 
should concentrate on the child and his or her rights. “In the past social work has been 
characterised by a „welfare‟ approach that tends to emphasise needs rather than rights, 
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disempowering the child.”116 In order to overcome this it is necessary to consider the needs 
and rights and other principles equally – in the light of special circumstances. To pre-weigh 
one factor will not lead to satisfactory outcomes. We would never deny “basic rights” of 
humans because of gender, race, religion or origin. But based on age? At the very least a 
special justification should be necessary. 
 
However, even while acknowledging that “belonging comes from relationships, not legal 
mechanisms as such”,117 legal provisions that give those concerned, especially the child, the 
feeling of security and belonging, are required. 
 
One of the purposes of the new guardianship order introduced in the White Paper is to 
address the specific needs for ongoing security. Ongoing security is part of the achievement 
of permanency. Furthermore, the White Paper states that “the child‟s voice, wishes and 
feelings will be a central part of the care planning, in addition to those of their 
family/whānau.”118 It does not explain in detail how the child should participate when it 
comes to the limiting of parental rights. There it is incomplete.  
 
                                               
116  Nicola Atwool “Participation in Decision-making: The Experience of New Zealand Children in Care” 
(2006) 3 Child Care in Practice 259 at 263. 
117  Susan Smith “Protection and identity: Finding the right balance to belong” (2012) 7 NZFLJ 124 at 126. 
118  Paula Bennett, Ministry of Social Development “The White Paper for Vulnerable Children” 
(Wellington, 2012) volume II at 121. 
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V Legal Issues and Practice 
Since time immemorial, there has been a societal assumption that children are best cared for 
by their biological parents:
119
  
 
From the numerous cases on custody which have come before Courts over the years it 
has been established that there is a prima facie presumption that it is for the benefit of the 
child that he or she should be in the custody of the natural parents …  
 
However, in cases of children permanently placed in the care of foster parents this 
presumption may no longer exist. Furthermore, the responsibility is transferred to the new 
caregiver. Based on the welfare and best interests of the child, the newly created relationship 
between foster parent and child must receive as an equally a strong protection by the law as 
the natural parent-child relationship. Anything less would jeopardise the placement and the 
relationship between child and foster parent and thus, not least the child‟s welfare. Of course, 
this approach is based on the assumption that the blood tie cannot be such a strong 
consideration as it seemed to be and that the so-called right of a parent to care for his or her 
own child is not a right in a legal sense. 
 
The emerging questions which have to answered are: How can the role of foster parents in a 
case of a permanent placement be defined? What is the existing legal framework to secure the 
relationship between foster parents and child? What rights and responsibilities remain for 
birth parents? Are the existing rules sufficient to allow a secure upbringing for the benefit of 
the child‟s welfare? 
A The Care of Children Act and the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 
Two different New Zealand statutes are relevant. The first statute is the Care of Children Act 
2004, which deals with the legal relationship between children and parents. Furthermore, it 
contains rules for those who act instead of the birth parents if the child is living with someone 
else instead. The Act provides the possibility of making guardianship and parenting orders.  
 
The second statute is the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989 which 
provides the legal basis for an intervention by the state if a child is in need of care and 
protection.
120
 The most drastic and therefore final action to be taken is the removal of the 
                                               
119  Re D (An infant) [1971] NZLR 737 at 740–741. 
120  The provisions in the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989 apply to a child or a 
young person. Child is defined by s 2 of the Act as a boy or girl under the age of 14 years. Young 
person means a boy or girl over the age of 14 years but under 17 years, but does not include any person 
who is or has been married or in a civil union. For ease of readability the text uses only the term 
“child”. This also refers, however, unless otherwise indicated, to the young person. 
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child from the birth family and placing the child in alternative care. Possible orders under this 
Act in relation to the removal and placement of a child are guardianship and custody orders.  
 
The reasons for a removal may be of different nature. There may be cases where a child lives 
with new caregivers because of an agreement as well as cases where the removal occurred 
because the child was in danger. 
1 General statements about the two statutes 
The purpose of the Care of Children Act is to promote the welfare and best interests of the 
child and facilitate the development.
121
 Therefore, it not only defines and regulates the 
parent‟s rights and responsibilities, but also contains the court‟s powers in relation to 
guardianship and care of a child.
122
 For Child, Youth and Family it is the prioritised statute to 
secure the relationship between child and caregiver.
123
 Under s 3(1)(a), the purpose of the Act 
is to be achieved by helping to ensure that appropriate arrangements are in place for the 
child‟s guardianship and care. Furthermore, according to s 3(1)(b), the rights of the child 
have to be recognised and in conjunction with s 6(2) the views of the child have to be 
considered as well. 
 
Permanency under the Care of Children Act can be achieved by making parenting orders 
under s 48 in favour of the new caregivers or/and appointing them either as additional or as 
sole guardians pursuant to s 27. Once such an order is made it is in this respect permanent 
that the Act does not provide for a regular review.
124
 A person affected by the order or a 
person acting on behalf of the child pursuant to s 56(3) has got the right to apply to vary 
parenting orders or, pursuant to s 29, guardianship orders.
125
 
 
The other important statute containing the specific framework regarding the placement of a 
child is the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act. This Act provides the legal 
basis for state intervention, if a child is in need of care and protection as defined in s 14 of the 
Act.  
 
Security for the child or permanency is provided by custody orders pursuant to s 101 and 
additional or sole guardianship orders pursuant to s 110(2). However, the birth parents remain 
guardians with the appropriate rights and responsibilities. Pursuant to s 11(2)(a) the rights, 
powers and duties of the parents will only be suspended where the court appoints another 
                                               
121  Care of Children Act, s 3(1)(a). 
122  See Care of Children Act, s 3(2)(a).  
123  See Child, Youth and Family “Use of Legal Orders to secure a home for life” (May 2011) 
<www.practicecentre.cyf.govt.nz>. 
124  Stephen Coyle “Permanency Policy: children in care” (2008) 6 NZFLJ 45 at 46; Child, Youth and 
Family “Use of Legal Orders to secure a home for life” (May 2011) <www.practicecentre.cyf.govt.nz>. 
125
  See below chapter V A 6 at 62. 
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person as sole guardian. Birth parents remain guardians – with (suspended) rights – as long as 
they are not removed by an order under the Care of Children Act. Moreover, the achieved 
security can be disturbed by any person making an application for variation or discharge of 
the orders made.
126
 This can undermine the secure base within the new family. “Thus the 
need for care and protection [of the child] will ordinarily extend to protection of the child by 
protecting the integrity of that permanent placement.”127 
 
The application of these statutes may be unclear in some borderline case. While the Children, 
Young Persons, and Their Families Act deals with guardianship and custody in cases where 
the child is in need of care and protection pursuant to s 14, the Care of Children Act is 
applicable in a more generic way. The Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act “is a 
public law statute concerned to direct the resources of the state to ensure the protection of 
children who are subject to abuse or neglect within their family.”128 On the other hand, the 
Care of Children Act “is part of private law and is primarily concerned with the appointment 
of, and disputes between, guardians.”129 
 
However, a case which was first dealt with under the Children, Young Persons, and Their 
Families Act may fall under the Care of Children Act after the passage of time and after the 
circumstances changed. In E v G, for example, the foster parents filed applications to 
discharge custody and guardianship orders under the Children, Young Persons, and Their 
Families Act and to replace them with a parenting order and a guardianship order pursuant to 
s 27 of the Care of Children Act.
130
 According to Judge Callinicos “only where the Court is 
satisfied that the child‟s situation will not be subject of ongoing care and protection issues … 
orders should fully transition to COCA.” 131  Finally, the Judge made a parenting order 
pursuant to s 48 of the Care of Children Act in favour of the foster parents, appointed them as 
additional guardians pursuant to s 27 and ruled that access or contact with the birth father had 
to continue under the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act.
132
 So in some cases 
courts see the application of both statutes as appropriate to protect the security of a 
placement.
133
 However, it can be questioned whether this is a good way to deal with the 
matter. Both Acts have different requirements to be met to make a court order. Furthermore, 
this can lead to several questions regarding review and variation as well as discharging the 
orders. It may complicate the legal process more than necessary. Would it not be more 
                                               
126  Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act, s 125(1)(f) and (g) 
127
  Allan Cooke “Permanency for children: why permanently placed children need ongoing support, and 
how to deliver that support” (2008) 6 NZFLJ 37 at 39. 
128  Brookers Family Law – Care and Protection (online looseleaf ed, Brookers) at [NT1.2.10]. 
129  At [NT1.2.10]. 
130  E v G [parenting orders] 2008 NZFLR 337 at [20]. 
131  At [31]. 
132  See E v G [parenting orders] 2008 NZFLR 337 at [151], [155], [160]. 
133
  See Brookers Family Law – Care and Protection (online looseleaf ed, Brookers) at [NT1.2.10]. 
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sensible to deal with a case only under one Act or another, having regard to the prerequisite 
whether a child is in need of care and protection? 
 
In Re B (children) the protection proceedings were adjourned, because the parents sought 
custody according to the Guardianship Act 1968, which would have resolved the protection 
proceedings.
134
 There are also cases where, at first, the matter was dealt with under the Care 
of Children Act and later orders under the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 
had to be made.
135
 
 
This dissertation focuses on the legal possibilities provided by both statutes to secure the 
placement of a child. To avoid repetition, the two statutes are examined together in the next 
sections. Even with potential differences, both statutes must be interpreted as a whole, since 
they act reciprocally. Some of the principles in both Acts mirror each other.
136
 The decisions 
and orders to make relate to the same child and the goal is the same: to create a secure 
placement to grow up.
137
 
 
In the following sections, firstly, the decision-guiding principles are examined. Secondly, 
guardianship as the general legal concept for a parent-child relationship is discussed: Birth 
parents are natural guardians and a third party can become a court-appointed guardian, but 
what does this mean? Where foster parents become guardians, what rights do they have? 
How can they be appointed? What does this mean for the birth parents as guardians? Thirdly, 
parenting orders are in the focus. They can be used to transfer the exercise of rights in regard 
to the child to a third party. So, often foster parents will apply for such an order to achieve a 
legal position in regard to their foster child. Where more than one party has a right to decide 
and they cannot find a solution a dispute resolving possibility has to be available. The 
examination of the provisions to resolve disputes is followed by part five dealing with the 
possibilities, for example, birth parents have to challenge court orders in favour of permanent 
caregivers. 
                                               
134  Re B (children) [1992] NZFLR 729 at 727. 
135  Tracy Gunn “Review of practice relating to representing clients in proceedings under the Children, 
Young Persons, and Their Children Act 1989” (New Zealand Law Society Care and Protections Orders 
and CYFS Seminar, Wellington, 25 October 2012); according to s 19(1) of the Children, Young 
Persons, and Their Families Act, where any body or organisation or court concerned with the welfare 
of the child believes that the child is in need of care and protection this organisation may refer the 
matter to a care and protection co-ordinator, so further investigation can take place. 
136  E v G [parenting orders] 2008 NZFLR 337 at [52]. 
137  The unclear application of the statutes in some cases may cause difficulties and insecurity. The White 
Paper talks about amending the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act. This may not 
resolve the problem. See also discussion below in chapter VII A 5 at 92. 
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2 Principles of the statutes 
The following section examines the contained principles. Both statutes know the welfare 
principle. In addition, the statutes comprehend several other principles to guide the decision-
making process. They are examined separately. 
(a) The welfare and best interests 
The welfare and best interests of the child as a key principle can be found in s 4 of the Care 
of Children Act:
138
 
 
The welfare and best interests of the child must be the first and paramount consideration 
in the administration and application of this Act, for example, in proceedings under this 
Act: and in any other proceedings involving the guardianship of, or the role of providing 
day-to-day care for, or contact with, a child. 
 
Declaring that the welfare and best interests must be paramount does not abolish the 
difficulties of definition. The statute itself does not define this legal term. Therefore, it seems 
not unreasonable to rely on the above attempt of definition. In addition, in G v G Richmond P 
and Richardson J stated:
139
 
 
The wellbeing of the children is the first and paramount consideration. An overall view 
must be taken. Undue emphasis must not be given to material, moral or religious 
considerations, or for that matter any other factor. All aspects of welfare must be taken 
into account and that will include consideration of the child‟s physical and mental and 
emotional wellbeing and the development in the child of standards and expectations of 
behaviour within our society. 
 
Furthermore, in J v C Lord MacDermott already determined what first and paramount 
consideration means:
140
 
 
[It] seems to me that they must mean more than that the child‟s welfare is to be treated as 
the top item in a list of items relevant to the matter in question. I think they connote a 
process whereby, when all relevant facts, relationships, claims and wishes of parents, 
risks, choices and other circumstances are taken into account and weighed, the course to 
be followed will be that which is most in the interests of the child‟s welfare as that term 
has now to be understood. That is the first consideration because it is of first importance 
and the paramount consideration because it rules on or determines the course to be 
followed. 
                                               
138  Care of Children Act 2004, s 4(1).  
139  G v G [1978] 2 NZLR 444 at 447 per Richmond P and Richardson J. 
140
  J and Another v C and Others [1969] 1 All ER 788 at 820–821 per Lord MacDermott. 
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Section 5 contains several principles, which are relevant for the welfare and best interests of 
the child and which are examined in the next section. 
 
However, according to s 4(2) the welfare of the specific child has to be taken into account 
and not a generic child or general circumstances. Furthermore, s 4(3) declares that the 
parent‟s conduct may only be considered as far as it is relevant to the child‟s welfare and best 
interests, which, for example, would be relevant when it comes to questions of abuse or 
neglect and contact issues.
141
 
 
Determining what accommodates the child‟s welfare best, it has to be taken into account 
“that decisions affecting the child should be made and implemented within a time frame that 
is appropriate to the child‟s sense of time”.142 
 
Also the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act contains the welfare principle, 
stating in s 6 that:
143
 
 
In all matters relating to the administration or application of this Act … the welfare and 
best interests of the child … shall be the first and paramount consideration, having regard 
to the principles set out in sections 5 and 13. 
 
Again, the welfare is the first and paramount consideration. It cannot be defined in another 
way as in relation to the Care of Children Act. However, the Children, Young Persons, and 
Their Families Act contains in ss 5 and 13 several principles which should be taken into 
consideration. Nevertheless, welfare is to be treated as paramount. 
(b) Other principles in s 5 of the Care of Children Act144 
Section 5 contains several principles relevant to the child‟s welfare and best interests.145 
Hence, their consideration is mandatory and these objectives must be kept in mind.
146
 
Section 4(5)(b) refers to them stating that:
147
 
 
                                               
141  See also Temple v Barr and Holborn HC Wellington CIV-2010-485-000561, 24 August 2010 at [29]. 
142  Care of Children Act 2004, s 4(5)(a). 
143  Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989, s 6. 
144  The Family Court Proceedings Reform Bill 2012, introduced in October 2012, replaces s 4 and s 5. The 
child‟s safety, for example, is the first mentioned principle. However, it does not introduce new 
principles. 
145  Section 4(5)(b) of the Care of Children Act 2004 refers to them stating that: In determining what best 
serves the child‟s welfare and best interest, a court or a person must take into account any of the 
principles specified in section 5 that are relevant to the welfare and best interests of the particular child 
in his or her particular circumstances. 
146  Temple v Barr and Holborn HC Wellington CIV-2010-485-000561, 24 August 2010 at [30]. 
147
  Care of Children Act, s 4(5)(b). 
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In determining what best serves the child‟s welfare and best interest, a court or a person 
must take into account any of the principles specified in section 5 that are relevant to the 
welfare and best interests of the particular child in his or her particular circumstances. 
 
Even though these principles can “never dictate the outcome given the infinite variety of the 
relevant circumstances surrounding”, because of their consideration by any court they “must 
lead to orders and conditions.”148 
 
The principles in s 5 overlap each other at some point and are not backbreaking in 
determining the welfare of the individual child having regard to the special circumstances of 
each case.
149
 Furthermore:
150
 
 
The policies contained in the principles are optimum policies. Circumstances in some 
cases will prevent their application. … But in situations where the optimum policies of 
relevant principles are in place … it is vital and indeed mandatory for a court to factor on 
and weigh them in the exercise of relevant judicial discretions. 
 
Nevertheless, they provide good evidence to make a decision for the benefit of the child‟s 
welfare. Even though the principles are self-evident, it seems to be appropriate to discuss 
them in more detail.
151
 
 
(i) Principles in detail 
The first principle contained in s 5(a) states that the child‟s parents and guardians should have 
the primary responsibility.
152
 This principle applies not only to the birth parents, but also 
includes psychological parents or in other words: “a father or mother figure with whom a 
child has bonded over a period of time”.153 One of the questions discussed in this dissertation 
is the relation between parents and permanent caregivers, their rights and duties. However, 
someone has to be responsible. The question to answer is, at least, who this person should be, 
if the parents fail to do so. Important to note is that “the s 5(a) principle does not confer rights 
on parents which can be enforced and pursued to the detriment of the paramount 
consideration of a child‟s welfare.”154 
 
                                               
148  Tanner v Edgill [2008] NZFLR 262 at [30]. 
149
  Temple v Barr and Holborn HC Wellington CIV-2010-485-000561, 24 August 2010 at [30]. 
150  Tanner v Edgill [2008] NZFLR 262 at [31]. 
151  At [31]. 
152  See also Family Court Proceedings Reform Bill 2012, clause 4. This principle can be found in new 
s 5(b). 
153  Temple v Barr and Holborn HC Wellington CIV-2010-485-000561, 24 August 2010 at [30] (emphasis 
added). 
154
  K v G [2004] NZFLR 1105 at [23]. 
32 Legal Issues and Practice – The Care of Children Act and the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 
 
 
Secondly, the arrangements for the child‟s care, development and upbringing should be 
continual.
155
 Furthermore, Cooke stretches this, stating that “the child has a right to 
continuity in care, development and upbringing”. 156  This supports the approach of this 
dissertation that permanency is an important principle in the life of the child concerned and is 
necessary to promote the welfare and best interests of a child. It needs to be investigated 
whether the regulations contained in the Care of Children Act and the suggestion in the White 
Paper and their application meet this approach. In determining the child‟s welfare, not only 
the relationship between birth parents and child is an important factor. The wider family has 
to be considered. In addition, s 5(b) also declares that:  
 
… the child‟s relationship with his or her family, family group, whānau, hapū, or iwi 
should be stable and ongoing (in particular, the child should have continuing 
relationships with both or his or her parents). 
 
The parentheses shows the importance of the relationship between parents and child. On the 
one hand, it is in the interests of the child to know his or hers origin and, on the other hand, it 
gives expression to the special status parents have in their child‟s life. It does not mean that 
the relationship between parents and child is a predominant factor, especially, if the child‟s 
welfare is endangered by them. However, the Pākehā concept of a nuclear family consisting 
of father, mother and child is rejected by this section.
157
  
 
It can be stated that the principle in s 5(a) and the principle contained in s 5(b) at the end 
indicate that the parents are responsible for their child in the first instance and an ongoing 
relationship between child and parents serves the child‟s welfare. In any case this should not 
be interpreted in such a way as “parents have some innate right or entitlement to the care of 
their children or that placement with parent will be presumed to serve the child‟s welfare and 
best interests.”158 Considering welfare as paramount there is no space for a right of parents to 
care for their child, if they endanger the welfare. This does not mean that parents are not or 
should not be responsible in the first place. 
 
Related to this, s 5(c) states that the care and upbringing of the child should be facilitated by 
ongoing consultation and co-operation between and among parents and guardians and all 
persons exercising the role of providing day-to-day care.
159
 “All persons exercising the role 
of providing day-to-day care” includes even on a literal interpretation the new caregivers 
                                               
155
  Care of Children Act, s 5(b); see also Family Court Proceedings Reform Bill 2012, clause 4. This 
principle can be found in new s 5(d). 
156  Allan Cooke “Contact Issues for children who have been permanently placed out of their birth 
families” (2009) 6 NZFLJ 176 at 179. 
157  PED v MHB [Whangai: Final Parenting order] [2012] NZFLR 35 at [26]. 
158  Brookers Family Law – Child Law (online looseleaf ed, Brookers) at [CC48.15 (4)]. 
159  See also Family Court Proceedings Reform Bill 2012, clause 4. This principle can be found in new 
s 5(c). 
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because they are responsible for the actual care. Nevertheless, in PED v MHB [Whāngai: 
Final Parenting order] it was stated that s 5(c) “should be given an expansive interpretation 
to include psychological parents.”160 The linchpin of this dissertation is the existing practice 
that the new caregivers share their responsibilities with the birth parents or the chief 
executive. The former situation could be problematic depending on the behaviour of the birth 
parents and their acceptance of the new care situation. Undermining the new placement of the 
child impedes the care and upbringing and is consequently contrary to the welfare and best 
interests of the child. Therefore it might be necessary to take the parents‟ guardianship away. 
 
The relationship between the child and members of his or her family, family group, whānau, 
hapū or iwi should not only be stable and ongoing as s 5(b) declares, it should also be 
preserved and strengthened.
161
 This means the relationship should not only be maintained, 
but steps should also be taken to develop the child‟s relationship with the wider family.162 
Furthermore, the child’s identity, which includes its origin, should be preserved and 
strengthened.
163
 
 
In this context the difficult question of contact with the birth family, the nuclear family as 
well as the wider family, arises. The Care of Children Act places an emphasis on the origin of 
the child as part of his or her identity, dealing with related matters in three different 
subsections. However, it is debatable to what extent contact with the birth family should be 
enabled.
164
 
 
Another principle relevant to the welfare is the child’s safety, which has to be protected, 
contained in s 5(e). A difference to all the other principles can be found in the wording: “the 
child‟s safety must be protected and, in particular, he or she must be protected from all forms 
of violence”.165 This clarifies the obligation to protect the child‟s safety.166 “All forms of 
violence” includes, of course, physical and sexual violence, but:167 
 
… is wide enough to require protection from witnessing or being involved in an 
environment where violence is likely to be observed and in that way impose suffering 
upon the child. 
 
                                               
160  PED v MHB [Whangai: Final Parenting order] [2012] NZFLR 35 at [30]. 
161  Care of Children Act, s 5(d); see also Family Court Proceedings Reform Bill 2012, clause 4. This 
principle can be found in new s 5(e). 
162  PED v MHB [Whāngai: Final Parenting order] [2012] NZFLR 35 at [32] 
163  Care of Children Act, s 5(f); see also Family Court Proceedings Reform Bill 2012, clause 4. This 
principle can be found in new s 5(f). 
164  See above chapter IV E at 20 and below chapter V A 4 (b) at 57 as well as chapter VII C at 93. 
165  Care of Children Act, s 5(e) (emphasis added). 
166  Temple v Barr and Holborn HC Wellington CIV-2010-485-000561, 24 August 2010 at [30]. 
167
  At [30]. 
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Any decision that places the child in danger, either emotionally, psychologically or 
physically, has of course to be omitted and cannot meet the welfare and best interests of the 
child. 
 
(ii) Weighting as between principles 
The questions which arises in determining the welfare and best interests of the child with 
reference to the named principles is, whether there is a priority between them. In Kacem v 
Bashir the Supreme Court had to deal with this question.
168
 The majority of the Supreme 
Court held that there has to be a focus on the particular circumstances of every special 
case.
169
 However, there is “no presumption of what the welfare and best interests of the child 
may require or what influence the s 5 principles may have”.170 Neither the wording nor the 
structure of s 5 set out that one principle should be more important than another.
171
 
Furthermore:
172
 
 
The bracket portion of principle (b), containing as it does the words “in particular”, 
creates internal emphasis within principle (b). It does not signal that any aspect of 
principle (b) has presumptive emphasis or priority as against the other lettered principles 
in s 5. 
 
Every principle has to be examined and if it is relevant it has to be taken into account. George 
states that the “… judges are reminded clearly that they must not pre-weigh any factor that is 
relevant to their decision.”173 The paramount consideration is the welfare and best interests of 
the child. All principles are of assistance for interpretation. In every special case one principle 
will be more important than another. However, this does not lead to the conclusion that one 
principle stands above all others. “[E]ach factor must be considered on the specific facts of 
the case and not pre-weighed based on generalisations”.174 Most notably, “promoting strong 
parent-child relationships is not presumptively more important than promoting children‟s 
welfare and best interests in other ways.” 175  Furthermore, the principles in s 5 are not 
exhaustive.
176
 So how could one of them carry determinant weight? It is said in Kacem v 
Bashir that principle 5(e) occupies a special position because of the word “must”.177 Anyway, 
the child‟s safety is a factor which should always be borne in mind making a decision on 
behalf of a child. To my mind this is a matter of course. 
                                               
168  Kacem v Bashir [2011] 2 NZLR 1. 
169  At [18] per Tipping J. 
170  At [18] per Tipping J. 
171
 At [21] per Tipping J. 
172  At [28] per Tipping J. 
173  Robert H George “Principles relevant to child‟s welfare and best interests” (2011) 7 NZFLJ 26 at 29. 
174  At 29. 
175  At 29. 
176  Kacem v Bashir [2011] 2 NZLR 1 at [18] per Tipping J. 
177  See Kacem v Bashir [2011] 2 NZLR 1 at [8] per Elias CJ, at [22] per Tipping J, at [47] per William 
Young J. 
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This decision only refers to the Care of Children Act. Anyway, a more general approach can 
be educed. The welfare is the paramount principle. Any other objective in the legislation 
cannot be decisive. They may only be assistance to determine and serve the child‟s welfare. 
 
(iii) Applying to the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 
An interesting fact is that both statutes presume the welfare and best interests to be the 
paramount consideration, but only the Care of Children Act provides a set of principles to 
clarify the undefined legal term. The Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act also 
contains a list of principles that have to be considered in exercising the powers the Act 
confers. However, they are not meant to clarify welfare and differ from the ones in the Care 
of Children Act. The question is whether or not the principles contained in the Care of 
Children Act should apply to the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act.  
 
First, this question would have to be answered in the negative, if the principles do not 
contribute in a positive way, but are not more than a list of confusing concepts. As stated, the 
welfare principle is a vague term and this is, on the one hand, necessary to have regard to the 
different situations the law has to deal with, but, on the other hand, brings uncertainty, which 
is, especially in law, a negative factor. Therefore, a list of guiding principles helping to define 
the welfare of a child is a useful step to more certainty. This list cannot be conclusive and the 
several principles can never have equal weight in every case. However, having provisions to 
define the welfare also mean that this legal term has to be interpreted equally.  
 
Second, even though both statutes are part of different realms of law, the legal system itself 
must be uniform. The child‟s welfare should not have a different meaning in the Children, 
Young Persons, and Their Families Act from the Care of Children Act. It must be interpreted 
in the same way: it is the same child. Therefore, the list of principles relevant for the welfare 
should apply to the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act, and also the other way 
around. In FMHM & Anor v JJMP & Ors Judge Ryan took the view that:
178
 
 
It would be a ludicrous state of affairs for [the principle of s 13 of the Children, Young 
Persons, and Their Families Act] to be taken into account whilst a child was under the 
care and protection provisions of the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 
and yet ignore them simply because the care and protection orders are discharged and the 
Care of Children Act comes into play. 
                                               
178
  FMHM & Anor v JJMP & Ors FC Grisborne FAM 2010-016-121, 25 February 2011 at [54]. 
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(c) Principles in the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 
In the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act principles are also contained, which 
should be considered. Section 6, stating that the welfare is the paramount consideration, is 
subject to ss 5 and 13.
179
 
 
(i) Principles of section 5 
Section 5 contains principles which should be applied in exercise of powers conferred by the 
Act. The Act could be seen as the “general framework for working with families”.180 Firstly, 
wherever possible the child‟s family, whānau, hapū, iwi and family group should participate 
in the decisions making affecting the child and regard should be had to the views of that 
family.
181
 Secondly, wherever possible the relationship between the family, whānau, hapū, 
iwi and family group and the child should be maintained and strengthened.
182
 This may be 
compared with the provisions in s 5(d) of the Care of Children Act. In addition, s 7(2)(c)(iv) 
states that: 
 
In carrying out the duty imposed by subsection (1), the chief executive shall ensure, 
wherever possible, that all policies adopted by the department, and all service provided 
by the department, avoid the alienation of children … from their family, whānau, hapū, 
iwi and family group. 
 
This means the relationship between the child affected and the birth family should be 
maintained. This, of course, has to be consistent with the child‟s welfare. 
 
Thirdly, it must be considered how a decision will affect the child‟s welfare and the stability 
of the child‟s family, whānau, hapū, iwi and family group.183 It should be noted that the 
wording of s 5(c) – must – indicates again that the child‟s welfare is the first and paramount 
consideration in exercising the court‟s jurisdiction.184 
 
However, s 5 itself shows the paramountcy of welfare. On the one hand, s 5 declares that the 
“family group should participate”(s 5(a)), the relationship between child and family “should 
be maintained and strengthened” (s 5(b)), “consideration should be given to the wishes” 
(s 5(d)) and decisions “should, whenever possible, be made” within an appropriate time-
frame (s 5(e)).
185
 On the other, s 5(c) requires that “consideration must always be given to 
                                               
179
  Re B (children) [1992] NZFLR 726 at 757; E v G [parenting orders] 2008 NZFLR 337 at [39]. 
180  Allan Cooke “Contact Issues for children who have been permanently placed out of their birth 
families” (2009) 6 NZFLJ 176 at 177. 
181  Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989, s 5(a). 
182  Section 5(b). 
183  Section 5(c). 
184  Re B (children) [1992] NZFLR 726 at 757. 
185
  Emphasis added. 
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how a decision … will affect (i) the welfare of the child” and, in addition, according to s 6 
“… the welfare and interests of the child … shall be the first and paramount 
consideration…”.186 Comparing the statutory words it is conspicuous that both wordings have 
a more imperative character:
 187
 
 
It is quite clear that within ss 5, 6 and 13 a plain distinction is drawn between, on the one 
hand, matters that ought to be taken into account but which need not in themselves be 
decisive and, on the other hand, the overriding and paramount principle need to ensure 
that the result of the exercise benefits the child. In the end every factor has to be judged 
and tested by the impact it has on the welfare and interests of the child. 
 
(ii) Principles of section 13 
Section 13 expands on the principles contained in ss 5 and 6.
188
 In the context of the care and 
protection of children s 13 contains several principles which must guide the exercise of any 
powers conferred by or under Part 2.
189
 The first guiding and supreme principle is the 
principle that children must be protected from harm, their rights upheld, and their welfare 
promoted.
190
 The protection of the child‟s safety can also be found in s 5(e) of the Care of 
Children Act, as already examined before. The following paragraphs of s 13 contain 
“guidelines” for intervention. First of all, they state that the primary role for caring and 
protecting lies within child‟s family and accordingly the child‟s family should be supported 
as much as possible and the intervention should be the minimum necessary.
191
 Such 
intervention should “be restrained to a level commensurate with that required to protect the 
safety or welfare of the child.”192 Furthermore:193  
 
… it is desirable that a child … live[s] in association with his or her family, whānau, 
hapū, iwi, and family group, and that his or her education, training, or employment be 
allowed to continue without interruption or disturbance. 
 
If a child is in need of care and protection the child should be cared for and protected within 
his or her own family, whānau, hapū, iwi or family group and, therefore, the necessary 
assistance and support should be provided.
194
 “Only if there is a serious risk of harm to the 
                                               
186  Emphasis added. 
187  Re B (children) [1992] NZFLR 726 at 757–758. 
188  E v G [parenting orders] 2008 NZFLR 337 at [44]. 
189  Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989, s 13, as well as any powers conferred by or 
under pt 3 or 3A or sections 341 to 350. 
190
  Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989, s 13(a). 
191  Section 13(b); In A v Ministry of Social Development [Access] [2009] NZFLR 625 at [25] it is stated: 
“The care and protection principles generally do not refer specifically to the biological relationship, but 
do frequently refer to the family group, involving thereby both biological and psychological 
relationships.” 
192  E v G [parenting orders] 2008 NZFLR 337 at [45]. 
193  Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989, s 13(c). 
194
  Section 13(d). 
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child” the child should be removed.195 This shows that the removal of a child should be the 
last option to protect the child. Even if a child has to be removed, he or she should be 
wherever practicable returned to and protected within his or her family, whānau, hapū, iwi 
and family group and where this is not immediately possible the child should live in an 
appropriate family-like setting, that is in the same locality as that in which the child lived 
before and in which the child‟s links with his or her family, whānau, hapū, iwi and family 
group are maintained and strengthened.
196
 This shows the importance the Act accords to the 
relationship between the child and the wider (birth) family. The last possible resort to be 
taken is the permanent removal of the child. The child who cannot be returned to his or her 
family, whānau, hapū, iwi and family group should live in a new family group.197 
 
One of the main objectives which has to be considered in placements outside of the birth 
families should be to give the child the possibility to experience a “normal” family life. The 
child should have the opportunity to develop a sense of belonging to a family (group) and a 
psychological attachment to the carer. This is in s 13(f)(iii). Furthermore, it is stated that in 
this new family group the child‟s sense of community and the personal and cultural identity 
should be maintained.
198
 The White Paper mentions the child‟s cultural identity as “an 
important contributor to wellbeing.”199 However, it focuses more on educational questions 
and supporting identity in this regard.
200
 Beyond this, it states that children should “get what 
they need to ensure their … sense of identity.”201 Unfortunately, the White Paper in this 
context pays little regard to permanent placements. 
 
The child removed should experience permanency. Cooke goes far further conceding the 
child a “right to live in an „appropriate family-like‟ setting so that a sense of belonging, 
continuity and personal and cultural identity are maintained” and “a right of the child to be 
given the opportunity to develop a significant psychological attachment to the person in 
whose care that child has been placed.”202 
 
Section 13 shows that the Act contains as a basic scheme that the family is responsible if a 
child is in need of care and protection, and that state agencies should be involved as a last 
                                               
195  Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989, s 13(e). 
196  Section 13(f)(i), (ii). 
197  Section 13(f)(iii). 
198
  Section 13(f)(iii). 
199  Paula Bennett, Ministry of Social Development “The White Paper for Vulnerable Children” 
(Wellington, 2012) volume II at 28. 
200  At 100. 
201  See Paula Bennett, Ministry of Social Development “The White Paper for Vulnerable Children” 
(Wellington, 2012) volume II at 168. 
202  Allan Cooke “Contact Issues for children who have been permanently placed out of their birth 
families” (2009) 6 NZFLJ 176 at 177 (emphasis added). 
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resort.
203
 Restoration the child‟s family is another important issue. However, this does not 
mean that a family reunification takes priority above the child‟s welfare and best interests.204 
 
Furthermore, Judge Inglis QC stated in Re B (children) that:
205
 
 
… at the bottom line there are two paramount factors. First, that the welfare and interests 
of these children, in this particular family situation, must come first. Second, that any 
generalisation or theoretical assumptions about the value of family connections must, in 
the end, give way to the pragmatic reality that it is the welfare of these children with 
these particular parents that must be addressed. 
 
This is comparable with the explicit wording of s 4(2) of the Care of Children Act. 
 
Section 13 may be summarised as including:
206
 
 
… principles that the rights of children be upheld and their welfare promoted. It is the 
right of a child to have a relationship with a parent notwithstanding that they may not 
live with that parent as long as the exercise of those rights are balanced with matters of 
protection. 
 
The child should experience a family life which includes ongoing support and stable 
relationships with the person who cares for the child. Where the White Paper suggests that 
applicants have to show a change in circumstances before challenging a court order,
207
 this is 
a further step to secure the placement, to give a chance to develop a feeling of belonging to 
experience a family-like life. 
(d) The views of the child 
One of the key principles mentioned above is the right to participate. It contributes to the 
definition of the child‟s welfare and best interests and simultaneously restricts its 
                                               
203  Re B (children) [1992] NZFLR 726 at 757. 
204  At 757. 
205  At 758. 
206  E v G [parenting orders] 2008 NZFLR 337 at [44]. 
207  Paula Bennett, Ministry of Social Development “The White Paper for Vulnerable Children” 
(Wellington, 2012) volume II at 125. Clause 27 of the Family Court Proceedings Reform Bill 2012 
restricts proceedings under the Care of Children Act (inserting s 139A): Proceedings under ss 46D 
(disputes between guardians), 48 (parenting order) or 56 (variation or discharge of parenting orders) 
may not be commenced without the leave of the court if that proceeding (a)is substantially similar to 
a proceeding previously filed in a Family Court by any person and (b) is to be commenced less than 
2 years after final judgment was given in the previous proceeding. Clause 80 amends the Children, 
Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989. Sections 206A and 206B shall be inserted which also 
require leave of the court. 
40 Legal Issues and Practice – The Care of Children Act and the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 
 
 
interpretation. According to s 6 of the Care of Children Act “a child must be given reasonable 
opportunities to express views on matters affecting the child: and any views the child express 
… must be taken into account” in proceedings involving the guardianship of or the role of 
providing day-to-day care for a child.
208
 The Care of Children Act requires a reasonable 
opportunity to express views, which also must be taken into account. According to s 4(6), 
taking the child‟s view into account is not limited by the principle that decisions should be 
made and implemented in an appropriate time frame or by any of the principles in s 5 that are 
relevant to the child‟s welfare in his or her particular circumstances. At least taking the 
child‟s views into account is given emphasis. The importance of an appropriate consideration 
of the views of the child is examined above.
209
 However, where the child‟s voice is not 
considered it is likely that judges or, for example, Child, Family and Youth will interpret the 
welfare in a wrong way from a parent‟s/adult‟s point of view. Furthermore, the welfare 
principle could be used to overrule the wishes and views of the child. 
 
Section 5(d) of the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act refers to the wishes of 
the child stating that any court must be guided by:
210
 
 
… the principle that consideration should be given to the wishes of the child or young 
person, so far as those wishes can reasonably be ascertained, and that those wishes 
should be given such weight as is appropriate in the circumstances, having regard to the 
age, maturity, and culture of the child or young person. 
 
The wishes of the child or young person do not have to be followed. Section 5(d) only 
requires a reasonable ascertainment. Furthermore, because of the mandatory consideration of 
the age, maturity and culture of the child the importance of the wishes is weakened. Coyle 
sees there an inconsistency.
211
  
 
Moreover, there is a similar limitation of the relevance of the views under the Care of 
Children Act:
 212
 
 
While s 6(2)(b) of the Act requires any wishes of the child to be taken into account, that 
does not require a Judge to give effect to them, particularly if the child is of an age where 
he or she is immature and has no real understanding of longer term consequences of the 
wishes expressed. 
 
A general disregard of the views/wishes of the child because of an age scheme does not meet 
the requirements set by the welfare principle as the paramount consideration. Here, too, the 
                                               
208  Care of Children Act 2004, s 6. 
209  See above chapter IV C at 14. 
210  Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989, s 5. 
211  Stephen Coyle “Permanency policy: children in care” (2008) 6 NZFLJ 45 at 47. 
212
  PJKW v DAR [Guardianship] [2006] NZFLR 946 at [67]. 
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particular child and his or her personal skills need to be considered. Otherwise, the paramount 
principle would merely be determined by others, which may weaken the acceptance of the 
decision by the child on the one hand and is, on the other hand, contrary to human dignity, 
because humans are self-determining beings. Therefore, at least, s 5 of the Children, Young 
Persons, and Their Families Act is too weak to give enough weight to the “participation” 
right of the child.
213
 
(e) Summary 
The New Zealand statutes declare welfare as the first and paramount consideration. The Care 
of Children Act contains several principles to clarify what is meant by welfare of the child. 
Due to the fact that both statutes deal with the same child at different stages in time and 
uniformity of law the principles in the Care of Children Act can be used to clarify the child‟s 
welfare even though the case is dealt with under the Children, Young Persons, and Their 
Families Act. In addition, the provisions of the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families 
Act should not be ignored only because orders under the Care of Children Act are made. To 
support this approach it may be necessary to amend the two Acts so both take the relevant 
principles into account.  
 
The principles contained in s 5 of the Care of Children Act, except the child‟s safety, have 
equal weight: only welfare itself is paramount. Lastly, part of this is the consideration of the 
views and wishes of the child.
214
 In the end, the question of what meets the specific child‟s 
needs, not the parent‟s or the needs of another child, has to be answered.215 
 
The previous examination shows that the emphasis is on the child. The provisions try to focus 
on the experience of a family life and continuing relationships, where the child is a full 
member, can develop an own personality and is safe. However, some of the provisions 
dealing with guardianship seem not to correspondent entirely with these principles.
216
  
3 Guardianship 
After the definition of guiding principles, it is necessary to examine the legal provisions the 
statutes contain that enable parents or another person to act on behalf of or care for a child: 
guardianship. Birth parents are the natural parents of a child. Any other person can become a 
court-appointed guardian conferring rights and responsibilities. 
                                               
213  See the recommendations regarding participation below in chapter VII F at 96. The Family Court 
Proceedings Reform Bill 2012 undermines child participation by restricting the appointment of lawyer 
for the child. 
214  See below chapter VII F at 96 regarding possible changes. 
215  CEMSD v M FC Dunedin FAM-2001-012-148, 15 April 2005 at [31]. 
216
  See the following examination. 
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(a) Guardianship defined and the exercise of guardianship 
(i) Meaning of guardianship 
The Care of Children Act deals in s 15 with guardianship:
217
 
 
For the purposes of this Act, guardianship of a child means having (and therefore a 
guardian of the child has), in relation to the child, (a) all duties, powers, rights, and 
responsibilities that a parent of the child has in relation to the upbringing of the child: (b) 
every duty, power, right, and responsibility that is vested in the guardian of a child by 
any enactment. 
 
The first part of the definition seems to be circular: “Parental powers for the most part arise 
from the parents‟ status as their child‟s guardian.”218 Therefore it might be necessary to have 
a look at the “natural” role of parents and their related obligations. Guardianship means that 
there is an individual, who is responsible for the child‟s upbringing, who has the 
responsibility to nurture and care.
219
 Furthermore, of course, this person has also the power to 
make decisions on behalf of the child, as long as the child is not able to manage his or her 
own affairs independently.
220
 
 
The question may be why birth parents are given the statutory guardianship rights and what 
significance their rights have in this regard. In Neho v Duncan Judge Inglis QC in referring to 
Jeffries J in E v M
221
, cited with approval in Director-General of Social Welfare v L,
222
 
declares that:
223
  
 
… three plain reasons can be identified. In the first place there has to be someone with 
full legal capacity to make decisions regarding the child which the child, who has no 
legal capacity, cannot make himself. Secondly, by providing the parents with an 
entrenched status, the family unit of parents and child is protected from gratuitous or 
unjustified outside interference. Thirdly, … the fact that the parents have legal 
guardianship rights in respect of the child fastens on them the responsibility for nurturing 
the child to the stage where the child becomes independent of the parent: to provide 
shelter, clothing, food, together with love and affection and, in preparation for 
independence, education in its broadest sense, all demanding close and attentive physical 
and emotional involvement. 
 
                                               
217
  Care of Children Act, s 15. 
218  Brookers Family Law – Child Law (online looseleaf ed, Brookers) at [CC15.02]. 
219  At [CC15.04]. 
220  See Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] 1 AC 112, [1985] 3 All ER 402 
at 421; Brookers Family Law – Child Law (online looseleaf ed, Brookers) at [CC15.04]. 
221  E v M HC Wellington M 316/79, 13 September 1979. 
222  Director-General of Social Welfare v L [1989] 2 NZLR 314. 
223
  Neho v Duncan [1994] NZFLR 157 at 160. 
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Besides this general approach, s 15(b) of the Care of Children Act points to other current 
statutes and, according to some examples, parents are responsible for the enrolment and 
regular attendance at school,
224
 for providing the necessities of life and adequate health 
care
225
 and the protection of the child.
226
 Further on, they have to give consent to a marriage 
until the child turns 18.
227
 Consent of a guardian has to be obtained for entering a civil union 
as long as the child is under 18 years
228
 as well as for entering a de facto relationship.
229
 
 
In addition, s 16(1) provides regulations for the exercise of the guardianship stating that:
230
 
 
The duties, powers, rights, and responsibilities of a guardian of a child include (without 
limitation) the guardian‟s (a) having the role of providing day-to-day care for the child: 
and (b) contributing to the child‟s intellectual, emotional, physical, social, cultural, and 
other personal development; and (c) determining for or with the child, or helping the 
child to determine, questions about important matters affecting the child. 
 
According to s 8, “day-to-day care includes care that is provided only for one or more 
specified days or parts of days”.231 Conversely, this does not mean that longer-lasting care is 
not to be subsumed under this legal term.  
 
Interpreting a change to the concept of childhood, providing the child with rights and 
considering the child as an independent personality, the Care of Children Act no longer uses 
terms such as “possession” or “control”. 232  Rather, the guardian has the obligation to 
contribute to the child‟s development.233 According to Baragwanath J the Care of Children 
Act puts a greater emphasis on the rights of the child. A shift in policy can be recognised 
“from an emphasis on parental rights to exclusive focus on the rights of the child, the parents‟ 
position being assessed nowadays in terms not of rights but of responsibilities.”234 Examining 
a distinction between duties and rights Judge Inglis QC stated that:
235
 
 
… the focus must be, not so much on the parental right in the abstract, but rather on how 
or whether that right is exercised and the impact of such exercise or non-exercise on the 
child. Thus, in specific cases, the focus must be directed on the parental duties and 
obligations which are the unavoidable correlatives of the parental rights. And it is only 
                                               
224  Education Act 1989, ss 20(1), 24(1) and 29(1). 
225  Crimes Act 1961, s 152. 
226  Crimes Act 1961, ss 152, 154; Summary Offences Act 1981, s 10B. 
227  Marriage Act 1955, s 18. 
228
  Civil Union Act 2004, s 19. 
229  Care of Children Act 2004, s 46A. 
230  Section 16(1). 
231  Section 8. 
232  See Guardianship Act 1968, s 3. 
233  See Brookers Family Law – Child Law (online looseleaf ed, Brookers) at [CC16.04]. 
234  Auckland District Health Board v AZ and BZ HC Auckland CIV 2007-404-2260, 27 April 2007 at [20]. 
235
  Neho v Duncan [1994] NZFLR 157 at 160–161. 
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one analytical step from that to perceive parental duties and obligations in terms of the 
correlative right of the child to expect that those parental duties and obligations will be 
carried out and performed for the benefit and the welfare of the child. 
 
(ii) Guardianship as a dwindling right 
In the High Court decision Hawthorne v Cox Heath J had to deal inter alia with the question 
of whether an alleged behaviour of a mother can justify a guardianship order in favour of the 
court.
236
 The first respondent was the lawyer for the 16-year-old minor and applied for a 
guardianship order which was made by the Family Court. The mother successfully appealed 
against this order, though the Judge said that “inappropriate controlling conduct is 
inconsistent with the obligations and responsibilities of a guardian.”237 The guardians of the 
16-year-old girl “ought only to exercise advisory responsibilities” and contrary actions to 
those principles “may well be grounds to remove the person concerned as a guardian.”238 
 
Declaring that the concept of guardianship is a cooperative process and as such requires 
“collaboration between guardian and child (on the one hand) and between guardians 
themselves (on the other)”239  and that duties, powers, rights and responsibilities are the 
predominant factors determining the role of a guardian pursuant to s 16(1) of the Care of 
Children Act, 
240
 Heath J identified s 16(1) underlying principles in the following way:
241
  
 
(1) The younger the child, the more likely it is that decisions about important matters will 
need to be made by his or her guardian. (2) As the child gets older and becomes more 
mature, the guardianship role changes to that of an advisor or a counsellor, endeavouring 
to assist the child to make good decisions. 
 
Furthermore, Heath J declared that the Act is consistent with the Gillick approach: the rights 
of parents to make decisions of behalf of their child decrease as the child grows older and 
reaches “sufficient intelligence and understanding to make up his own mind”242 or in his 
words: “namely that a parent‟s interest in the development of his or her child does not amount 
to a „right‟ but is more accurately described as „a responsibility or duty‟”, which is reflected 
in s 16 itself.
243
 
 
In Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority and another the House of 
Lords had to deal with the question whether or not an under 16-year-old girl could be given 
                                               
236  Hawthorne v Cox [2008] 1 NZLR 409. 
237
  At [92]. 
238  At [92]. 
239  At [55]. 
240  At [52]. 
241  At [60]. 
242  Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] 1 AC 112, [1985] 3 All ER 402 
at [422]. 
243
  Hawthorne v Cox [2008] 1 NZLR 409 at [61]. 
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treatment on contraception without the knowledge or permission of the parents.
244
 Lord 
Scarman concluded “that parental rights are derived from parental duty and exist only so long 
as they are needed for the protection of the person and property of the child.”245 Furthermore, 
as the child‟s welfare is the paramount principle, it:246 
 
… limits and governs the exercise of parental rights of custody, care and control. It is a 
principle perfectly consistent with the law‟s recognition of the parent as the natural 
guardian of the child; but it is also a warning that parental right must be exercised in 
accordance with the welfare principle and can be challenged, even overridden, if it be not.  
 
The parental right is not an absolute right. Over time it is dwindling and “ends with little 
more than advice.”247 Citing this, Lord Scarman declared:248 
 
The principle is that parental right or power of control of the person and property of his 
child exists primarily to enable the parent to discharge his duty of maintenance, 
protection and education until he reaches such an age as to be able to look after himself 
and make his own decisions. 
 
In Director-General of Social Welfare v L the Court of Appeal dealt with the question of 
whether or not a mother‟s consent to adoption should be dispensed and what role the child‟s 
welfare and best interests plays in this regard. Hardie Boys J stated that the:
249
  
 
… rights of the natural parent arise from status and from the natural family relationship. 
But they are not absolute rights. They depend on the parent exercising the responsibilities 
of parenthood. 
 
This shows that the emphasis is on the child and parental rights serve only to support the 
development of the child. These are not “rights” that parents can enforce against their child. 
Parents have duties and responsibilities and they are entitled to fulfil these to the benefit of 
the child‟s welfare. Therefore, it can be concluded that parental “rights” do not exist, if they 
are pursued to the detriment of the child. Therefore, any action, which harms the child‟s 
welfare even in an insignificant way, can never be justified. 
 
(iii) Further provisions regarding the exercise of guardianship rights 
Section 16(3) of the Care of Children Act declares that:
250
 
                                               
244  Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] 1 AC 112, [1985] 3 All ER 402. 
245  At 420 per Lord Scarman. 
246  At 420 per Lord Scarman. 
247  Hewer v Bryant [1969] 3 All ER 579 at 582. 
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46 Legal Issues and Practice – The Care of Children Act and the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 
 
 
A guardian of a child may exercise (or continue exercise) the duties, powers, rights, and 
responsibilities of a guardian in relation to the child, whether or not the child lives with 
the guardian, unless a court order provides otherwise. 
 
Firstly, s 16(3) does not provide a power to remove the duties, powers, rights and 
responsibilities of a guardian.
251
 This section only declares that a court order may have this 
result, whether under this Act or another.
252
 Secondly, s 16(3) recognises that “a separation 
does not in itself mean that the … joint guardianship responsibilities … need to be 
changed.”253 Especially in cases where the child lives with foster parents, who are additional 
guardians, this plays a role. Pursuant to s 16(5): 
 
… in exercising … the duties, powers, rights, and responsibilities of a guardian in 
relation to a child, a guardian of the child must act jointly (in particular, by consulting 
wherever practicable with the aim of securing agreement) with any other guardians of the 
child. 
 
The idea is clear and self-evident at first blush. The parents of a child should act together and 
in “normal” cases this does not have to be declared. However, this mandatory codification 
may raise problems where parents separate and even more where a third party becomes a 
guardian of the child.
254
  
 
Another problem relating to the compulsory collaboration of guardians results from s 16(6) 
declaring that this “does not apply to the exclusive responsibility for the child‟s day-to-day 
living arrangements of a guardian exercising the role of providing day-to-day care.” When 
consultation is necessary remains unclear.
255
 
 
(iv) Guardianship under the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 
According to s 110, the court can make guardianship orders in favour of the chief executive 
of the Ministry of Social Development or other persons as, for example, new caregivers, if 
the child is in need of care and protection.
256
 Pursuant to s 2(1) “guardianship has the 
meaning as given to it by section 15 of the Care of Children Act”.257 Further discussion of the 
concept is therefore unnecessary. 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
250  Care of Children Act 2004. S 16(3). 
251
  JS v CR HC Auckland CIV-2011-404-002711, 20 September 2011 at [17]. 
252  At [17]. 
253  Rivers v Carian FC Palmerston North FP054/327/97, 23 August 2002 as cited in Brookers Family Law 
– Child Law (online looseleaf ed, Brookers) at [CC16.13]. 
254  See below VI A at 79. 
255  Family Law Service – Guardianship (online looseleaf ed, LexisNexis) at [6.201]. 
256  See also below chapter V A 3 (b) at 47. 
257
  Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989, s 2(1). 
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(v) Summary 
Guardianship as a legal concept confers rights and responsibilities to bring up a child. Caused 
by a “natural order” parents have these rights.258 In regard to the child the parental right is not 
a right. It is dwindling and exists only as long as it is exercised for the benefit of the child. As 
parents “normally” do, guardians have to work jointly together. 
(b) Appointment as guardian 
The birth parents are usually the natural guardians of a child.
259
 In addition to this, on an 
application by any person or on its own initiative, on making an order removing a guardian 
under s 29 of the Care of Children Act, a court may appoint a person as guardian of a child.
260
 
There is no restriction on who may apply to be appointed nor an age restriction. One main 
reason for an application is to formalise the actual responsibilities when another person 
instead of the natural guardians cares for the child.
261
 Furthermore, the actual caregiver will 
have a say in decisions affecting the child.
262
 In particular, foster parents “may seek greater 
security and recognition of their role”.263 The court may appoint the person either in addition 
or as a sole guardian.
264
 “In addition to any other guardian” means that a child can have more 
than two guardians. In S v C the grandparents were appointed as additional guardians to have 
a protective role in the child‟s life because the mother was concerned that there would be 
difficulties with the father in the future.
265
 In Crother v Green Judge von Dadelszen said that 
“it would be unrealistic for the child not to have as a guardian the person who was entrusted 
with the custody.”266 Hence, the grandmother who already had custody was appointed. The 
guardian can be appointed either for a specific purpose or generally,
267
 and either for a 
specific period or not.
268
  
 
The child‟s welfare has to be paramount.269 As stated above, s 5 of the Care of Children Act 
contains principles that have to be considered in determining the welfare of the specific child. 
                                               
258  An examination whether the parental right is a natural right or a legal status awarded to parents by the 
state is beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
259  However, some fathers will not be guardians, see Care of Children Act 2004, ss 17ff. 
260  Care of Children Act, s 27(1). 
261  Brookers Family Law – Child Law (online looseleaf ed, Brookers) at [CC27.02]. 
262  At [CC27.02]. 
263  At [CC27.02]. 
264
  Care of Children Act, s 27(1). 
265  S v C FC Marton FP 034 028 94, 28 April 1995 as cited in Family Law Service – Guardianship (online 
looseleaf ed, LexisNexis) at [6.204]. 
266  Crowther v Green FC Hastings FP020/113/96, 24 June 1998 as cited in Brookers Family Law – Child 
Law (online looseleaf ed, Brookers) at [CC27.02]. 
267  Care of Children Act, s 27(2)(a). 
268  Section 27(2)(b). 
269
  See Care of Children Act, s 4(1). 
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Because of the appointment of a guardian several principles may be affected.
270
 However, to 
serve the welfare of a child, generally, the person who is actually caring should be appointed 
as guardian.
271
 The appointment grants the person a recognised legal status and supports the 
person in fulfilling the parental role. Therefore, it is appropriate. 
 
Under the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act a court can appoint any other 
person to be a guardian where it makes a declaration pursuant s 67 that a child is in need of 
care and protection.
272
 According to s 14, a child is in need of care or protection if the child 
is being harmed, ill-treated, abused or seriously deprived,
273
 the child‟s well-being is being 
impaired or neglect, and that impairment or neglect is serious and avoidable,
274
 serious 
differences between the child and the parents or guardians exist to such an extent that the 
physical or mental or emotional well-being of the child is seriously impaired,
275
 the parents 
are unwilling or unable to care for the child,
276
 the parents have abandoned the child
277
 or 
serious differences exist between a parent or guardian and any other parent or guardian to 
such an extent, that the physical or mental or emotional well-being of the child is being 
seriously impaired.
278
 The court may appoint a person as sole guardian of the child
279
 or in 
addition to any other guardian,
280
 whereupon the consent of the person is necessary.
281
 The 
Act makes no provisions to appoint a guardian only for certain matters, in contrast to 
s 27(2)(a) of the Care of Children Act. However, in Director-General of Social Welfare v R it 
was declared that an additional guardian can be appointed “both „generally‟ and for [a] 
„particular purpose‟” under ss 110, 114.282 Section 112 gives the court the power to appoint 
the chief executive as a guardian for a particular purpose.
283
 The question is why does 
legislation not provide this possibility for any other person.
284
 
 
                                               
270  The principles contained in s 5(a): primary responsibility of the child‟s parents; s 5(b): continuity in the 
care arrangements and continuing relationship with both parents; s 5(d): relationship between child and 
family members should be preserved and strengthened; and s 5(e) protecting the child‟s safety.  
271  See Brookers Family Law – Child Law (online looseleaf ed, Brookers) at [CC27.04]. 
272  Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act, s 110(1); according to s 70, no application for a 
declaration may be made unless a family group conference has been held in several circumstances. The 
family group conference is not part of this dissertation due to the word limit. 
273  Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act, s 14(1)(a). 
274  Section 14(1)(b). 
275  Section 14(1)(c). 
276  Section 14(1)(f). 
277  Section 14(1)(g). 
278
  Section 14(1)(h). 
279  Section 110(2)(a). 
280  Section 110(2)(b). 
281  Section 111(c). 
282  Director-General of Social Welfare v R (1997) 16 FRNZ 357 at 376. 
283  Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act, s 112. 
284  However, this is beyond the scope of the paper due to the fact that this dissertation seeks to find an 
answer to the question whether or not permanent caregivers should become sole guardians. 
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A person appointed as a sole guardian under the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families 
Act has the same rights as set out in s 27 of the Care of Children Act.
285
  
 
Whether appointed under the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act or under the 
Care of Children Act the previous guardians remain guardians unless their guardianship 
rights are removed under the Care of Children Act.
286
 Doogue J said that sole guardianship 
under the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act cannot be compared with the 
removal of a parent as guardian under the Care of Children Act.
287
Effectively, the 
guardianship rights are suspended.
288
 According to s 114(2) of the Children, Young Persons, 
and Their Families Act, where a person is appointed as sole guardian the rights, 
responsibilities and duties of any other guardians are suspended and have no effect. However, 
the person remains a guardian. The White Paper intends to limit or reduce guardianship 
rights. The court will “direct which guardianship powers [should] reside exclusively with the 
caregivers.”289  
(c) Removing a parent as guardian 
An additional guardian has to work together with the birth parents. This can lead to several 
problems. One way of avoiding these problems is the termination of parental guardianship 
rights. 
 
(i) Existing provisions 
The guardianship of parents ends normally when the child turns 18, lives with another person 
in a de facto relationship, marries or enters a civil union.
290
 However, s 29(1)(a) contains 
regulations to make a court order to deprive a parent of the guardianship of his or her child. 
In addition, s 29(3) encloses in this respect the various cases:
291
 
 
An order under subsection (1)(a) (that is, an order depriving a parent of the guardianship 
of his or her child) must not be made unless the court is satisfied (a) that the parent is 
unwilling to perform or exercise the duties, powers, rights, and responsibilities of a 
guardian, or that the parent is for some grave reason unfit to be a guardian of the child; 
and that the order will serve the welfare and best interests of the child. 
 
                                               
285  Family Law Service – Children, Young Persons, and Their Families (online looseleaf ed, LexisNexis) 
at [6.578]. 
286  A v D-GSW [1995] NZFLR 241 at 245–246. 
287  Director-General of Social Welfare v B HC Palmerston North M 42/97, 18 August 1997 at 15. 
288  A v D-GSW [1995] NZFLR 241 at 246. 
289  Paula Bennett, Ministry of Social Development “The White Paper for Vulnerable Children” 
(Wellington, 2012) volume II at 125. 
290  Care of Children Act, s 28(1)(a). 
291
  Section 29(3) (emphasis added). 
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The first reason to remove a parent as guardian is his or her unwillingness to perform or 
exercise this role.
292
 “„Unwilling‟ … results from an act of will rather than force of 
circumstances.” 293  Furthermore, if a parent creates circumstances which prevent the 
fulfilment of guardianship duties and responsibilities this cannot be labelled as “force 
majeure” and the court could remove him or her as guardian as well.294 “Unwilling” may be 
not applicable when the parent cannot fulfil the parental role.
295
 
 
Second, to remove a parent as guardian a grave reason is needed. “Grave” in this context 
means “really serious”.296 Because of this grave reason the parent must be “unfit” to perform 
the role as a guardian of the child. A parent is “unfit” when his or her behaviour “constitutes 
a risk to the child‟s physical or psychological safety or wellbeing.”297 As the removal of a 
parent “should not be seen as a punishment for bad behaviour” the parent‟s status as guardian 
must be harmful to the child and, therefore, minor deficiencies may be not sufficient.
298
 
Serious reasons may be because of sexual abuse of the child or siblings or criminal 
convictions which put the parent in a situation of being unable to perform the role of a 
guardian because of the length of imprisonment or the nature of the conviction. Violence 
towards the other parent of the child or physical abuse of the child can be reasons to remove a 
parent as well as serious mental illness. 
 
In Pita v Putahi the father was removed as guardian because he murdered the mother of the 
child.
299
 According to Judge Inglis QC, he “disqualified himself by his own actions from any 
expectations that he might have any influences over [the child‟s] upbringing in the 
foreseeable future.”300 Further on Judge Inglis QC stated: 
 
There is no reason in [the child‟s] welfare, why [the other guardians of the child] should 
be required to consult with him on any guardianship issues, or that he should have the 
power to dispute any guardianship decisions they may make. 
 
In N v C-D Judge Murfitt also dealt with the removal of a parent as guardian. The father 
seriously assaulted his 15-days-old son sexually.
301
 The extremely serious assault in this case 
demonstrated “a fundamental repudiation of the responsibilities of a guardian to protect and 
nurture a child.”302 
                                               
292  Section 29(3)(a); Re D (An infant) [1971] NZLR 737 at 744. 
293  Brookers Family Law – Child Law (looseleaf online ed, Brookers) at [CC29.05]. 
294  At [CC29.05]. 
295
  At [CC29.05]. 
296  Re D (an infant) [1971] NZLR 737 at 744. 
297  At [CC29.04A]. 
298  At [CC29.04A]. 
299  Pita v Putahi FC Rotorua FP063/075/98, 29 September 2000. 
300  At [18]. 
301  N v C-D [2009] NZFLR 193 at [4]. 
302
  At [10]. 
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Where a parent is unwilling to meet the responsibilities of a guardian or unfit because of a 
grave reason the court can only remove guardianship if this serves the child‟s welfare and 
best interests.
303
 “The welfare and best interests principle emphasis continuity and 
strengthening of the relationship of the child and parent unless the child‟s safety is at risk.”304 
The removal of a parent as guardian is very rare.
305
 It is seen as a further step to deprive a 
parent of guardianship, even if he or she is unfit.
306
 Courts may refrain if there is a strong 
bonding between the child and the parent and the removal of the guardianship could 
detrimentally affect the relationship and the child‟s welfare. Lastly, “the child must be given 
reasonable opportunities to express views on matters affecting the child” and these views 
have to be considered.
307
 
 
(ii) Application 
Only an eligible person is able to make an application for the purpose of removal:
308
  
 
[Eligible] person, in relation to a child, means any of the following persons: (a) a parent 
of the child: (b) a guardian of the child: (c) a grandparent or aunt or uncle of the child: (d) 
a sibling (including half-sibling) of the child: (e) a spouse or partner of a parent of the 
child: (f) any other person granted leave to apply be the Court. 
 
The legislation does not list the child as an eligible person. Rather, the child could apply for 
an order to deprive a parent of the guardianship as “any other person granted leave to apply 
by the Court”. Especially considering that siblings are eligible persons pursuant to s 29(2)(d) 
irrespective of their age or maturity this provision seems to be inconsistent. Child, Youth and 
Family comes under the definition of “eligible person” under s 29(2)(f) as well as actual 
caregivers. 
 
(iii) Effect of removal 
To deprive a parent of his or her guardianship rights is the most dramatic measure that 
generally should be taken only in “exceptional circumstances”.309 The status of the guardian 
is revoked. There is no provision in the statute to reinstate a natural guardian once the rights 
have been removed. “Presumably though, such a parent could come back as a court-
appointed guardian.”310 In contrast, placing the child under the guardianship of the court does 
not extinguish the rights of a guardian. Rather they are suspended with the possibility to 
                                               
303
  At [5], [6], [7]. 
304  Family Law Service – Guardianship (looseleaf online ed, LexisNexis) at [6.205]. 
305  N v C-D [2009] NZFLR 193 at [6]. 
306  At [6]. 
307  Care of Children Act, s 6(2); see to the views of a child above V A 2 (d) at 39. 
308  Section 29(2). 
309  Re D (an infant) [1971] NZLR 737 at 742. 
310
  Family Law Service – Guardianship (online looseleaf ed, LexisNexis) at [6.205]. 
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obtain them back.
311
 Otherwise the child would have no guardian at all when the 
guardianship of the court ends and “it is not easy to accept an interpretation which will have 
that result.”312 If the order granting the court guardianship is repealed the natural guardians 
are left and resume their role.
313
 It is stated that this approach is nevertheless “consistent with 
the grounds on which it can be made, being limited to parents who are either unwilling or 
unfit to be guardians.”314 An even less invasive possibility is the appointment of additional 
guardians. Again, birth parents as guardians would share their role and responsibility with a 
third party.
315
 
 
(iv) Criticism 
Albeit criticism seems justified. First of all, the provision is inconsistent in itself: there is a 
big gap between “unwilling” and “grave reasons” when the latter only relates to really serious 
cases. Furthermore, harm to a child can be done at an earlier stage. Therefore, it might be 
necessary to intervene before a grave reason occurs. Children have rights and they have needs 
to be met. With the focus on the child‟s welfare there is an objective minimum, even though 
the welfare has to be determined individually for every child: as stated above in defining 
welfare, food, shelter, clothing, education should be provided. Where a parent fails to do so 
state intervention to protect the child is necessary. Of course, not in every case guardianship 
rights should be removed. Several steps to help the family to overcome the problems should 
be taken. However, bearing in mind that the child‟s welfare has to be paramount and the 
child‟s safety must be protected, furthermore, that the child should grow up in a harmonious 
family-like setting with the possibility to develop an individual personality to become a full 
member of the society, it is debatable whether the removal of a parent should happen at an 
earlier stage. Physical harm towards the child must be a reason to remove a parent as a 
guardian.
316
 Furthermore, “unwilling” should be interpreted in a broader sense. As research 
shows that neglect can lead to brain damage
317
 and thus negatively affect the child‟s welfare, 
a neglectful parent has to be seen as “unwilling”.  
 
As stated above, the child‟s welfare is influenced by different issues. However, where the 
physical integrity is no longer protected, parents do not deserve to care for their child. 
Physical integrity is the minimum standard, if such a standard has to be determined.  
 
                                               
311
  Hawthorne v Cox [2008] 1 NZLR 409 at [81]. 
312  Re T [1982] 2 NZLR 662 at 664. 
313  At 664. 
314  Hawthorne v Cox [2008] 1 NZLR 409 at [82]. 
315  See below V B 1 at 65. 
316  Physical harm in this regard is seen as lasting physical damage, intentional injury. 
317  Nicola Atwool “Permanency: what children need” (New Zealand Law Society Care and Protections 
Orders and CYFS Seminar, Wellington, 25 October 2012). 
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(v) Potential risks 
Another question may be whether the child has to be an actual victim or whether potential 
risk is sufficient, for example, where another child of the parents was abused or neglected. 
Again, the specific circumstances of the case have to be taken into account. Potential risk is a 
reason to look more closely and to monitor the relationship between parents and child. But 
potential risk itself, caused by past deeds towards other persons, may not be sufficient enough 
to remove guardianship rights. Especially if a long time has passed, the parents must be given 
the opportunity to change and to prove that they have changed. 
 
The White Paper contains a proposal to introduce Child Abuse Prevention orders which focus 
on future risks rather than past behaviour.
318
 It does not include a suggestion to limit parental 
responsibilities where a placement places a future risk at the child.  
 
(vi) Proceeding 
Lastly, there should be no debate about the question of who should make such a decision. It is 
a serious step. Parents should be given the opportunity to be heard. They have to have 
procedural rights, have to have the chance to appeal and to challenge the decision until a 
certain point in time when circumstances have changed. This right must expire when the 
child lives in secure permanent placement and any disruption would be detrimental. In the 
end, the decision has to be made by an objective authority. Therefore, the decisions must be 
made by a judge within a process of law. 
 
Finally, it is important to note that a grave reason or unwillingness is no prerequisite 
removing a guardian who is not a birth parent. Therefore, it is sufficient enough that the order 
will serve the child‟s welfare and best interests.319 Where non-birth parents have become 
psychological parents for the child this can be seen as inconsistently focusing on the child‟s 
welfare. Or with other words: Is the blood tie so strong that the child must accept more 
detriment? 
 
(vii) Summary 
It has to be kept in mind that the specific child has to be considered. Besides the more general 
minimum standard, specific reasons can occur that can be seen as sufficient reasons to 
remove a parent as guardian. To have the opportunity to care for a child should be seen as 
something special, not as onerously task. 
 
                                               
318  Paula Bennett, Ministry of Social Development “The White Paper for Vulnerable Children” 
(Wellington, 2012) volume II at 138. 
319
  Care of Children Act, s 29(4). 
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As shown, the removal of a parent as guardian is rare and happens only in exceptional cases. 
Where children can no longer live with their birth parents, often the chief executive becomes 
sole guardian
320
 and after discharging this order the new caregivers can be appointed 
additional guardians. This means that they have to work jointly together with the birth 
parents. 
 
The White Paper talks about limiting parental guardianship rights. This is a less restrictive 
intervention than a removal. Unfortunately, it remains unclear whether birth parents can get 
legal responsibilities back. Probably not, because the new guardianship orders will be used to 
finalise the permanent Home for Life care arrangement.
321
 The remaining question is why 
limit or reduce the rights only where the child is placed in a Home for Life arrangement? It 
may be necessary to remove guardianship rights where a parent places at high risk a child 
who does not yet live in a permanent placement, even though a “grave reason” is not 
apparent. The question of whether parental rights should be removed has to be distinguished 
from the question of whether foster parents should be given sole guardianship. 
4 Parenting and custody orders 
In some cases foster parents refrain from appointment as additional guardian due to the 
obligation of joint co-operation. Instead the chief executive remains guardian. To secure the 
placement with the new caregivers in such a case parenting orders can be achieved:
322
 
 
On an application made to it for the purpose by an eligible person, the Court may make a 
parenting order determining the time or times when specified persons have the role of 
providing day-to-day care for, or may have contact with, the child.  
 
Section 47(1) of the Care of Children Act determines what eligible person means. Thus an 
application can be made by:
323
 
 
(a) a parent of the child: (b) a guardian of the child: (c) a spouse or partner of a parent of 
the child: (d) any other person who is a member of the child‟s family, whānau, or other 
culturally recognised family group, and who is granted leave to apply by the court: (e) 
any other person granted leave to apply by the court. 
 
The new caregivers are not specially mentioned in s 47 as eligible person. Hence, they only 
have the opportunity to apply for a parenting order if the court granted leave. Therefore, “the 
                                               
320  Pursuant to s 110(1), (2); only the director of a child and family support services cannot be appointed 
as sole guardian, s 110(3). 
321  Paula Bennett, Ministry of Social Development “The White Paper for Vulnerable Children” 
(Wellington, 2012) volume II at 124. 
322  Care of Children Act 2004, s 48(1). 
323
  Section 47(1). 
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applicants need to demonstrate an appropriate and sustainable interest in promoting the 
welfare of the child” and have to show “that there is an arguable issue.”324 However, in an 
arguable case that the order would be in the child‟s best interests the court should grant 
leave.
325
 
 
A parenting order includes two different issues: day-to-day care for and contact with the 
child.
326
  
(a) Day-to-day care 
As mentioned, a parenting order applies to the day-to-day care. According to s 48(2) of the 
Care of Children Act:
327
 
 
A parenting order determining that a person has the role of providing day-to-day care for 
the child may specify that the person has the role (a) at all times or at specified times: 
and (b) either alone or jointly with [one] or more other persons. 
 
Parenting orders give the court the opportunity to form arrangements which suit the particular 
child in his or her special circumstances. Section 48(5) declares that “a parenting order may 
also be subject to any other terms or conditions … the Court determines.” This provision is 
broad. Possible conditions can affect health, education, holidays and religion regarding the 
child.
328
 Furthermore, they can affect the parents directly as a parent has to undertake a 
parenting programme, go to rehab and undergo regularly recurring drug tests or avoid contact 
of specified people having the child in care.
329
  
 
In the most cases, foster parents will apply for a parenting order in their favour to secure the 
relationship with the child more and get some legal responsibility. Parenting orders in their 
favour can be conditional. This may be the case if the child, for example, is raised in another 
religion from the new caregiver or there were some difficulties in the relationship between 
the birth parents and the new caregivers (especially if the placement is a kinship placement). 
 
Situations can be imagined in which birth parents apply for parenting orders in their favour 
even when the child has lived for a longer period with new caregivers, justified by the 
principle in s 5(b) that birth parents should have the primary responsibility and furthermore 
                                               
324  GFS v ES [2007] NZFLR 495 at [23]. 
325
  See AHP v RGJ FC Hamilton FAM-2007-019-001613, 29 April 2008 at [24]. 
326  R v R FC Palmerston North FAM-2001-054-723, 17 August 2005 at [10]; Brookers Family Law – 
Child Law (online looseleaf ed, Brookers) at [CC48.05]. 
327  Care of Children Act, s 48(2). 
328  See for further examples Brookers Family Law – Child Law (online looseleaf ed, Brookers) 
at [CC48.28A]. 
329  See for further examples Brookers Family Law – Child Law (online looseleaf ed, Brookers) 
at [CC48.28A]. 
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that the relationship between parents and child should be ongoing and supported. In several 
cases judges ordered shared day-to-day care between parents so the child has according to the 
principle set out in s 5(b) a continuing relationship with both parents. Nevertheless, if shared 
day-to-day care causes a risk to the child‟s welfare this is not an option. Gault J declared this 
in the case B v VE:
330
 
 
Any arrangement by which the child spends substantial time with each parent has the 
potential for harm to the child arising from inconsistent activities, influences and living 
patterns. To reconcile these for the purpose of providing the child with stable and 
consistent support necessarily must involve substantial agreement and co-operation 
between the parents. These problems of course remain where children spend substantial 
periods of time with non-custodial parents exercising access rights. I think that the 
difficulties are likely to be less however when primary responsibility for the care of the 
child rests with one parent rather than with both. 
 
Transferred to the situation of a permanent placement this means that the foster parent who 
actually cares for the child should be the only legally responsible person endowed with 
corresponding rights to avoid any risks for the child‟s welfare. Nevertheless, there is the 
possibility of a joint parenting order in the future, for example, where the child lives in a 
kinship placement. This can cause additional problems, when, for example, the grandmother 
has to work together with her own daughter for the benefit of her grandchild, even though she 
does not agree with the opinion of her own daughter.
331
 
 
The legislation does not provide a presumption in favour of birth parents. As examined 
above, the child‟s welfare is the first and paramount consideration. This means that the 
welfare has to take priority over blood ties.
332
 Otherwise the child‟s welfare and best interests 
would be subordinated compared to the interests of birth parents:
333
 
 
The biological tie does not give a natural parent a right to custody or access. The relevant 
right is the right of the child to have his or her welfare and interests treated as paramount. 
 
If a child is subject to a guardianship or custody order under ss 78, 101 or 110 of the 
Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act, a parenting order cannot be made.
334
 
 
According to s 101(1)(e) of the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act, a court 
may make an order placing the child in the custody of any other person. The person must 
                                               
330  B v VE (1988) 5 NZFLR 65 at 70. 
331  See Marie Connolly “A kinship care literature review” (2003) 25 Social Work Now 24 at 28. 
332  See A v Ministry of Social Development [Access] [2009] NZFLR 625 at [57]. 
333  At [57]. 
334
  Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act, s 120(1). 
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consent to the order.
335
 These custody orders have the same effect a parenting order has, 
made under s 48(1) of the Care of Children Act.
336
 Pursuant to s 2 of the Children, Young 
Persons, and Their Families Act, custody means the right to possession and care of a child.
337
 
Considering the child as a person with rights, there cannot be a “possession” of the child. In 
this regard, it is necessary to change the wording, perhaps comparable with the Care of 
Children Act. 
 
A custody order suspends all rights, powers and duties of every other person having 
custody,
338
 so affecting every parenting order under the Care of Children Act.
339
 Judge 
Murfitt has held that a custody order may constitute a serious interference in the life of a 
citizen and should reflect this; therefore, it “should not be granted lightly.”340 Furthermore, in 
some cases a parenting order under the Care of Children Act is sufficient to respond to the 
special circumstances, so that a custody order is not required.
341
 
(b) Contact 
Parenting orders under the Care of Children Act can also define contact with the child. 
Therefore, a contact order is a form of a parenting order and not a seperate order itself;
342
 “a 
parenting order must be in place if a contact order is to be made.”343 Section 48(3) declares:  
 
A parenting order determining that a person may have contact with the child may specify 
any of the following: (a) the nature of that contact (for example, whether it is direct (that 
is, face to face) contact or some form of indirect contact (for example, contact by way of 
letters, telephone calls, or email)): (b) the duration and timing of that contact: (c) any 
arrangements that are necessary or desirable to facilitate that contact. 
 
Under the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act the court may make an order 
granting access
344
 to the child on an application made by any parent or any other person.
345
 
This provision is wider than ss 47 and 48 of the Care of Children Act. Before making an 
                                               
335  Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act, s 101(3). 
336  Section 104(1)(a). 
337  Section 2 (emphasis added). 
338  Section 104(1)(b). 
339  Director-General of Social Welfare v R (1997) 16 FRNZ 357 at 374. 
340
  Child Youth and Family Service v S FC New Plymouth FAM-2005-043-784, 15 November 2006 
at [67]. 
341  At [67]. 
342  Brookers Family Law – Child Law (online looseleaf ed, Brookers) at [CC48.37]. 
343  R v R FC Palmerston North FAM-2001-054-723, 17 August 2005 at [11]. 
344  The Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act uses the word “access”. In the following the 
term “contact” will be used instead. 
345
  Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act, s 121(2)(d) (emphasis added). 
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order granting contact, there has to be a custody order or a guardianship order,
346
 and thus 
depends on the existence of a s 101 or s 110 order. 
 
In the case of a permanent placement contact orders may be important for birth parents as the 
child does not live with them and is no longer in their personal daily care. Contact with birth 
parents may also be important for the child as it gives the child the chance to maintain 
relationship with the birth family. Furthermore, contact helps to preserve and strengthen the 
child‟s identity, which includes the child‟s origin. However, it should be kept in mind that 
contact with birth parents influences the relationship between the new caregivers and the 
child. Judge Inglis QC stated:
347
  
 
… any such liberality of access must depend on the cooperation of [the child‟s] principal 
caregivers, and it would have to be said that it is demanding enough to ask the caregiver 
to cope with a disturbed child without also having to cope with access problems as well. 
 
It is important to find the right balance. There is not only the question of whether or not a 
child should have contact with birth parents. The form of contact – face to face or telephone, 
email, Skype – as well as the frequency and the duration have to be determined. This can be 
done within a contact order.
348
  
 
Moreover, the frequency and form of contact may depend on the duration of the placement: 
“If it is anticipated that a child will be returned to their parents, then frequency of contact will 
be greater than children who are permanently placed.” 349  Furthermore, the possibility of 
having contact also depends on the reason for the removal of the child. There is a difference 
whether the child was removed because of neglect, abuse or mental health problems. This has 
also to be taken into account. Where the child is placed in the custody of any person pursuant 
to s 101 of the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act and a contact order has not 
been made, this person has the sole authority to determine contact issues.
350
 
 
On the other hand, where parents do not want to have contact to their child, it may be 
detrimental for the child to force them to do so, even though contact would support defining 
the child‟s identity. At least, there is the question of whether or not contact can be enforced 
against unwilling parents.  
 
                                               
346  See Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act, s 121(2)(b) or (a). 
347
  Re Children FC Napier CYPF 041/002/89, 13 June 1990 at 4 as cited in Family Law Service – 
Children, Young Persons, and Their Families (online looseleaf ed, LexisNexis) at [6.578]. 
348  See Care of Children Act, s 48; and Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act, s 121(3). 
349  Tracy Gunn “Review of practice relating to representing clients in proceedings under the Children, 
Young Persons, and Their Children Act 1989” in Nicola Atwool and Tracy Gunn (eds) Care and 
Protection Orders and CYFS (paper presented to New Zealand Law Society Care and Protection 
Orders and CYFS Seminar, Wellington, 25 October 2012) at 9. 
350
  Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act, s 107. 
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Contact to birth parents can have a detrimental effect for the placement because of negative 
comments about the new caregivers or because parents do not accept their new role and their 
limitation or they have a different style in care-giving during the access time. “Where there is 
no buffer between those caregivers and the family group, the placement is destabilised 
commonly through access arrangements.” 351  However, it is also said that access may 
sometimes disrupt the placement, but “that this is the burden that goes with the privilege and 
joy of primary care.”352 It should be kept in mind that a permanent placement “should suffer 
the minimum disruption.”353  
 
Especially in a case of a permanent placement, contact will not be granted to develop a 
relationship between child and birth parents. In Chief Executive of the Ministry of Social 
Development v SK Judge Somerville analysed the attachment of the children and the purpose 
of contact as follows:
354
 
 
Because none of the boys is demonstrating attachments to anyone other than the foster 
parents, none of them is experiencing a sense of loss which should be addressed by 
access. Instead, they simply need to have an understanding of who their parents are that 
is based on reality and is not idealised. This will give them a sense of what has happened 
in their lives and an appreciation of where they come from. 
 
Finally, the child‟s wishes have to be considered. Where a child wishes not to have contact, it 
should be denied.
355
 Nevertheless, contact to birth parents and other family members, for 
example, siblings might be important for the child. Therefore, the child‟s views have to be 
taken into account and should be the first consideration. 
 
However, the focus is on the child‟s welfare. Contact to birth parents might be suspended or 
limited or the form might be varied, where the child would suffer detrimental effects, even 
though contact would be in the child‟s long-term interests.356 On the other hand, it is stated 
that, although contact would have lightly disadvantageous impacts on the child short-term, it 
should be granted because of the beneficial long-term effects.
357
 To understand the child‟s 
own background and identity is important and this can be achieved by contact.
358
 
 
                                               
351  E v G [parenting orders] 2008 NZFLR 337 at [31]. 
352  CEMSD v M FC Dunedin FAM-2001-012-148, 15 April 2005 at 49. 
353  A v Ministry of Social Development [Access] [2009] NZFLR 625 at [18]. 
354  Chief Executive of the Ministry of Social Development v SK FC Christchurch FAM-2006-009-4165, 19 
September 2011 at [33]. 
355  See Director-General of Social Welfare v R (1997) 16 FRNZ 357 at 371. 
356  W v D-GSW (1991) 7 FRNZ 450. 
357  Re the L children (Family Court, Papakura CYPF 055/15-20/94, 7 December 2001 as cited in Family 
Law Service – Children, Young Persons, and Their Families (online looseleaf ed, LexisNexis) 
at [6.578]. 
358  See A v Ministry of Social Development [Access] [2009] NZFLR 625 at [57], where it is said that “this 
is a reason why access will be directed.” 
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In the end, there is no general solution that fits all. Children in permanent placements cannot 
be compared with children in care of foster parents for a shorter time. Whether or not contact 
should be granted and how has to be answered case-specific and the special circumstances a 
specific child has to deal with have to be taken into account. Even in a permanent placement 
it might be appropriate to have more frequent contact. On the other hand, contact with birth 
parents can lead to loyalty conflicts and more negative experiences. First of all, the child has 
to be in a secure and safe placement.
359
 Contact must not be able to undermine this. Only 
where contact has a beneficial effect should it be granted. 
5 Resolving disputes 
There are different approaches to resolve a day-to-day care or contact dispute after the 
separation of the parents of a child, if they are not able to find a solution by themselves. “The 
underlying assumption in this area of law is that parents know what is best for their 
children.”360 Keeping this in mind, the opportunities start by a joint meeting between the 
parties and their lawyers and negotiation through their lawyers, counselling and conciliation, 
and if those do not work out, at last a court hearing.
361
  
 
However, in cases involving a third party such as because of a permanent placement with 
foster parents, those informal techniques do not seem helpful, especially if the parties are at 
odds with each other or the birth parents cannot accept the new situation. Nevertheless, the 
Care of Children Act requires the foster parents to work together with the birth parents of the 
child.
362
 When the adults involved are not able to agree on a certain matter, any of them can 
request a counselling or apply to the court for its direction.
363
 In the latter case, the court may 
make any order that it thinks proper.
364
 Possible disputes are not restricted to important 
matters affecting the child as referred to in s 16(2).
365
 They range from disputes about 
education, to religion, health and place of residents, as well as “disputes over consultation 
and sharing information between guardians”.366 
                                               
359  Nicola Atwool “Permanency: what children need” in Nicola Atwool and Tracy Gunn (eds) Care and 
Protection Orders and CYFS (paper presented to New Zealand Law Society Care and Protection 
Orders and CYFS Seminar, Wellington, 25 October 2012) at 36. 
360  Family Law Service –Day-to-day care and contact (online looseleaf ed, LexisNexis) at [6.101]. 
361  See Family Law Service – Day-to-day care and contact (online looseleaf ed, LexisNexis) at [6.102] for 
further explanation. 
362  Care of Children Act, s 16(5). 
363
  Section 44(1). Clause 8 of the Family Court Proceedings Reform Bill 2012 will repeal s 44. The new 
introduced s 46D will deal with disputes between guardians; see clause 9. According to s 46D(1) any of 
the guardians may apply to the court for its direction they are unable to agree on a matter concerning 
the exercise of their guardianship. The court may make any order relating to the matter that it thinks 
proper, new s 46D(4). 
364  Care of Children Act, s 44(3); see also Family Court Proceedings Reform Bill 2012, clause 9. 
365  Brookers Family Law – Child Law (online looseleaf ed, Brookers) at [CC44.08]. 
366
  At [CC44.08]. 
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The application can only be made by a guardian. This means that foster parents cannot apply 
if they are not appointed as guardians of the child, parents cannot apply if the guardianship 
rights have been removed and a guardian cannot apply to seek the court‟s direction in a 
dispute with a non-guardian. Where foster parents only have a parenting order the court 
cannot resolve disputes under s 44. They may have the possibility to apply to vary the 
parenting order. There are no provisions to enforce the decision of the court. One possibility 
is to place the child under the guardianship of the court and direct an agent to take steps to 
enforce the order.
367
 
 
Instead of making a direction the court could also make a time-limited or purpose-limited 
order to solve the dispute and give guardianship rights to a third or fourth person, especially 
if there are no parenting orders in force.
368
 However, in cases of a permanent placement with 
a new caregiver, this solution might not be appropriate, dividing the responsibilities between 
too many people. Finally, if the court could deal with the dispute sufficient under s 44, 
changing the parenting order is not necessary.
369
 
 
Furthermore, the court cannot make an order under s 44 if there are guardianship or custody 
orders in force under the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act. Under the 
Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act a guardian may also apply to the court for 
its direction and the court has the power to make such an order as it thinks fit.
370
 As well as 
under the Care of Children Act, only a guardian can apply. 
 
Even though both statutes contain provision to resolve disputes between parents and 
guardians, an application for such a direction is a further step to be taken. The dispute may 
exist much longer and during this time it may have a detrimental influence on the child‟s 
welfare. Furthermore, it cannot be advantageous for the child to be the permanent centre of  
disputes. No matter how good the new foster parents may be, they cannot hide ongoing 
disputes. On the other hand, the child cannot develop a feeling of security and belonging, if 
the caregivers are not able to decide everyday questions, for example, extracurricular 
activities or special school trips, without consent of the birth parents. Therefore, the current 
provisions seem insufficient to support the child‟s welfare. 
 
Besides the imprecise wording of the White Paper, the proposal to limit parental guardianship 
rights “by enabling the Family Court to direct which guardianship powers should reside 
exclusively with the caregivers” may be a step to prevent future disputes.371 
                                               
367  Brookers Family Law – Child Law (online looseleaf ed, Brookers) at [CC44.29]. 
368  At [CC27.07]. 
369  See Wright v Wright [1984] 1 NZLR 366 at 372. 
370  Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act, s 115. 
371  Paula Bennett, Ministry of Social Development “The White Paper for Vulnerable Children” 
(Wellington, 2012) volume II at 125. 
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6 Challenging court orders  
Birth parents can challenge court orders like guardianship orders or parenting orders in 
favour of the new caregivers. Under the Care of Children Act, the court may vary or 
discharge a parenting order,
372
 any other order about the role of providing day-to-day care 
for, or about contact with, a child,
373
 an order about the upbringing of a child
374
 or an order 
vesting the guardianship in a person.
375
 The application can be made by an eligible person, so 
a person affected by the order or a person acting on behalf of the child.
376
 
 
A person affected by the order is someone the order has a material effect on.
377
 A parent or a 
party to the order is an eligible person.
378
 “… [On] a literal interpretation it would cover 
people … who are not able [to] apply for a parenting order without prior leave of the 
court.”379 The Care of Children Act acknowledges the role of the family, for example in s 5 
and s 47, so that the provision should be extended to the wider family or whānau.380  
 
The applicant need not show a change in circumstances to file the application. Furthermore, 
the Care of Children Act does not contain any specific threshold that must be overcome 
before an application can be filed. Even though “the court may look closely at the reason for 
the application” and may dismiss the proceeding pursuant to s 140,381 or “further litigation 
will not be permitted unless a welfare issue arises”,382 it is in the end an intervention in the 
life of the child with the new caregivers that could be detrimental for the child. Indeed, s 141 
declares that a person may commence a proceeding under the Act of any kind only with the 
leave of the court, if the court is satisfied that a person has persistently instituted vexatious 
proceedings under this Act and has given the person a reasonable opportunity to be heard. So 
once a court has dealt with a sufficient number of applications it can dismiss any further 
requests. However, before this “sufficient number” is reached, every application is a potential 
threat to the placement. 
 
The Ministry of Justice published Family Court Review: a public consultation paper and 
asked whether access to the Family Court should be limited and whether changes are 
necessary due to the fact that ss 140, 141 show limited use in practice because of the too high 
                                               
372  Care of Children Act, s 56(1)(a). 
373  Section 56(1)(b); which can be an order under s 44. 
374  Section 56(1)(c). 
375
  Section 56(2). 
376  Section 56(1) and (3). 
377  B v M [1997] 3 NZLR 202 at 205. 
378  Brookers Family Law – Child Law (online looseleaf ed, Brookers) at [CC56.03]. 
379  At [CC56.03]. 
380  At [CC56.03]. 
381  At [CC56.05]. 
382
  Family Law Service – Day-to-day care and contact (online looseleaf ed, LexisNexis) at [6.138]. 
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thresholds.
383
 Some submissions “suggested greater powers were needed to limit vexatious 
and repeat claims.” 384  The ensuing Cabinet Paper provides that “a material change in 
circumstances” has to be shown before an application can be made.385 Furthermore, “any 
application may also be dismissed if its is contrary to the welfare and best interest of the 
child, if it purposes only minor changes, or is without merit.”386 Moreover, it is suggested that 
leave has to be obtained for “new proceedings … where an order has been made within the 
previous two years”.387 For the benefit of the child, these proposed changes are to embrace. In 
October 2012 the Family Court Proceedings Reform Bill 2012 was introduced. Clause 27 
amends the Care of Children Act 2004 in inserting s 139A. According to s 139A leave has to 
be obtained.
388
 The same applies to the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 
1989, amended by clause 80 which inserts the new ss 206A and 206B.
389
 
 
An application to vary or discharge an order vesting the guardianship in a person applies to a 
court appointed guardian.
390
 Under such an application the court cannot suspend or remove 
guardianship rights; deprivation and suspension are dealt with under s 29.
391
 Guardianship 
rights may only be separated by a guardianship order for a limited time or limited purpose.
392
 
 
According to s 56(4), any order under the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 
cannot be varied or discharged because of an application under s 56. 
 
Under the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act the court has the power for a 
variation or discharge of inter alia any custody order made under s 101, any guardianship 
order made under s 110 and any order made under s 121 granting access to, or conferring 
rights in respect of, any child.
393
 Section 126 provides an extensive list of person who may 
apply for such a variation or discharge. An application can be filed, besides others, by the 
child in respect of whom the order was made,
394
 any parent or guardian of that child,
395
 any 
near relative of that child,
396
 any member of that child‟s whānau or family group,397 and, with 
                                               
383  Ministry of Justice “Reviewing the Family Court: a public consultation paper” (Wellington, 20 
September 2011) at 45–46. 
384  Ministry of Justice “Summary of Submissions in response to Reviewing the Family Court: a public 
consultation paper” (Wellington, April 2012) at 27. 
385  Minister of Justice “Family Court Review: Proposals to Reform” (2012) at [94]. 
386  At [94]. 
387  At [95]. 
388  See also explanation above fn 207. 
389  See also explanation above fn 207. 
390
  Brookers Family Law – Child Law (online looseleaf ed, Brookers) at [CC56.08]. 
391  CJJ v HJJ HC Auckland CIV-2011-404-2801, 28 September 2011 at [22]. 
392  Brookers Family Law – Child Law (online looseleaf ed, Brookers) at [CC56.09]. 
393  Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act, s 125(1)(f), (g) and (h). 
394  Section 126(a). 
395  Section 126(b). 
396  Section 126(d). 
397
  Section 126(e). 
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the leave of the court, any other person.
398
 These provisions also do not contain a threshold to 
file an application. However, Judge van Dadelszen declared that the applicant has to 
demonstrate a change in the evidence and finding made at the time of the first order.
399
 
Furthermore he said, that there may be cases where the court:
400
  
 
… need to use the inherent power … to prevent an abuse of its process and there needs to 
be a mechanism in place to prevent a repeat of this application unless the circumstances 
clearly justify it. 
 
A court will only vary or discharge an order if it has “outlived [its] usefulness”.401 Under the 
Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act the court has to determine what the 
consequences will be if a protective order is withdrawn and whether the child is in need of 
care and protection.
402
 
 
However, in the end it is again an intervention in the child‟s life and it can be 
disadvantageous for the placement of the child. It endangers the permanency and places the 
new caregivers in a “defence position”. As already examined, a stressed situation for the 
caregivers can influence the child‟s welfare. Therefore, there should be a threshold to protect 
the new family environment against inappropriate interferences. The proposed changes may 
give more security to the placement. 
7 Summary 
One of the problems is that the Care of Children Act does not grant consistency for the 
affected child. The parenting orders as well as the guardianship orders can be challenged by 
the birth parents. Due to the contestability of the court order the relationship between the 
child and the new family could be destabilised or even more the placement could be 
overthrown. The same applies to the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act.  
 
Court orders can be discharged or varied because of an application made by the birth parents, 
without having to meet certain requirements. This is disadvantageous for the security of the 
placement. Foster parents of children in permanent placements have to face the possibility of 
interference in their family environment. Parenting orders may not be strong enough to secure 
the placement. Furthermore, they seem not to be meant for long durations like years. 
                                               
398
  Section 126(o). 
399  S v D-GSW FC Palmerston North CYPF (054) 7/90, 6 December 1990 at 4 as cited in Family Law 
Service – Children, Young Persons, and Their Families (online looseleaf ed, LexisNexis) at [6.580] 
n 12. 
400  S v D-GSW [1991] NZFLR 89 at 91. 
401  JG v Chief Executive of the Ministry of Social Development FC Rotorua FAM-1999-063-15, FAM-
2002-063-638, 22 May 2007 at [26]. 
402
  At [26]. 
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However, this is the case with a permanent placement. With birth parents remaining 
guardians
403
 they have a say in the upbringing of the child. A parenting order cannot overrule 
guardianship rights. The exercise of these rights is only granted to someone else. This does 
not mean that the parents are cut off. A parenting order is not an appropriate legal mechanism 
for foster parents bringing up a child. The interferences they have to fear are too strong to 
have the feeling of security. 
B Foster Parents and Birth Parents 
Once a permanent placement is formalised the relationship between the child, the foster 
parents and the birth parents has to be determined. The persons involved have to find a way 
to balance the different issues, for example, the stabilising of the relationship between the 
new family and the child, on the one hand, and the remaining contact with the birth family on 
the other. The question that arises is which relationship should have priority and to what 
extent it should be privileged. Furthermore, the legal status, rights and responsibilities of 
everyone involved have to be determined. 
1 Foster parents as additional guardians 
To secure the placement the new caregivers can obtain guardianship orders to get an 
appropriate legal status to deal with the needs of the child and to integrate the child more into 
their foster family. According to s 27(1) and (2) of the Care of Children Act: 
 
The court may appoint a person as a guardian of a child, either in addition to any other 
guardian or as sole guardian, either (a) on an application for the purpose by any person: 
or (b) on its own initiative, on making an order removing a guardian under section 29. 
 
The court may appoint the person as a guardian of the child (a) either for a specific 
purpose or generally; and (b) either for a specific period or not. 
 
Although the Care of Children Act provides the possibility of removing the birth parents of 
the child as guardians
404
 and appointing the new caregivers as sole guardians this possibility 
is used rarely. In most cases the parents remain guardians and the new caregivers, after the 
guardianship orders in favour of chief executive are discharged, are appointed as additional 
guardians. 
 
                                               
403  In some cases their rights are suspended under s 114 of the Children, Young Persons, and Their 
Families Act or they may be additional guardians. 
404  Family Law Service – Guardianship (online looseleaf ed, LexisNexis) at [6.204 Fn 5]; see also [6.205]: 
“extremely rare”. 
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Pursuant to s 16(5) the several guardians have to work in cooperation:
405
 
 
However, in exercising (or continuing to exercise) the duties, powers, rights, and 
responsibilities of a guardian in relation to a child, a guardian of the child must act jointly 
(in particular by consulting wherever practicable with the aim of securing agreement) 
with any other guardian of the child. 
 
The ability to cooperate is seen “as an essential ingredient” for people acting as guardians.406 
The obligation to work together can lead to different problems. Where birth parents do not 
accept the new circumstances they might be not able or willing to agree on certain matters. 
Furthermore, this means that the actual caregiver has to ask for permission to make decisions 
important for the child, for example, choice of school, extracurricular activities, decisions 
about medical treatment. Even where foster parents have a parental order in their favour, 
different aspects cannot be decided by them without the consent of the other guardians. This 
can lead to situations where the child is not allowed to participate at events that his or her 
foster siblings are. The ability of a child to understand the different treatment is limited. 
Furthermore, the feeling of belonging and being part of the family may be destroyed. To 
allow, or indeed foster, developments, which will lead to disruption of that new family 
setting, can damage that sense of belonging.
407
 
 
Where foster parents have to deal with uncooperative birth parents this must have an impact 
on the child. Also, this could lead to situations where foster parents are no longer willing to 
cooperate with birth parents, maybe because they have the feeling that the parents do not act 
for the benefit of the child, just to make the “work” more complicated for the foster parents or 
maybe because they do not agree with the way of life of the birth parents at all. This can 
jeopardise the placement. 
 
As examined, the provisions for a resolution of a dispute are not sufficient. Even though 
courts try to avoid hearings and try to solve a dispute through mediation and counselling, this 
is every time an intervention in the placement. On the other hand, neither is a potential 
conflict between guardians sufficient ground to remove a parent as a guardian,
408
 nor to 
decline the appointment of foster parents as additional guardians.
409
 
 
                                               
405  Care of Children Act 2004, s 16(5). 
406  See AH v Chief Executive of the Ministry of Social Development FC Timaru FAM-2003-003-000172, 
28 August 2009 at [58]. 
407  A v Ministry of Social Development [Access] [2009] NZFLR 625 at [58]. 
408  Moyle v Child, Youth and Family FC Papakura CYPF055/4-6/96; 21/98, 6 August 2002 as cited in 
Brookers Family Law – Child Law (online looseleaf ed, Brookers) at [CC27.08]. 
409
  See Brookers Family Law – Child Law (online looseleaf ed, Brookers) at [CC27.05]. 
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In addition, s 16(6) declares that: “Subsection (5) does not apply to the exclusive 
responsibility for the child‟s day-to-day living arrangements of a guardian exercising the role 
of providing day-to-day care.”410 
 
It has to be noted, of course, that additional guardianship:
411
 
 
… gives practical effect to the principles in subparas 5(a) and 5(c) [of the Care of 
Children Act], recognising that [the child] has both biological and psychological parents, 
as well as legal and psychological guardians making decisions in relation to [the child‟s] 
life. 
 
However, in the case of a permanent placement there are mostly two issues. The first is the 
relationship between child and birth parents which “is of utmost importance, and must 
whenever possible be nurtured.” 412  Secondly, if the child is settled in a new family 
environment, this family placement “should suffer the minimum disruption.”413 Again, it is a 
question of balance between identity and security. Even though there is not a fits-one-fits-all 
solution, a secure upbringing and the experience of a family might be more important than 
the child‟s identity, which can be supported in different ways, even though the parents do not 
play a big role in the child‟s life. 
 
It is always harder to make a decision when several parties are part of the decision-making 
process. Where they are not willing to work together it seems to be impossible. That they 
have to work together and have to act for the child‟s welfare cannot change the human nature. 
At last, where foster parents care for a child for a long duration, as is the case with a 
permanent placement, the child may have a closer emotional link to them than to the birth 
parents. The foster parents may know the child and the child‟s needs better than the birth 
parents. Should not the person who cares for the child, who knows the child and who is 
accepted or seen as the responsible person, make the decision? 
2 Role of birth parents 
“Beyond doubt, the natural order [and a prima facie presumption are] that children are best 
brought up by a natural parent or parents.”414 Furthermore, normally parents and to be with 
                                               
410  Care of Children Act, s 16(6); see below chapter VI A 1 (a) at 79 for further explanations. 
411  PED v MHB [Whangai: Final Parenting order] [2012] NZFLR 35 at [66] 
412  See A v Ministry of Social Development [Access] [2009] NZFLR 625 at [18]. 
413  See A v Ministry of Social Development [Access] [2009] NZFLR 625 at [18]. 
414  K v G [2004] NZFLR 1105 at [22]; Re D (an infant) [1971] NZLR 737 at 740; J and Another v C and 
Others [1969] 1 All ER 788 at 832 per Lord Upjohn. 
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them is part of the child‟s welfare.415 Where the relationship between child and parent has 
developed fully and usually, it can be said that:
416
 
 
… the parent knows the child best, loves the child most, and is best fitted to care for him 
or her. It can also be said that the child is most likely to be bonded to the parent in the 
same way, and will flower under the parent‟s care. Where the parent/child relationship is 
less well developed, and others have shared in the child‟s care … neither assumption can 
be made as confidently. 
 
Furthermore, where the:
417
 
 
… parent‟s custody … would be in some important respects disadvantageous to the 
child … [the] parent is by character or conduct unfit to the custody of the child[,] is 
lacking in affection for the child or has been unmindful of his parental duty towards it [or 
where there] has been an abdication by the parent of parental authority in such a way that 
the court will not allow the parent to resume it [the presumption is displaced.] 
 
“Parents [do not have] a pre-eminent position or … an exclusive „right‟ to the custody of the 
child when the future of that child is being considered by the Court.”418 
 
However, Cooke
419
 stated that s 5 provides arguments in favour of the birth parents when a 
child is permanently placed: s 5(a) refers to the birth parents as well as to the new caregivers 
using the word “parents” because there is still a legal relationship between them and the child. 
Mentioning the continuity in development and upbringing could also be interpreted as 
maintaining contact with the birth family, especially the use of the words “in particular” 
shows that there should be continuity in the relationship with the birth parents and, 
furthermore, this could be used as an argument in favour of contact with the birth parents. At 
last, the references to the wider family cover the child‟s right420 to contact with members of 
the extended family.  
 
Even interpreting the legal rules in favour of the birth family, as Cooke does, this cannot 
obscure the given facts: a permanent placement exists because the child has been taken away 
from the family inasmuch the birth parents were no longer able to care. Even with regard to 
the existing rules provided in the Care of Children Act, for example s 4(2) which states that 
                                               
415  See J and Another v C and Others [1969] 1 All ER 788 at 832 per Lord Upjohn; see also Re D (an 
infant) [1971] NZLR 737 at 742. 
416
  Atkinson v Atkinson [1990] NZFLR 323 at 329. 
417  Re D (an infant) [1971] NZLR 737 at 740–741. 
418  K v G [2004] NZFLR 1105 at [23]; A v Ministry of Social Development [Access] [2009] NZFLR 625 
at [57]. 
419  Allan Cooke “Contact Issues for children who have been permanently placed out of their birth 
families” (2009) 6 NZFLJ 176 at 179. 
420  Allan Cooke “Contact Issues for children who have been permanently placed out of their birth 
families” (2009) 6 NZFLJ 176 at 178 (emphasis added). 
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“the welfare and best interests of the particular child in his or her particular circumstances 
must be considered”, priority must be admitted to the relationship between the child and the 
new caregivers. Cooke stated:
421
 
 
The welfare and best interests analysis will, in the end, see this outcome as there will be a 
reluctance on the party of the Family Court to see that new placement jeopardised. 
 
There are two different reasons why a parent is not a guardian of his or her own child: Firstly, 
the parent never was. Pursuant to s 17(2):  
 
… the child‟s mother is the sole guardian of the child if the mother was neither (a) 
married to, or in a civil union with, the father of the child at any time during the period 
beginning with the conception of the child and ending with the birth of the child; nor (b) 
living with the father of the child as a de facto partner at any time during this period. 
 
The second possibility is that the parents were removed as guardians under s 29(1)(a). It is 
stated that the Care of Children Act is inconsistent in relation to parents who are not 
guardians of their child.
422
 Section 5(a) states that the parents “should have the primary 
responsibility … for their child‟s care, development, and upbringing”. In addition, pursuant to 
s 5(c) “the child‟s care, development, and upbringing should be facilitated by ongoing 
consultation and co-operation among and between the child‟s parents and guardians”. The 
inconsistency lies in the powers of the guardian:
423
 
 
In contrast, the definitions of a guardian‟s powers in ss 15, 16 repose the child‟s 
guardians the right to make important decisions for or with the child. Parents who are not 
guardians have no such powers and have no power to apply to the Court under s 44(1) to 
resolve a dispute between themselves and a guardian of the child. 
 
In JMN v RVG Judge Walker declared that it has “limited value” whether a parent who is not 
a guardian is consulted on the question of an application for a re-hearing.
424
 On the one hand, 
this is contrary to the principles contained in s 5(a) and (c).
425
 On the other, even though the 
parent could apply for a parenting order, this does not provide him or her with the 
responsibilities and rights of a guardian in relation to the child:
426
 
 
                                               
421  See also Allan Cooke “Contact Issues for children who have been permanently placed out of their birth 
families” (2009) 6 NZFLJ 176 at 178. 
422  Brookers Family Law – Child Law (online looseleaf ed, Brookers) at [CC16.15]. 
423  At [CC16.15]. 
424  JMN v RVG [2008] 1 NZLR 40911 at [38]. 
425  See Brookers Family Law – Child Law (online looseleaf ed, Brookers) at [CC16.15]. 
426
  See Brookers Family Law – Child Law (online looseleaf ed, Brookers) at [CC16.15]. 
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New Zealand family law has long attached separate rights and responsibilities to a 
parent‟s role qua parent and his or her role qua guardian. While this separation has 
advantages, it does leave the parental non-guardian in a somewhat ambiguous position. 
 
Being a parent of someone else is a (biological) fact which cannot be eliminated, although the 
rights and responsibilities normally connected with that fact can be subject to change. The 
principles in s 5(a) and (c) should be seen as an establishment of objectives, which arises 
from the nature of things. Parents as “causer” should have the primary responsibility. Yet, if 
they prove themselves undeserving, their rights – which they only have for the benefit of the 
child – must be taken to protect the child. Therefore, the separation of parents and guardians 
itself is important. Being a biological father or mother cannot be taken, being a guardian can. 
Parents removed as guardians have acted not for the benefit of the child, so that they have 
their basic rights initially forfeited, even though they may be still the parents of the child 
concerned. This is reflected in s 16. So the question of whether a parent, who lost 
guardianship, should be consulted and should have the right to work jointly together with 
other guardians, can only be answered in the negative. Therefore, s 16 has to be seen as a 
justified exception to the general principle in s 5. The Care of Children Act may be 
inconsistent only where a parent never has been a guardian. 
 
As stated, the focus has to be on the child and it has to be determined what serves best the 
child‟s welfare and best interests. The blood tie and the general assumption that a relationship 
with birth parents will benefit the child‟s welfare should not be stressed too much. It is said 
that biological relationship and psychological bond “must both be weighted in considering 
the interests of the child [and neither] is entitled to any presumptive superiority when it 
comes to assessing the welfare of the child.”427 It has to be borne in mind that “parents have a 
special relationship with the child not because of their parental status but because they have 
formed emotional bonds with the child and have become an important part of the child‟s life 
and experience.”428 The psychological bond seems to be more important than the blood tie. 
 
In S v E the court was unable to determine who the psychological parent was and took a look 
at other factors such as the capacity and ability of the parent to develop a child‟s potential429 
or with other words “what positive contribution the parent can make to the child‟s care, 
development, and upbringing”.430 Applied to a child in permanent foster care, especially, one 
placed in early childhood, the biological connection loses its importance. If a child is placed 
early and/or for a long time with other caregivers there may not be a close relationship with 
birth parents. Furthermore, the assumption of a close relationship may be only based on the 
                                               
427  A v Ministry of Social Development [Access] [2009] NZFLR 625 at [32]. 
428  Brookers Family Law – Child Law (online looseleaf ed, Brookers) at [CC48.41]. 
429  See for example S v E (1981) 1 NZFLR 73 at 75 in a dispute between the birth mother and birth father 
about custody. 
430
  Brookers Family Law – Child Law (online looseleaf ed, Brookers) at [CC48.41]. 
 Sole Guardianship for Permanent Caregivers 71 
 
 
idea that there has to be such a connection because of the biological connection. The 
relationship between child and caregiver can be more important than the one with the birth 
parents, only because they have formed an emotional bond. Furthermore, the ability and 
capacity of the new caregivers to care for the child may be better and, therefore, they would 
serve the welfare and best interest of the child more than the birth parents could do. This is 
more important, keeping in mind that the children concerned in most of the cases have a 
difficult legacy caused by their birth parents. Moreover, children with such a legacy can only 
rework their early negative experiences in the context of secure relationships.
431
 
 
Section 4(2) of the Care of Children Act determines that the specific child has to be taken 
into account and this leads to the conclusion that the principles contained in s 5 have to be 
weighted in the context of the child‟s special circumstances. In cases where the child‟s 
attachment to the foster parents is stronger than to the birth parents, the societal expectation 
which says that the biological parents who have “produced” the child should have the 
responsibilities and, furthermore, the rights to bring up the child cannot outweigh the child‟s 
welfare. Considering the special circumstances, the foster parents – as psychological parents 
– have to have the legal support.  
 
Where a child is placed with foster parents it may be important that the child has contact with 
the birth parents.
432
 This enables the child to understand his or her background and 
identity.
433
 This contact, however, is not granted “for the purpose of allowing a biological 
parent to develop a relationship in a way which will ultimately lead to a young child being 
returned to that biological parent.”434 Further on, Asher J declared that:435 
 
… such an approach would be contrary to the interests of the child. This is because the 
child will end up with confused loyalties and families ties. It is in a young child‟s interest 
that it has a predominant connection with the permanent placement family with which 
the child lives. 
 
One of the guiding principles is that the child should develop a feeling of belonging.
436
 Any 
development that disrupts the permanent placement is detrimental to the sense of belonging 
and may not be beneficial for the child‟s welfare.437 This has to be considered determining 
contact between child and birth parents.  
 
                                               
431
  Nicola Atwool “Permanency: what children need” (New Zealand Law Society Care and Protections 
Orders and CYFS Seminar, Wellington, 25 October 2012). 
432  See above chapter IV E at 20 and chapter V A 4 (b) at 57 regarding contact issues. 
433  A v Ministry of Social Development [Access] [2009] NZFLR 625 at [57]. 
434  At [58]. 
435  At [58]. 
436  See Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act, s 13(f)(iii). 
437
  See A v Ministry of Social Development [Access] [2009] NZFLR 625 at [58]. 
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Furthermore, assuming that a return of the child to the birth family is automatically in the 
child‟s interests would give the blood tie priority over the welfare and, consequently, has to 
be refused:
438
 
 
That is not permissible, because it makes the blood tie and parental and family rights, 
rather than the child‟s welfare and interests, the deciding factor. Parental and family 
rights are relevant only to the extent that they are exercised for the welfare and interests 
of the child. 
3 Summary 
In the end, birth parents can play a role on the life of their child. First, they remain guardians 
in most of the cases, so still have rights and responsibilities, even though a third person will 
exercise them. Secondly, they can apply for contact and access orders, as well as parenting 
orders. However, the child‟s welfare has to be the deciding factor. Especially in cases of 
permanent placements, foster parents may have become the psychological parents of the 
child. This relationship has to be legally recognised, supported and protected. The child‟s 
welfare is the deciding factor, not the blood tie or the “right” of a parent. 
C Māori Perspective 
Besides the two statutes there is another issue important in New Zealand:
439
 
 
[All] Acts dealing with the status, future, and control of children are to be interpreted as 
coloured by the Treaty of Waitangi. Family organisations must be said to be included 
among those things which the Treaty was intended to preserve and respect. 
 
From a historical point of view children were cared for not only by their birth parents. The 
whole family was responsible for the care of the child. Children were and are not considered 
as in their parents‟ exclusive possession: “Indeed the idea of possession and exclusion, 
separately or in association outrage Māori sensibilities.”440 They belong to the whānau, hapū 
and iwi and are not considered as the property of their parents.
441
 Children are seen as toanga 
that are both tangible and intangible and as such have “to be treated with respect, 
responsibility, love, and care by all members of the group.”442 It is expected that the care for a 
                                               
438  Re B (children) [1992] NZFLR 726 at 758. 
439  BP v DGSW [1997] NZFLR 643 at 646. 
440  Temple v Barr and Holborn HC Wellington CIV-2010-485-000561, 24 August 2010 at [117]. 
441  Joan Metge and Jacinta Ruru “Kua Tutū Te Puehu, Kia Mau: Māori Aspirations and Family Law 
Policy” in Mark Henaghan and Bill Atkin (eds) Family Law Policy in New Zealand (3rd ed, 
LexisNexis, Wellington, 2007) 47 at 52. 
442
  At 53. 
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child is shared with members of the whānau.443 Furthermore, other whānau members take 
over the role of parents from feeding to discipline the child.
444
 Where others than parents or 
grandparents primarily care for the child for a significant period, this is called whāngai.445 
The expression:
446
 
 
… whāngai is derived from the term to feed or look after or to care. It has now been 
extended to mean to foster or care for a child that is not one‟s own. In the specific 
context of Māori children and childcare, it is more appropriate to use the word matua 
whāngai which is the well known practice of one whānau taking over and fostering a 
child usually of the same whakapapa and bringing up that child as one of the adoptive 
family, but still mainly in a care and fostering role. 
 
Again, this has a more holistic whānau rather than a possessory approach. 447  Such a 
placement is in most cases informal and not secured by a court order.
448
 The general 
expectation for such an agreement is that it is short-term and that the child will return to the 
birth parents.
449
 The reasons for such a placement may differ: parents are unable to care for 
the child (mental health, drugs, alcohol),
450
 there is a risk for the wellbeing of the child
451
 or 
the parents and the future caregivers agree (often before birth) that they bring up the child as 
their own, because close relatives, childless themselves, expressed a wish or willingness.
452
 
Some see it as “an informal type of adoption without the formalities required under the 
Adoption Act 1955.”453 This arrangement is sometimes translated into English as “adoption” 
regardless of whether it is formalised under the Adoption Act or not.
454
 
 
According to Atwool, 45 per cent of the children in care are Māori and of these 45 per cent 
are in kinship care.
455
 Māori culture does not approve the severance of the child‟s legal 
relationship to the birth parents that adoption involves.
456
 The child has to know his or her 
                                               
443  At 53. 
444  At 53. 
445  At 60. 
446  PED v MHB [Whangai: Final Parenting Order] [2012] NZFLR 35 at [6]. 
447  At [31]. 
448  At [8]. 
449  At [8]. 
450  At [9]. 
451  At [10]. 
452  At [11]. 
453  At [7]. 
454  Joan Metge and Jacinta Ruru “Kua Tutū Te Puehu, Kia Mau: Māori Aspirations and Family Law 
Policy” in Mark Henaghan and Bill Atkin (eds) Family Law Policy in New Zealand (3rd ed, 
LexisNexis, Wellington, 2007) 47 at 60. 
455  Nicola Atwool “Participation in Decision-making: The Experience of New Zealand Children in Care” 
(2006) 3 Child Care in Practice 259 at 260, data from 2000: 24 per cent of children under the age of 18 
were identified as Māori in 2001. 
456  Joan Metge and Jacinta Ruru “Kua Tutū Te Puehu, Kia Mau: Māori Aspirations and Family Law 
Policy” in Mark Henaghan and Bill Atkin (eds) Family Law Policy in New Zealand (3rd ed, 
LexisNexis, Wellington, 2007) 47 at 61. 
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true whakapapa and connections to establish his or her identity and group membership.
457
 
Nevertheless, Māori use adoption orders to secure their children into their whānau. 458 
According to Smith, between 1995 and 2000, 362 out of 700 final relative adoption orders 
related to Māori children and 93 per cent of them where adopted by relatives where one or 
both adoptive parents were of Māori descent.459 She concluded that this shows “that the 
protection or security adoption offers must outweigh the legal cut in identity in these 
instances.”460 
 
Even though all Acts have “to be interpreted as coloured by the Treaty of Waitangi”,461 the 
first and paramount consideration is the child‟s welfare. This can lead to circumstances in 
which the welfare overrules the Māori heritage.462 However, the cultural background and the 
special position within a whānau must be kept in mind deciding about the child‟s 
placement.
463
 Therefore, it is important that the new caregiver recognises the responsibility to 
bring up the child with knowledge of the cultural heritage, language and tikanga as well as 
tribal history and whakapapa.
464
 Hence, the most suitable placement seems to be a kinship 
placement. 
 
Besides this general approach both Acts refer to the whānau, hapū and iwi.465 The Children, 
Young Persons, and Their Families Act strongly favours a kinship placement stating that the 
child should return to whānau, hapū or iwi466 or should at least live in a family-like setting in 
which the links with whānau, hapū and iwi are maintained and strengthened where a child 
cannot be returned.
467
 Where this is not possible, the child should live in a family group in 
which his or her personal and cultural identity is maintained.
468
A person who is a member of 
the child‟s whānau, hapū or iwi should be given priority when deciding about the person who 
should care for the child.
469
 According to s 5 of the Care of Children Act, it is relevant for the 
child‟s welfare to be in a stable and ongoing relationship with whānau, hapū and iwi,470 
which has to be preserved and strengthened
471
 and that the child‟s identity including culture 
                                               
457  At 61. 
458  See Susan Smith “Protection and identity: Finding the right balance to belong” (2012) 7 NZFLJ 124 
at 126. 
459  At 126. 
460  At 126. 
461  BP v DGSW [1997] NZFLR 643 at 646. 
462  See for example: BP v DGSW [1997] NZFLR 643; and Pita v Putahi FC Rotorua FP063/075/98, 29 
September 2000; A v Ministry of Social Development [Access] [2009] NZFLR 625. 
463  BP v DGSW [1997] NZFLR 643 at 647. 
464  Temple v Barr and Holborn HC Wellington CIV-2010-485-000561, 24 August 2010 at [118]. 
465
  See for example Care of Children Act, s 5(b), (d) and (e); Children, Young Persons, and Their Families 
Act, s 13. 
466  Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act, s 13(f)(i). 
467  Section 13(f)(ii). 
468  Section 13(f)(iii). 
469  Section 13(g). 
470  Care of Children Act, s 5(b). 
471
  Section 5(e). 
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and language is preserved and strengthened.
472
 In the case law the important role is 
recognised.
473
 
 
Summarising this, the child‟s relationship to whānau, hapū, iwi is important and has to be 
maintained. Adoption may not be a perfect solution as it severs the legal tie to the birth 
family. This is not in accordance with the Māori beliefs. Therefore, a more appropriate 
solution has to be found. Nevertheless, kinship care may have positive effects for the child, 
especially regarding identity, culture and continuity, but in many cases kinship carer are older 
than foster parents, more likely to live in poverty and less educated.
474
 Especially, when 
considering a kinship placement it should be kept in mind that the focus has to be on the 
child‟s welfare and not a family reunification. Furthermore, to prefer kinship care can lead to 
situations where a child is placed outside of his or her community with strangers he or she 
never met before,
475
 which should not be the solution, especially, where familiar non-kinship 
carers might be available. Obviously, the same problems as in a Pākehā family can occur, 
when relatives become additional guardians. 
D The Practice of Child, Youth and Family 
Child, Youth and Family, as an agency of the Ministry of Social Development and, thereby, 
responsible for care and protection, offers support for children in different life situations.  
 
The Ministry established a permanency policy which envisages that a permanency plan is 
made for a child for whom a permanent care arrangement came into question within a defined 
timeframe. This was updated in 2010 by the Home for Life policy.  
 
The purpose of this policy is to create a Home for Life for children who cannot return home 
“where they feel loved, wanted and valued.” 476  According to the policy for every child 
concerned a special plan has to be developed, including permanent care goals. Firstly, the 
child should return home. However, if this not possible, the child should be placed with 
family/whānau. Placing children with whānau shows different advantages. “This placement 
will help maintain family links, family history and a sense of belonging, as well as fostering 
the child‟s cultural and spiritual needs.”477 
                                               
472  Section 5(f). 
473  See for example Re T (1999) 19 FRNZ 11, where a Māori baby should be cared for by a couple in 
Australia. Before the court made a decision a family conference had to be held. As mentioned above, 
this dissertation does not discuss family group conferences due to the word limit. 
474  Marie Connolly “A kinship care literature review” (2003) 25 Social Work Now 24 at 26–27. 
475  Also Nicola Atwool “Permanency: what children need” (New Zealand Law Society Care and 
Protections Orders and CYFS Seminar, Wellington, 25 October 2012). 
476  Child, Youth and Family “Permanent Care and creating a Home for Life” (3 April 2012) 
<www.practicecentre.cyf.govt.nz>. 
477  Child, Youth and Family “Securing a bright and safe future in home for life” 
<www.practicecentre.cyf.govt.nz>. 
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To secure the Home for Life there should be legal orders in favour of the new caregiver in 
place. According to Child, Youth and Family, in cases of placements with family or whānau 
this might be problematic because of cultural beliefs or the Home for Life parents do not want 
to disturb the relationship between the birth parents and the child.
478
 However, the policy 
suggests discharging the legal orders in favour of the chief executive in these cases without 
making orders in favour of the new caregivers, which means that the birth parents legally 
gain back any decision-making powers. Hence:
479
 
 
The natural parents need to agree to the permanency of the placement with the 
family/whānau caregivers and a plan in place to cover any concerns that may arise 
around the natural parents wishing to resume the care of the child. 
 
This cannot be the case if there is a conflict between the adults involved. Then legal orders in 
favour of the chief executive should remain:
480
 
 
The child‟s needs, including safety [are] paramount. If these conditions are not satisfied 
then it is in the child‟s best interests to remain in the custody of the chief executive for as 
long as this meets the child‟s needs. 
 
If this is also not an option “home for life with non-family/whānau becomes the primary 
goal”.481 In CAS v Chief Executive of the Ministry of Social Development it was stated that:482  
 
It follows that permanency for a child outside the family as is proposed in a „Home for 
Life‟ package should be considered only when the point of time is reached where there is 
either acceptance that a child‟s parent or guardian cannot properly re-assume the care of 
the child or alternatively the Court determines that issue. 
 
Keeping in mind that a permanent placement does not mean an end of one family and the 
beginning of another, the policy states that it is important to involve the whānau in the 
decision-making process and, furthermore, when choosing the best caregivers issues as 
ethnicity, religion and maintenance of ties with the birth family have to be considered.
483
  
 
                                               
478  Child, Youth and Family “Securing a bright and safe future in a home for life” 
<www.practicecentre.cyf.govt.nz>. 
479  Child, Youth and Family “Securing a bright and safe future in a home for life” 
<www.practicecentre.cyf.govt.nz>. 
480
  Child, Youth and Family “Securing a bright and safe future in a home for life” 
<www.practicecentre.cyf.govt.nz>. 
481  Child, Youth and Family “Permanent Care and creating a Home for Life” (3 April 2012) 
<www.practicecentre.cyf.govt.nz>. 
482  CAS v Chief Executive of the Ministry of Social Development FC Dunedin FAM-2009-012-950, 18 July 
2011 at [35]. 
483  Child, Youth and Family “Securing a bright and safe future in a home for life” 
<www.practicecentre.cyf.govt.nz>. 
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In the question concerning legal orders for non-family/whānau caregivers they prefer legal 
orders under the Care of Children Act.
484
 A combination of different orders should be chosen 
in order to meet the needs of the present child, whereupon this all should happen in 
collaboration with the Home for Life parents, birth parents and family/whānau. This 
procedure aims to secure the relationship between the Home for Life parents and the child and 
gives them the opportunity to make day-to-day care decisions.
485
 Legal orders in favour of 
the chief executive should not remain.
486
 
 
In addition, because of the shared guardianship responsibilities the policy declares that 
continuing meetings between whānau and caregivers should take place, not only to determine 
the form of Home for Life, even more to decide how to manage these responsibilities, 
eventual contact issues and how to address conflicts.
487
 One aspiration seems to be that the 
child develops a feeling of belonging to both: whānau and Home for Life family.488 
 
The Home for Life is realised when the child lives in an endorsed placement, the caregiver 
has obtained legal orders to secure the placement and custody orders in favour of the chief 
executive are discharged.
489
 According to Child, Youth and Family custody orders under the 
Care of Children Act, now referred to as parenting orders, are the best way to give the new 
caregivers responsibility for the day-to-day care.
490
 The fact, that these orders will not be 
reviewed secures the placement in recognising the child as a part of the new family and that a 
monitoring is not required.
491
 Furthermore, to achieve the appropriate legal status the new 
caregivers should become additional guardians, in addition to parenting orders.
492
 Child, 
Youth and Family sees sole guardianship (ideally under the Care of Children Act) as an 
appropriate legal instrument to secure the placement, when working with birth parent is not 
possible or they undermine the safety or wellbeing of the child.
493
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493  Child, Youth and Family “Use of Legal Orders to secure a home for life” (May 2011) 
<www.practicecentre.cyf.govt.nz>. 
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Different problems arise with this policy: the orders to achieve permanency should be made 
under the Care of Children Act. Child, Youth and Family will no longer be part. This may 
lead to a more “normal” family-life feeling. However, this also means that there will no 
longer be a buffer between the caregivers and the birth parents. Foster parents may have to 
deal with birth parents by themselves directly.  
 
Another issue is the (financial) support of foster parents. Without the Home for Life policy 
foster parents can receive financial support, if the child needs this, for example, for health and 
educational issues. Generally, this ends becoming part of the Home for Life policy. The 
declaration that the child is in need of care and protection will be discharged. This is a 
prerequisite for a services order under s 86 of the Children, Young Persons, and Their 
Families Act. Instead, the policy envisages that foster parents receive the Home for Life 
package. This includes a three year support. Inter alia, they receive a $2,500 upfront payment 
and support to make contact to adjuvant agencies.
494
 For example, the payment shall “provide 
for the individual needs of the child.”495  This policy is criticised. “The approach of the 
Ministry seems to be a blanket policy where individuals‟ circumstances are given scant 
attention.”496 In the end, this may be detrimental for the child‟s welfare. 
 
The provisions in the White Paper are intended to finalise the permanent Home for Life 
arrangement.
497
 One suggestion is to assure that the Home for Life parents “will be supported 
should the child‟s parents attempt to disrupt the placement.”498 Unfortunately, it does not 
contain details about this assistance nor provisions for further support. In the following 
chapters, some proposals are put forward. 
 
                                               
494  Child, Youth and Family “Home for Life support” (September 2011) 
<www.practicecentre.cyf.govt.nz>. 
495  Child, Youth and Family “Home for Life support” (September 2011) 
<www.practicecentre.cyf.govt.nz>. 
496  PFMB v JJB [services orders] [2012] NZFLR 837 at [8]. 
497  Paula Bennett, Ministry of Social Development “The White Paper for Vulnerable Children” 
(Wellington, 2012) volume II at 124. 
498  Paula Bennett, Ministry of Social Development “The White Paper for Vulnerable Children” 
(Wellington, 2012) volume II at 125. 
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VI Sole Guardianship for Foster Parents? 
Sole guardianship means granting exclusive responsibilities and duties to a person to the 
exclusion of third parties. Where others have had such responsibility before this order 
(typically birth parents), their rights are at least suspended.
499
 
A Joint Cooperation 
1 When foster parents are additional guardians 
As shown above, additional guardians have to act jointly with other guardians under s 16(5) 
of the Care of Children Act 2005. This provision causes different problems: (1) The 
exception in s 16(6) of the Care of Children Act is not clear and different interpretations are 
possible. This could destabilise the arrangements. (2) The relationship between the adults 
involved could make joint collaboration difficult, if not impossible. 
(a) Day-to-day living arrangements 
Section 16(6) of the Care of Children Act states that s 16(5) “does not apply to the exclusive 
responsibility for the child‟s day-to-day living arrangements of a guardian exercising the role 
of providing day-to-day care.” This exception can be interpreted in two different ways: First, 
it applies to the guardian who in fact is providing the day-to-day care or secondly, to the 
guardian who is exclusively responsible for providing the day-to-day care because of a 
parenting order.
500
 
 
Assuming a parenting order exists in favour of the long-term foster parents, there is no 
difference between both interpretations. In both cases the birth parents would be excluded 
and joint collaboration is not necessary. On the other hand, if there is no parenting order 
granting the foster parents day-to-day care the two questions to answer will be how to 
interpret s 16(6) of the Care of Children Act and whether or not the foster parents are 
exclusively responsible. 
 
Even though these problems can be solved, s 16(6) only refers to the day-to-day living 
arrangements. Actually, this term is not legally defined in the Act. This can evoke further 
problems. The question is what areas of life are included. The interpretation depends on the 
different points of view. While foster parents will choose a broader definition, the birth 
parents, who are interested in the care of their child, will try to keep the area as narrow as 
possible, to obtain a larger say in the child‟s life. 
                                               
499  For more details see the recommendations below in chapter VII A at 89. 
500
  See Family Law Service – Guardianship (online looseleaf ed, LexisNexis) at [6.201]. 
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Nevertheless, there are points which cannot be interpreted as part of “the child‟s day-to-day 
living arrangements” and therefore, the birth parents and the foster parents would have to act 
jointly together, in particular by consulting. 
 
Besides the more general approach that long-term foster parents who live daily with the child 
know the needs, strengths and weaknesses better than birth parents whose roles in the child‟s 
life have waned, there are certain specific aspects to consider. A school enrolment may be not 
part of “the child‟s day-to-day living arrangements”. Foster parents and birth parents would 
have to act jointly together in deciding what school the child should attend. This can be 
difficult, for example, if the child has special needs which can be better addressed in a special 
school, but are necessary for the child‟s welfare like special sports or music programmes or 
the attendance in a certain school may cause problems with an eventual contact with the birth 
parents because of distance. The religion of the child is also another issue to address. Of 
course, in the best case foster parents are members of the same religion in which the child 
was brought up by the birth parents. However, this may not be possible in cases in which the 
birth parents belong to two different religions and the foster parents only to one of them. Joint 
collaboration between the foster parents and the birth parents of another religion could prove 
difficult. 
(b) Involvement of a third party 
Joint collaboration means further that the guardians have to inform a third party
501
 about the 
agreement or they have to refrain from the intended action. Anyway, in most cases the third 
party will not have any reason to doubt the guardian‟s ability to act. This legal situation:502 
 
… effectively puts the onus on an objecting guardian to take the initiative of referring the 
matter to the Court and, in the meantime, making his opposition to the decision known to 
the third party about to act on it. 
(c) Comparison with disputes between mother and father 
Another issue results from the case law relating to fathers applying for guardianship orders. 
In some cases the father did not have guardianship over his child and applied for an order in 
his favour. The court denied him such orders. The reason for dismissing these applications 
was the relationship between mother as primary caregiver and the father.
503
 
 
                                               
501  For example a school principal, directors of clubs the child wants to join, parents of friend of the child. 
502  Family Law Service – Guardianship (online looseleaf ed, LexisNexis) at [6.201]. 
503  In K v B [1991] NZFLR 168 the child was the result of a brief sexual relationship. The mother wanted 
the child adopted. The father was inter alia not appointed as guardian because it would have been 
contrary to the child‟s welfare. 
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In Skedgwell v Ewington it was held that granting the step-father guardianship responsibility 
“would lead to continued guardianship disputes”.504 The lawyer for the father argued that it 
was necessary to appoint him as an additional guardian because the mother did not 
communicate with him and he was concerned about several health and welfare issues.
505
 
 
To sum up, a conflict between both birth parents can be a reason not to grant the biological 
father guardianship rights and responsibility over his own child, mainly because cooperation 
cannot be expected. As examined, this is not the case in the situation between foster parents 
and birth parents. In the end, this could be detrimental to the child‟s welfare and best 
interests. The question coming to mind is why good collaboration is expected in a case of a 
permanent placement or even more importantly can good collaboration to the benefit of the 
child be expected? 
(d) Resolving disputes 
The Care of Children Act provides in s 44 the possibility to apply for a court direction where 
there is a dispute between guardians.
506
 It should be kept in mind that a proceeding is a 
possible threat to the security of the placement of the child. Furthermore, the Act does not 
provide a provision to enforce a direction. The court can make several orders. However, this 
means that more and more persons get involved and this may complicate the upbringing of 
the child and the decision-making process, especially where the identification of the 
responsibilities is not clear. The same applies under the Children, Young Persons, and Their 
Families Act, where pursuant to s 115 the court may make an order to solve a dispute. 
However, it would be more beneficial for the child to avoid disputes. Therefore, appropriate 
provisions should be in place which not only try to solve disputes (especially in an 
insufficient way), but prevent future conflict. 
2 When foster parents have a parenting order in their favour 
Where foster parents are not additional guardians, s 44 causes another problem. Foster 
parents who are not guardians cannot apply for a court direction under s 44 and cannot be 
party of such a proceeding. When there is a dispute between both parties the provisions are 
not sufficient to resolve it; at least there is no provision at all. The question is: Who should 
decide in such a conflict? Does a parental order overrule guardianship rights? An explicit 
regulation defining the relation between both does not exist. Section 16(6) of the Care of 
Children Act grants exclusive responsibilities, but not every decision that has to be made can 
                                               
504  Skegdwell v Ewington [1992] NZFLR 641 at 651. 
505  At 650. 
506
  As noted above, the Family Court Proceedings Reform Bill 2012 re-writes this section. 
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subsumed under “the child‟s day-to-day living arrangements”. Therefore, in several situations 
the parties concerned are left without legal provisions. 
 
A parenting order gives the person, in whose favour it is made, the power to exercise parental 
responsibility. It does not transfer the responsibility itself. Any other interpretation would 
lead to the consequence that parents would be deprived of their rights in every case where 
someone is granted a parenting order; this would have the effect of a sole guardianship. 
Further, this would mean that parental rights are weak and not strongly secured, because for a 
parenting order no grave reason is needed. This cannot be the case. Hence, even where a 
parenting order exists, the whole exclusion of parents does not exist. Parents as guardians still 
have their rights and furthermore, a guardianship right is a stronger position than the one 
conferred by a parenting order. Parents as guardians still have a say in the upbringing of their 
child and may as long as they are guardians “insist in some form of involvement with and 
control of the children.”507 They still have the right to bring up the child except on a day-to-
day basis.
508
 
 
In addition, it should also be kept in mind that not every part of the life of the child can be 
dealt with by a parenting order. Some aspects were identified that still belong to the 
responsibility of all guardians even though a comprehensive parenting order is in place. This 
was, for example, stated for a change of residence.
509
  
 
Finally, just because a parenting order in favour of the foster parents is in place this does not 
mean that they do not have to work together with the guardians. A parenting order is not 
stronger than a guardianship order. If guardians have to work together then a person whose 
position was “only” granted by a parenting order has to do so as well. Furthermore, according 
to s 5(c) of the Care of Children Act, the parents and the permanent caregivers as “persons 
exercising the role of providing day-to-day care” should cooperate with each other. So even 
where there is a parenting order granting foster parents the day-to-day care, joint cooperation 
with other guardians is expected. As already mentioned, this causes additional stress for the 
child. Ongoing conflicts and proceedings cannot be in the best interests of the child. This 
could be prevented if it is clear from the very first that long-term foster parents can decide 
without consultation.
510
 
                                               
507  A v D-GSW [1995] NZFLR 241 at 243. 
508  See A v D-GSW [1995] NZFLR 241 at 246. 
509  In the matter of AHRJ [2005] NZFLR 49 at [21]; Chief Executive of the Ministry of Social 
Development v BJG FC Hastings FAM 2009-020-447, 19 January 2010 at [38]. 
510
  See the recommendations below in chapter VII A at 89. 
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B Advantages for the Placement of the Child 
Often it has been stated that “it is better to maintain the status quo and thus avoid unnecessary 
disruption in the children‟s lives when it is unknown what consequences of such change 
would bring about.”511 Furthermore, a “[family] placement is thought to minimise disruption 
while increasing the opportunity for family self-determination and the reintegration of the 
child within their immediate family.”512 However, there are cases where reunification with 
birth parents is not possible and the child has to be placed with new caregivers even though 
this means a change and disruption in the first place. Where a child has to be removed this 
child should grow up in a stable and secure placement. Security of a placement can be 
achieved through “certainty of one person having ultimate responsibility for decision-
making”.513  
1 Avoid disruptions 
As shown above, a placement can be disrupted by several applications parents may file, for 
example, to have contact with the child or to challenge a parenting order in favour of the 
long-term foster parents. Therefore, it might be necessary to protect the placement and thus 
also the child against disruptive attempts.
514
 In cases, where the chief executive was 
appointed as a sole guardian it was stated that:
515
 
 
Further, sole guardianship may sometimes be the only way of achieving stability and 
security in a family that cannot be “patched up”,516 and sometimes sole guardianship may 
be used as a holding measure pending later directions by the Court.
517
 
2 Family-like feeling 
There may be several situations in which the family-like life with the foster family can be 
disturbed because of a joint guardianship between birth parents and foster parents. This might 
be the case where the foster family wants to travel. A holiday with the foster family may not 
be included in the day-to-day care. Another example might be the medical treatment of the 
child which can be made complicated because of different religious views and a general 
                                               
511  TTH v JTAH [Parenting order] [2011] NZFLR 369 at [40]. 
512  Allan Cooke “Contact Issues for children who have been permanently placed out of their birth 
families” (2009) 6 NZFLJ 176 at 177. 
513
  D-GSW v R (1997) 16 FRNZ 357 at 373; In the matter of C [2003] NZFLR 769 at [41]. 
514  Re the P Children (No 2) (1992) 9 FRNZ 93 at 109. 
515  Family Law Service – Children, Young Persons, and Their Families (online looseleaf ed, LexisNexis) 
at [6.578]. 
516  DSW v R DC Auckland CYPF 004/53/93, 22 February 1994 as cited in Family Law Service – Children, 
Young Persons, and Their Families (online looseleaf ed, LexisNexis) at [6.578]. 
517  DSW v T [1998] NZFLR 177 as cited in Family Law Service – Children, Young Persons, and Their 
Families (online looseleaf ed, LexisNexis) at [6.578]. 
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parental attitude in favour or against contraception, termination of pregnancy, blood 
transfusion.
518
 Different treatment, especially in comparison to other children of the foster 
family, can be detrimental to the child‟s welfare and best interests. 
 
Furthermore, it may be difficult for foster parents to convey the child values if they do not 
comply with them. It can be said that these foster parents then might be the “wrong” foster 
parents for the child. However, the difficulty of finding of long-term foster parents should not 
be underestimated. Foster parents will never be like the birth parents. Therefore certain 
concessions must be made. In addition, the foster parents must be given some leeway. 
3 Strengthen the position of foster parents 
Foster parents apply for a guardianship order for several reasons. Such an order can 
strengthen identification with the child. Furthermore, legal protection can be given to the 
relationship between them and the child to a certain extent. With a guardianship order their 
position would be legally recognised and they would have the “rights” to participate in the 
life of the child, to intervene and influence.
519
 Foster parents may become substitute parents 
to the child. As additional guardians they would be equated with the birth parents. 
 
Sole guardianship responsibilities given to foster parents also mean more security and give 
the signal of more permanency. The placement would be less likely to be terminated which is 
also a positive effect for the child in developing a sense of belonging. Furthermore, granting 
foster parents guardianship rights can strengthen their commitment to the child they care for. 
This is important for the upbringing of the child:
520
 
 
[The] threat of uplift (perceived or real) hanging over [the actual caregiver] could present 
a potential reason for their disagreement with [the child] either completely or 
emotionally, in part, to the detriment of [the child]. 
4 Disregard of guardianship orders 
However, there may be cases where the new caregivers, even when it is a permanent 
placement, do not want to become guardians of the child at the moment. In Department of 
Child, Youth and Family Services v GDB the aunt and uncle of the two children became the 
new permanent caregivers after the father murdered the mother.
521
 Judge Whitehead stated:
522
 
                                               
518  Brookers Family Law – Child Law (online looseleaf ed, Brookers) at [CC16.10]. 
519  Skegdwell v Ewington [1992] NZFLR 614 at 650. 
520  Ministry of Social Development v C-P F FC Kaikohe FAM-2008-027-000351, 26, 27 May 2011 
at [40]. 
521  Department of Child, Youth and Family Services v GDB FC Nelson FAM-2003-009-4314, 02 
November 2005. 
522
  At [35]. 
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… that the most appropriate guardians would be the aunt and uncle who are having care 
of the children and will continue with their care in the foreseeable future … [Anyway, 
there is] reluctance [on the part of the aunt] to have the formal orders in her and her 
husband‟s favour and [she] wishes to deal at arms‟ length with her brother, who is the 
father of the children. 
 
Nevertheless, the placement has to be considered as a permanent one, which also means that 
the responsible persons should be able to make decisions without delay and “acrimonious 
dispute”.523 In the case, the Department of Child, Youth and Family Services remained sole 
guardian.
524
 However, the question is: Would it have been appropriate to give sole 
guardianship responsibilities to the aunt and uncle, for example, in regard to daily life 
decisions such as health treatment or, more ordinary, sport activities and memberships in 
clubs, and having the chief executive as guardian and simultaneously as “protective barrier” 
against disruptive attempts from birth parents as well as a supportive “third party”? It should 
be respected that foster parents who bring up a child with a difficult legacy refrain from 
guardianship orders to avoid direct disputes with birth parents and to have the chief executive 
as a buffer. Furthermore, having the chief executive involved can also mean more support. 
However, this should not be the reason to refrain from an application for a guardianship order. 
Rather support should be available in any case where necessary. 
5 Summary 
Granting sole guardianship responsibilities to a permanent caregiver can secure the 
placement. With the right protection, disruption and termination of the placement are less 
likely. Giving them the exclusive responsibility will strengthen their commitment to the child. 
Child, Youth and Family should be available as a buffer between foster parents and birth 
parents, if this is necessary. 
C For the Benefit of the Child 
Another aspect in favour could be the child‟s own point of view. As stated above the child 
should be the focus. How does it look like for the child if the long-term foster parents, as the 
ones who have in fact cared for the child for a long time and may be the psychological 
parents for the child, have to ask strangers before making important decisions? In this 
context, consider a longer school trip. This may not be part of the child‟s day-to-day living 
arrangements. Another example could be medical treatment like a vaccination which may not 
be urgent and not absolutely necessary. 
                                               
523  Department of Child, Youth and Family Services v GDB FC Nelson FAM-2003-009-4314, 02 
November 2005 at [46]. 
524
  At [46]. 
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The affected children have a difficult legacy which affects permanent placements. These 
children need ongoing support, not only financial also therapeutic in a lot of cases. Precisely 
for this reason they should have a secure basis to grow up and be “prepared to live an 
individual life in society”. 525  This security can be achieved in granting one person the 
exclusive responsibility. 
 
Once the decision is made that a child should be permanently placed this has to be taken as a 
fact and the child should be supported. This means that the child should be given the 
opportunity to experience a “normal” upbringing. The child has a right to grow and develop 
in the new family. A permanently placed child should be supported in developing emotional 
attachments to the new family.
526
 
 
Foster parents as guardians would be legally bound to the child. Of course, depending on the 
age and maturity not every child will understand the difference. However, where foster 
parents are granted legal rights to care children feel more secure in their placement and this is 
beneficial for the welfare.
527
 Moreover:
528
 
 
For fostered young people, the complicated question of who actually makes decisions in 
the complex network of birth, foster and corporate parents – and which „parents‟ they 
need to influence and negotiate with – can exacerbate the problematic negotiation of 
autonomy. 
 
Children need a secure relationship and a strong commitment, especially, when children have 
a difficult legacy. Furthermore, “children need secure and uninterrupted emotional 
relationships with adults who are responsible for their care in order to learn how to build 
secure attachments later in life”.529 Being a child in foster care or a “CYFS child” gives 
children the feeling of being different. Moreover, knowing that they can be placed with new 
caregivers every time is stressful and detrimental. Giving more legal responsibilities to the 
actual caregivers can give them a more secure feeling. Granting sole guardianship 
responsibilities to the caregivers can avoid future disputes. It would be beneficial for the 
welfare because the child would not remain the centre of unremitting disputes for the rest of 
the childhood.
530
 The appointment is furthermore advantageous because “it will usually add 
                                               
525  United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child GA Res 44/25 (1989), preamble. 
526  See Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act, s 13(f)(iii). 
527
  See Jill Theresa Messing “From the child‟s perspective: A qualitative analysis of kinship care 
placements” (2006) 28 Children and Youth Services Review 1415 at 1432. 
528  Gillian Schofield and Mary Beek “Growing up in foster care: providing a secure base through 
adolescence” (2009) 14 Child and Family Social Work 255 at 263. 
529  Child, Youth and Family “Securing a bright and safe future in a home for life” 
<www.practicecentre.cyf.govt.nz>. 
530  See Skegdwell v Ewington [1992] NZFLR 614 at 653, where the appointment as additional guardian 
was in question because of possible conflict. 
 Sole Guardianship for Permanent Caregivers 87 
 
 
to the child‟s sense of security if the actual carers have legal duties and responsibilities for his 
or her care.”531 “The child has a right to a peaceful and stable upbringing, undisturbed by 
unnecessary conflict.”532 When children have a right to be nurtured and cared for there has to 
be someone who has the duty. This should be the one who actually cares otherwise the child 
has a right against a third party who has to delegate the actual carer. 
D Enduring Guardianship 
In 2000 the Law Commission recommended the creation of an “enduring guardianship”.533 
This was thought of as an alternative to adoption. The purpose of this “enduring guardianship” 
was the adding of “a further adult relationship to a child‟s life rather than substituting 
parents”.534 The links to the birth parents would persist535 and the legal parental status would 
not expire.
536
 It should be used by step-parents and family members where they assume the 
responsibility.
537
 The enduring guardian would have the same legal role as a natural guardian 
has.
538
 Moreover:
539
 
 
The importance of enduring guardianship lies less in its legal significance than in the 
moral and social benefit of providing explicit recognition of the social importance of the 
extra parent in the child‟s life. Enduring guardianship provides a means by which a 
child‟s security and sense of familial belonging can be incrementally strengthened. 
 
This approach was different, because it was meant to give family members or stepparents 
who actual care for the child legal responsibilities. This did not relate to children in need of 
care and protection placed away from birth parents. Also the other guardians would not have 
been limited or their rights would not have been suspended.
540
 
 
                                               
531  Brookers Family Law – Child Law (online looseleaf ed, Brookers) at [CC27.04]. 
532  C v M FC Wanganui FP083/086/92, 12 November 1993 as cited in Brookers Family Law – Child Law 
(online looseleaf ed, Brookers) at [CC27.04]. 
533  Law Commission “Report 65: Adoption and its Alternatives: A Different Approach and a New 
Framework” (Law Commission, Wellington, September 2000) at [117]–[125]. 
534  At [118]. 
535
  At [117]. 
536  At [119]. 
537  At [117]. 
538  At [125]. 
539  At [125]. 
540  According to s 114(2)(a) of the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act shall the rights of a 
person who is a guardian be suspended or have no effects where a sole guardian is appointed under 
s 110. 
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VII Recommendations 
Permanency as part of the child‟s welfare cannot be conferred by legal orders alone. The 
caregivers and birth parents attitudes‟ play a role as well. However, legal orders are part of 
the whole, influence the relationship between parties and give security to a certain extent. 
 
As already examined, the law in general sees parents as the best persons to bring up their 
children. However, the “rights” of parents exist only where they are exercised for the benefit 
of the child. The fact that two people produced a child is not enough to grant them “more” 
rights.
541
 “It has often been said that children are not prizes to be awarded to a parent or 
others for good behaviour, nor are they to be used as sanctions or to punish for bad 
behaviour.”542 
 
Where other persons fulfil the parents‟ role and the child bonds with them as if they were the 
birth parents, these persons should get legal security. This can be achieved through additional 
guardianship. Moreover, as shown, the removal of a parent as guardian is rare, so foster 
parents can usually be appointed only as additional guardians. 
 
However, the disadvantages were examined above. Therefore, granting caregivers sole 
guardianship responsibilities can overcome these difficulties. Having only one set of parents 
responsible means that fewer disputes will occur. The caregivers would not have to work 
together with the birth parents in every case. The child would have a set of parents he or she 
could count on and develop a sense of belonging. Furthermore, the actual caregiver would no 
longer be “only the caregiver”. The order would have the effect that the actual caregiver can 
decide, as would be the case in a “normal” child-parent relationship and the placement would 
be less likely to be interrupted. Furthermore, stressful and disruptive cooperation would not 
be necessary due to the sole responsibility of the caregiver. 
 
The White Paper
543
 aims to increase stability and security of the permanent placement due to 
the introduction of a new guardianship order. Unfortunately, it fails to give detailed 
information about intended changes. It is unclear what is meant by limiting or reducing 
guardianship powers. Furthermore, same guardianship powers should be shared between birth 
parents and guardians. As examined, this leads to several problems. Recommendations to 
overcome this are not contained in the White Paper. Therefore, the White Paper raises several 
questions. The following suggestions seek to fill the gap created by the White paper. 
                                               
541  See Tanner v Edgill [2008] NZFLR 262; K v G [2004] NZFLR 1105; Atkinson v Atkinson [1990] 
NZFLR 323; Taylor v Wilson, Wilson and Wilson FC Hastings FP 020/172/96, 30 April 1998. 
542  K v G [2004] NZFLR 1105 at [20]; Temple v Barr and Holborn HC Wellington CIV-2010-485-
000561, 24 August 2010 at [73]. 
543  Paula Bennett, Ministry of Social Development “The White Paper for Vulnerable Children” 
(Wellington, 2012). 
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It is important to have a look at the specific child in the specific circumstances. The reasons 
why children are in care differ from case to case and the law has to recognise this. Therefore, 
the following suggestion distinguishes between different scenarios and provides different 
solutions. Four situations are distinguished: (1) the child was abused by birth parents; (2) the 
birth parents neglected their child; (3) due to mental illness or imprisonment, for example, 
parents are unable to fulfil their role; (4) the child lives with new caregivers due a private 
agreement. In all these case the following questions arise: When should the new caregivers 
become sole guardians? Are the rights of parents suspended or removed? Can parents 
challenge the court orders? Should they have contact with their child? 
A Sole Guardianship 
1 Cases of abuse 
Where a child is victim of abuse parents forfeit their “rights”. As soon as the placement is 
considered as permanent the new caregiver should become an exclusive sole guardian with 
appropriate rights. The guardianship rights of parents must be removed. The rights of the 
child to grow up in a non-violent environment, respecting the child‟s rights as, for example, 
the right to physical integrity and free development of the own personality, and supporting 
the child‟s welfare are the reasons for this. Of course, the human rights of parents and child 
require the least restrictive intervention.
544
 However, this cannot lead to an assumption that 
parents can treat the child as an object. In cases of child abuse parents should have no 
influences in the upbringing of their child. An abusive parent obviously repudiated parental 
responsibilities. Section 5(e) of the Care of Children Act and s 13(a) of the Children, Young 
Persons, and Their Families Act provide that the child has to be safe and protected, in some 
cases from birth parents. Removing the rights and responsibilities to care is one step to 
achieve this protection.  
2 Cases of neglect 
If the child is neglected by birth parents the new caregiver may become sole guardian as well 
as soon as the placement is considered as permanent. The reasons for neglect can differ. In 
some cases birth parents might not be interested, in other they are not able to care in an 
appropriate way for their child. Keeping in mind that the human rights require the least 
restrictive intervention, birth parents should be given the opportunity to improve. Therefore, 
parental guardianship rights should not be removed; they should be suspended at first. In the 
following 18 months parents should have the chance to show their improvement. 
                                               
544  Andrew Bainham “Permanence for Children: Special Guardianship or Adoption?” [2007] Cambridge 
Law Journal 520 at 522. 
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The proposal of 18 months stems from the law of the United States of America.
545
 Of course, 
the child‟s sense of time has to be considered. Therefore, it might be appropriate to set a 
different timeline for different stages of age. In the end, this is a question which has to be 
examined and answered from a psychological point of view as well which is beyond the 
scope of his paper. For this reason, the proposed 18 months should not be seen as unalterable. 
However, it should be kept in mind that the focus is on the child, but the parents may need 
time to change and this change may be for the benefit of the child long-term. On the other 
hand decisions have to be made within a certain time frame, because:
546
 
 
Avoidable delay can be regarded as a form of systematic abuse for children less than five 
years of age because instability and uncertainty undermine any chance of recovery and 
may incur further damage. 
 
Where parents fail to improve, their parental guardianship rights must be removed after this 
period. If they improve the suspension of their guardianship rights may be lifted, where they 
are able to cooperate with the new caregiver or even become, as a very unlikely event, 
guardians born in mind that in most cases after two years reunification with the birth family is 
doubtful.
547
 Whether or not parents should become additional guardians or “sole guardians” 
must be decided according to the child‟s welfare. Where the bonding to the foster parents has 
increased to a level where an interruption would be detrimental for the child, sole 
guardianship for the foster parents may be the appropriate solution. This suggestion seeks to 
find a balance between the human rights of parents and child on the one hand, and the rights 
of the child, on the other. The removal of parental rights after a certain time is necessary to 
give the child the opportunity to grow up in a secure family-like setting:
548
 
 
The expectation of reunification may in itself cause some difficulties for both the young 
person and the birth family … Sometimes it is the young people who become anxious 
because they realise that they have no wish to give up the foster family and the way of 
life that has defined who they have become during childhood and adolescence. They may 
seek reassurance that they are able to remain in the foster family. In other cases, it is the 
parents who realise that they do not want an adolescent back in the family. 
                                               
545  The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (US), s 103(a) which amended the Social Security Act 
(US), 42 USCS § 675(5)(E), provides that if a child has been in foster care for the last 15 of the most 
recent 22 months, or if a court has the child determined to be an abandoned infant, the state has to file a 
petition to terminate parental rights. That the state has to file an application for termination after 15 
months was a compromise. 
546  Nicola Atwool “Permanency: what children need” in Nicola Atwool and Tracy Gunn (eds) Care and 
Protection Orders and CYFS (paper presented to New Zealand Law Society Care and Protection 
Orders and CYFS Seminar, Wellington, 25 October 2012) at 20. 
547  John Triseliotis “Long-term foster care or adoption? The evidence examined” (2002) 7 Child and 
Family Social Work 23 at 31. See also A v D-GSW [1995] NZFLR 241 at 244, where it is stated that 
the father has become something of a stranger after the children did not have seen him for two years, 
which is a long time for a small child. 
548  Gillian Schofield and Mary Beek “Growing up in foster care: providing a secure base through 
adolescence” (2009) 14 Child and Family Social Work 255 at 264. 
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3 Other cases of parental failure 
In some cases the child cannot be cared for by birth parents due, for example, mental illness 
or imprisonment. These cases have to be distinguished from the cases mentioned above. The 
birth parents may have not done something wrong in regard to the child. As already stated, 
limiting parental rights, especially in these circumstances, must not be seen as a punishment. 
On the other hand, the child‟s welfare and thus the child‟s rights have to be respected. 
Therefore, it is appropriate to give the court several options to find a suitable solution. 
 
In these cases the court should be given the opportunity to choose between additional 
guardianship and sole guardianship. This choice depends on the ability of the birth parents to 
handle the situation and to work together with the new caregivers. Furthermore, the child‟s 
welfare has to be the paramount consideration.  
 
Where the court orders additional guardianship this order should be reviewed regularly. Over 
the time this review should take place at increasing intervals, for example, the first after one 
year, the second after further two years. On the other hand, the new caregiver should have the 
possibility to apply for a variation of the additional guardianship order where birth parents are 
unable to cooperate or become a threat to the security of the placement. 
 
If the court appoints the new caregiver as sole guardian, the rights of the birth parents should 
be suspended at first. Like the proposed regulation in cases of neglect, the birth parents 
should have the possibility to improve themselves. Again, after a period of 18 months there 
must be a decision whether the parental guardianship rights should be removed, if there is no 
improvement, or whether additional guardianship or a reunification is appropriate.  
 
Especially in cases of mental illness, removal may seem “unfair”. However, it has to be kept 
in mind that the emphasis is on the child. The removal of parental guardianship rights does 
not mean that birth parents are removed from their child‟s life. They must have the 
opportunity to keep contact.
549
 In the end, the child‟s welfare has to be the deciding factor 
and it cannot be beneficial for the child‟s welfare to make no clear decision. 
 
The same applies to an imprisoned birth parent. At a certain point the child has to be placed 
in a secure environment. In these cases it might be appropriate to vary the 18 months period 
having regard to the duration of the imprisonment; but even in these cases, welfare has to be 
paramount. 
                                               
549
  A question which is dealt with below in chapter VII C at 93. 
92 Recommendations 
 
 
4 Cases of private agreements 
In some cases a child lives with caregivers due to a private agreement, not necessarily a legal 
binding one. This can be for the purpose of bridging familial difficulties and often with the 
expectation that the child will return back after some time. However, where a child lives in 
such a placement for a long time and considers, for example, the new caregiver as a parent, 
there should be legal provisions to secure this placement and to give the new caregiver legal 
responsibility. 
 
Obviously, they can apply for additional guardianship. However, the new caregiver must be 
given the opportunity to apply for sole guardianship as well. If sole guardianship is granted, 
parental rights should, again, be suspended and after 18 months of non-improvement be 
removed. In these cases, of course, cultural issues have to be considered, for example, 
whāngai. 
5 Amending New Zealand statutes 
Another question may be in which legislation new provisions should be included. Several 
cases have to be distinguished.  
 
Where abuse and neglect occurred, the child was in need of care and protection. Therefore, 
the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act is the statute to be amended for the first 
three named cases, even though it is a permanent placement and the child may no longer be in 
need of care and protection pursuant to s 14. 
 
Amending the Care of Children seems appropriate where the child lives with new caregivers 
due a private agreement. The child was never in need of care and protection nor in state care 
in the widest sense. 
6 Summary 
The suggestions made in this chapter try to seek a balance between the child‟s need for 
security and permanency, the recognition of foster parents as psychological parents and the 
rights of birth parents. The paramount consideration is the child‟s welfare. For example, 
where a reunification would be detrimental it should be waived. 
 
Giving foster parents sole guardianship responsibilities supports the establishment of a secure 
base. The child can develop a feeling of belonging. In the case of a permanent placement the 
child often bonds with the caregivers and sees them as psychological parents, especially, 
when placed in early childhood. The proposal is consistent with the principle in s 5(a) of the 
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Care of Children Act: primary responsibility should be with the mother and the father 
figure.
550
 Furthermore, cooperation between remaining guardians would be simplified.
551
 
 
Giving birth parents the opportunity to show their improvement to retrieve their parental 
responsibility recognises their human rights. The new family environment can be secured. 
From a child‟s point of view it is important to create a secure and stable placement. A time 
frame is a possibility to achieve this.  
 
An argument against the approach may be that this will lead to birth parents and child drifting 
even more apart. However, it has to be faced that in the case of a permanent placement 
reunification is almost impossible. Furthermore, depending on the special circumstances of 
every case, there is the possibility for birth parents to have contact with their child. 
 
The just proposed amendments contain the possibility to remove parental guardianship rights 
at an earlier stage compared to the current provisions. As examined, the “grave reasons” test 
is a too high a threshold considering the child as a person and taking into account the child‟s 
welfare. 
B Exceptions 
Granting foster parents sole guardianship means that they receive the legal responsibility to 
care for and bring up a child to the exclusion of someone else. Due to the fact that they are 
not the biological parents and hence do not have the same legal position as birth parents do, 
some decisions may be excluded from their legal responsibility. The court should be able to 
direct the foster parents, for example, regarding religion or cultural issues. 
C Contact 
A different question is the contact between birth parents and child. Removing or suspending 
parental guardianship responsibilities does not take away the possibility of having contact 
with the child. This contact has to be seen independently from the above distinguished cases. 
Rather, contact depends on the child‟s welfare. Where contact with birth parents is 
advantageous, for example, to preserve cultural identity, it should be granted. Duration and 
manner have to be determined from the child‟s point of view to support the child‟s welfare. 
Therefore, it is important to give the child the chance to formulate his or her views about 
contact with birth parents. Moreover, also contact with other family members, especially 
                                               
550  Compare Temple v Barr and Holborn HC Wellington CIV-2010-485-000561, 24 August 2010 at [30]; 
see above chapter V A 2 (b) (i) at 31. 
551
  See the principle in the Care of Children Act, s 5(c). 
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grandparents and siblings should be considered. The relationship to the wider family has to 
be determined, especially in relation to Māori children. 
 
A different question is whether birth parents removed as guardians should be able to obtain 
information about their child. This could be done by direct contact with foster parents or by 
another independent person appointed by the court when it is considered as appropriate 
depending on the parental attitude. 
D Proceedings 
1 Sole guardianship order 
As already examined to remove or suspend parental responsibilities a court order is 
needed.
552
 Birth parents must have the possibility to be heard, to appeal against a decision 
and to be part of a legal proceeding. Therefore, the decision cannot be made by a social 
worker or police. 
2 Challenging court orders 
The court orders made can be challenged. The question is to what extent should birth parents 
or third parties have the opportunity. To secure the placement, intervention from a third party 
should be inhibited as much as possible. The legislation should make it more difficult to vary 
or discharge orders that secure the placement:
553
 
 
It cannot be in the welfare and best interests of children for them to be cut adrift with 
caregivers in a situation where there is a reasonable risk that a stable placement is 
undermined through the actions of family members who may not act with the children‟s 
welfare at heart. 
 
Where the guardianship rights of birth parents are suspended they should be able to show 
their improvement. Therefore, they must be given the right to apply to vary the court order 
within the 18 months period. However, leave of court should have to be obtained. Moreover, 
they must show a change in circumstances and must prove their improvement. In so far as it 
can be said that there is a presumption that parents did not improve over the 18 months 
period, parents should be given the opportunity to adduce evidence to rebut this presumption. 
                                               
552  See above chapter V A 3 (c) (vi) at 53. 
553
  E v G [parenting orders] 2008 NZFLR 337 at [32]. 
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The White Paper also suggests that “a significant change in circumstances before a care order 
could be challenged” has to be shown.554 
 
After the 18 months period parental guardianship rights will be removed due to the fact that 
parents did not improve. Focusing on the child means that the opportunity to challenge court 
orders has to be limited after a certain point in time. Anything else would be detrimental for 
the child‟s welfare. 
 
Where parental guardianship rights are removed, the parents have no possibility to challenge 
this order in order to secure the placement and to give the child a chance to grow up in a safe 
family environment. This may seem harsh, but parents are given the opportunity to change 
themselves and to prove their interest in their child. The same applies to other family 
members. Of course, the intervention in the family relationship should be as narrow as 
possible and the relationship should be supported.
555
 However, the child‟s welfare is the 
paramount consideration.  
 
The 18 months period and the limiting of procedural possibilities to challenge court orders 
contribute to more continuity in the life of the child.
556
 Due to less interruption the child can 
develop psychological attachments to the foster family.
557
 The proposals formulated in the 
Cabinet Paper regarding the Family Court Review are a good step to avoid disruptive 
attempts. Focusing on the welfare of the child, more precisely the dismissal of applications 
which are detrimental for the child‟s welfare, is an appreciated proposal. 
3 Resolving disputes 
In cases of additional guardianship birth parents and new caregiver have to work together. As 
examined, the statutes of New Zealand contain the possibility of obtaining a court direction in 
cases where they cannot agree on a certain matter. However, there is no legal provision to 
enforce the court direction. Therefore, the Act should be amended with a regulation providing 
the possibility to impose a fine where a party does not act according to the court order.  
 
Where there are profound disagreements the court should be able to vary the court order and 
to change the status of foster parents from additional guardians to sole guardians where this is 
necessary to support the child‟s welfare. 
                                               
554  Paula Bennett, Ministry of Social Development “The White Paper for Vulnerable Children” 
(Wellington, 2012) volume II at 125. 
555  See principle in Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act, s 13(b). 
556  See principle in Care of Children Act, s 5(b). As noted, the Family Court Proceedings Reform Bill 
2012 contains regulations to limit court proceedings in amending the Care of Children Act 2004 (see 
clause 27) and the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989 (see clause 80). 
557
  See principle in Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act, s 13(f)(iii). 
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E Support 
Where foster parents are granted sole guardianship responsibilities they should still be able to 
receive financial and other support to secure the upbringing of the child. Foster parents have 
to deal with vulnerable children. They and the child need support no matter what 
guardianship provision defines their relationship. Of course, this support depends on the 
particular circumstances. However, granting sole guardianship cannot be the only reason to 
stop supporting measures. The Home for Life policy, especially, the package may not be 
appropriate due the lack to focus on the individual child. A court should not be constrained 
by a policy; a court should take “seriously its statutory obligation to put in place orders that 
are in fact in the best interests and welfare of the child.” 558  Moreover, in some cases 
psychological support for the child to overcome his or her difficult legacy as well as for the 
foster parents, for example, to remind them of the importance of their role to hold on to their 
relationship with the child may be necessary. 
 
The White Paper contains an intention to support Home for Life parents where birth parents 
attempt to disrupt that placement.
559
 Such support should be available even where foster 
parents do not want to participate in the Home for Life policy. In addition, support should be 
given not only in the case of disruptive attempts as it is proposed in the White Paper. The 
child and foster parents may need also psychological and financial support in cases where the 
birth parents do not try to destabilise the placement. 
F Participation 
Finally, but most importantly, the child‟s views have to be considered. The child must be 
given a say in proceedings regarding his or her future. The obligation to take the views into 
account cannot vary from statute to statute. This has to be unified. Of course, the ability to 
make decisions clear depends on age and maturity. However, this cannot be a reason not to 
listen. The participation rights of the child should be increased and strengthened. 
 
As already examined, an amendment of the statutes can be the anchoring of a presumption of 
competence: adults (birth parents, lawyers, judges…) would have to demonstrate that a child 
is incompetent before the views and wishes can be ignored or overruled. 
                                               
558  PFMB v JJB [services orders] [2012] NZFLR 839 at [17], [16]. 
559  Paula Bennett, Ministry of Social Development “The White Paper for Vulnerable Children” 
(Wellington, 2012) volume II at 125. 
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G Other Changes 
Besides the amendments some other changes should be made. The principles set out in s 5 of 
the Care of Children Act should be applied to define the child‟s welfare even though the case 
is dealt with under the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act.  
 
The wording of the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act should be changed 
where it still uses the terms of possession and access. 
H Summary 
Changing provisions, the child‟s welfare has to be paramount. A secure and stable placement 
with positive and ongoing relationships that feels like a “normal family life” should be the 
long-term goal. Sole guardianship can be a step towards the achievement of this goal. One 
advantage is also that the legal relationship will not be severed as is the case with adoption. 
Therefore, it might be more appropriate taking Māori beliefs into consideration.  
 
To summarise the proposed regulations: 
 
1. Where foster parents care for a child on a permanent basis they should become sole 
guardians: 
a. Where the child is the victim of abuse, parental guardianship rights must be 
removed, and foster parents should become sole guardians. 
b. Where the child is the victim of neglect, parental guardianship rights are 
suspended, and foster parents should become sole guardians. 
c. Where the birth parents cannot care for the child for other reasons, the court can 
chose between additional guardianship and sole guardianship. In the case of sole 
guardianship parental rights are suspended. 
d. Where new caregivers care for the child because of a private agreement, they 
must be given the opportunity to apply for a sole guardianship order. Parental 
guardianship rights are suspended. 
2. Where parental guardianship rights are suspended, birth parents are given the 
opportunity to apply for a variation within the following 18 months. Leave has to be 
granted. Parents have to show their improvement and a change of circumstances. After 
18 months without improvement their rights will be removed. 
3. Birth parents are given the opportunity to apply for a contact order. Contact depends on 
the particular circumstances and the child‟s welfare. 
4. Where a court direction is made to resolve a dispute between additional guardians, the 
court can impose a fine to enforce the direction. 
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5. The participation rights of the child have to be strengthened. The child must have a say 
in proceedings. 
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VIII Final Conclusion 
Every child has the right to grow up in a loving family. Where the birth parents are not able 
to provide this familial environment the child is placed with new caregivers. Even in this 
placement the child should experience the feeling of belonging and development of 
personality and be respected as a full member of the family. Unfortunately, these placements 
are often jeopardised because of disruptive attempts from birth parents and insufficient legal 
security. To increase stability and security the Ministry of Social Development launched the 
White Paper for Vulnerable Children which indicates an intention to introduce new 
guardianship orders. Unfortunately, the White Paper lacks detail. It is intended to curtail 
parental guardianship powers, but a consideration of the legal consequences, especially for 
birth parents, is missing as well as procedural rights, for example. Therefore, this dissertation 
has sought to fill the gap in proposing amendments in order to secure the permanent 
placement. 
 
In placing a clear and profound emphasis on the child, the welfare of the child has to be the 
paramount consideration. To provide a secure base for the child to grow up and develop, sole 
guardianship responsibilities should be given to permanent foster parents. The legal 
consequences depend on the actual reasons why a child entered foster care. Distinctions have 
to be made between child abuse and parental mental illness, for example. Furthermore, 
suggestions are made regarding court proceedings, and the child must be given participation 
rights in every proceeding. 
 
Giving foster parents sole guardianship to the exclusion of anybody else may secure the 
permanent placement for the benefit of the child due to the fact of clear responsibility. Why 
should foster parents become sole guardians? For the same reasons birth parents are: They 
fulfil the parental role. The relationship between them and the child has to be protected from 
outside interference. This fastens the responsibility to care for the child on them.
560
 
 
Even where the emphasis is placed on the child, the rights of the birth parents have to be 
considered. Therefore, birth parents are given the opportunity – except in cases of abuse – to 
get their responsibilities back. Where they fail to improve the child must be given the chance 
to experience a family life without interruptions with the new caregivers, who may already 
have become “mum and dad”. 
                                               
560  Compare Judge Inglis QC in Neho v Duncan [1994] NZFLR 157 at 160; see above chapter V A 2 (c) 
(ii) at 37. 
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X Glossary of Māori Terms 
Hapū kinship group, clan, tribe, sub-tribe 
Iwi extended kinship group, tribe; often refers to a large group of people 
descended from a common ancestor 
Pākehā New Zealander of European descent 
Taonga treasure, anything prized; applied to anything considered to be of value 
Whakapapa genealogy, genealogical table, lineage, descent 
Whānau extended family, family group 
Whāngai to feed, to bring up, foster; foster child, adopted child; it is a customary 
practice 
 
Source: Te Aka, Māori-English, English-Māori Dictionary (online ed) <www.maoridictionary.co.nz>. 
